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ABSTRACT
PRIVATE AND FEDERATED DEEP LEARNING:
SYSTEM, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL GOOD
by
Han Hu
During the past decade, drug abuse continues to accelerate towards becoming the most
severe public health problem in the United States. The ability to detect drugabuse risk
behavior at a population scale, such as among the population of Twitter users, can help to
monitor the trend of drugabuse incidents. However, traditional methods do not effectively
detect drugabuse risk behavior in tweets, mainly due to the sparsity of such tweets and
the noisy nature of tweets. In the first part of this dissertation work, the task of classifying
tweets as containing drugabuse risk behavior or not, is studied. Millions of public tweets
were collected through the Twitter API, and a large human labeled dataset with both expert
labels and crowdsourced (through the Amazon Mechanical Turks) labels was built. Three
papers on this topic were published: The first work leveraged large quantities of unlabeled
tweets with selftaught deep learning (DL); In the second work, the method of mitigating
the imbalance of tweets’ classes through the ensemble of DL models was proposed. Results
on the testing dataset showed improved performance over traditional and recent methods.
Statistical analysis on the results of applying the model on 3million tweets also yield
interesting and meaningful results. Based on the detection model, a demo system was built,
which allows the geographical and various statistical information of drug abuse indication
tweets to be viewed on live interactive maps.
The development of the drug abuse detection models revealed the importance of
privacy preservation in DL. Related works have demonstrated that the privacy of the
training data of a DL model can be exploited through either reconstruction attack or
membershipinference attack. Thus, due to the sensitive nature of the drug abuse detection
model, the privacy of the training data has to be rigorously protected before the model can be

made public. The goal of the first work in this direction was to develop a novel mechanism
for preserving differential privacy (DP), such that the privacy budget consumption is
independent of the training steps and grants the ability to adaptively inject noise according
to the importance of features to improve the model utility. Then, in the second work, the aim
was to develop a scalable DP preserving algorithm for deep neural networks, with certified
robustness to adversarial examples. The robustness bound was strengthened by a novel
adversarial objective function, and by injecting noise into both input and latent space. For
the first time, a novel stochastic batch training that allows the training of the DP models to
be parallelized, was proposed. In the third work along this line, the goal was to preserve
DP in the setting of lifelong learning (L2M), given the more challenging privacy risk that
the L2M posts. A scalable and heterogeneous algorithm was proposed and implemented,
which allows the efficient training and the continuous releasing of new versions of L2M
models without affecting the DP protection.
Despite that DPDL can provide provable privacy protection, another aspect of
privacy protection is to protect the data itself. In the foreseeable future, more rigorous
data privacy regulations will be widely implemented, which promotes the use of federated
learning (FL). In the third part of the dissertation work, the FLSys, a prototype mobilecloud
federated deep learning system was designed and implemented. By utilizing modern cloud
architecture, the FLSys is designed to achieve energy efficiency, tolerance failure tolerance,
and scalability. To demonstrate the capability of the FLSys, the task of mobile human
activity recognition, which aims at predicting human activities with smartphone sensors,
was selected. For model developing purpose, two data collection campaigns were launched
to collect human activity data through smartphone sensors in the wild from hundreds of
volunteers. A simple yet effective way of data augmentation to combat the nonI.I.D
(Independent and Identically Distributed) issue that plagues FL was proposed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview
In this dissertation, a series of work on three distinctive yet interconnected fields will be
presented. In the first part of the dissertation, our aim is to provide an improved method
of monitoring the ongoing drug abuse epidemic through the lens of online social media,
utilizing the stateoftheart AI techniques. In the first work, we demonstrate the feasibility
and the improved performance of a trained neural networks in identifying tweets, a type of
short posts on the online social media platform Twitter, that contains drug abuserelated
contents. The training data is constructed by manually identifying tweets, which are
automatically cultivated with drug abuserelated keywords, with drug abuse contents. Then
in the second work, we provide improved detection model that utilizes the large quantity of
unlabeled tweets through selftraining mechanism. In addition, we run the trained detection
model on a large quantity of tweets (i.e., 3 million tweets) and preformed quantitative and
qualitative analysis over the detection results. The analysis not only shows that the detection
model is effective, but also reveals interesting properties that were not explored by previous
work. Given the fact that a significant portion of tweets are geotagged, it makes sense
to explore the analysis results in conjunction with their geographical proprieties. Aiming
to extend the impact of this study, and to provide a tool for inspecting the geographical
proprieties of the monitoring results in a visual and interactive way, we implement and
demonstrate a webbased data visualization tool in the third work.
The great potential of monitoring the drug abuse epidemic through online social media
is explored and demonstrated in the first part of this dissertation. However, a significant
roadblock of privacy issue prevents the work to be wildly and openly adopted. With
the modern standard of privacy, any model to be released that is trained with private or

1

individually identifiable data, has to employ strict privacy protection methods. Given the
individual identifiable nature of tweets and the sensitive nature of the drug abuserelated
topic, strict and rigorous privacy protection will be required for the work in the first part.
Thus, in the second part of this dissertation, we switch the course to the developing of
more advanced privacy protection methods for deep learning. Our aim here is to advance
both the empirical and theoretical aspects of the differential privacy (DP) mechanism, a
promising privacy protection mechanism that is originated from the field of database but is
quickly found its place in deep learning. Three pieces of work are presented in this part of
the dissertation. In the fourth work, we propose a novel Adaptive Laplace Mechanism
(AdLM) for differential privacy protection in deep learning. Two key features set the
AdLM apart from existing mechanism: (1) The privacy budget consumed by AdLM is
totally independent of the number of training epochs; and (2) The amount of noise that
the AdLM injects to different weight depends on the importance of that weight. These
features mean that the model will be able to have better utility while having the same level
of privacy protection, when compared with existing methods. Then, in the fifth work, we
propose a more advanced DP mechanism that: (1) Works together with adversarial training
and addresses the previously unattended aspect of DP; (2) The provided DP protection is
bounded with certified robustness; and (3) Allows fully parallelized training of DP deep
learning models. And in the sixth work, we propose novel DP mechanism for Lifelong
Learning (L2M). L2M has great potential to be used in the drug abuse detection tasks in
order to capture the ever changing trends and expressions of drug abuserelated topics.
Here is yet another privacy protection method that has great potential, the Federated
Learning (FL). FL means to train the models at where the data is collected. In the mobile
computing setting as an example, it means to use the data collected on each smartphone,
and the ever growing mobile computation power, to jointly train a model, instead of
uploading the collected data and conducting centralized training. Sharing gradients or
model parameters that can be protected by DP further protects privacy of each user. When
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the epidemic of COVID19 hits, we were presented an unique opportunity to conduct
a study that collects sensor data from smartphones for studying human behaviors and
mental health. We also see this study an opportunity to pursue better privacy protection
techniques by working on FL, in conjunction with DP. Thus, we step into the track of
FL and make our first work in the field. In this work, we propose and implemented a
prototype FL framework, which is a first working prototype in the literature that employs
applicationsystem codesign approach. Differ from existing proprietary FL system of the
Gboard (Google’s keyboard app), our design propose an architecture with the following
three aims: (1) To provide easy integration of FL with a wide variety of apps, by sharing the
FL framework among different apps that want to use FL; (2) To provide low overhead and
high efficiency for having many FL models coexist on one smartphone; and (3) To provide
users a place to see and to control the behaviors of different FL models, with unified user
experiences.
Thus, this dissertation consists of the aforementioned three tracks. The following
introductions will give detailed introduction, background, related works, and contribution
of each individual work.

1.2
1.2.1

Drug Abuse Detection and Analysis in Online Social Media

Background

Misuse and abuse of prescription drugs and of illicit drugs have been major public health
problems in the United States for decades. A “Public Health Emergency”declared in
2017 [1] and several official surveys [2] all show that the problem has been getting worse
in recent years. For example, the most recent reports from the National Survey on Drug
Use and Health (NSDUH) [2] estimate that 10.6% of the total population of people ages 12
years and older (i.e., about 28.6 million people) have misused illicit drugs in 2016, which
represents an increase of 0.5% over 2015. According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), opioid drugs were involved in 42,249 known deaths in 2016 nationwide

3

[3]. In addition, the number of heroinrelated deaths has been increasing sharply over five
years and has surpassed the number of firearm homicides in 2015 [4]. The emerging new
problems, such as the epidemic of illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF) [5], marijuana
related traffic accidents [6], and marijuana use among adolescents [7] are posing further
increasing threats to public health.
In April 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services announced their
“Opioid Strategy” to battle the country’s drug abuse crisis [1]. In the Opioid Strategy, one of
the major aims is to strengthen public health data collection, in order to inform a timeliness
public health response as the epidemic evolves. Given its 100 million daily active users and
500 million daily tweets [8] (messages posted by Twitter users), Twitter has been used as
a sufficient and reliable data source for many detection tasks, including epidemiology [9]
and public health [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15], at the population scale, in a realtime manner.
Motivated by these facts and the urgent needs, our goal in this dissertation is to develop
a largescale computational system to detect drug abuse risk behaviors via Twitter sphere.
Twitter is a popular social media platform that has 100 million daily active users and 500
million daily tweets [8] (messages posted by Twitter users), most of which are publicly
accessible, on a wide range of topics.
Several studies [12, 16, 17, 18, 15, 19] have explored the detection of prescription
drug abuse on Twitter. Still, the current stateoftheart approaches and systems are limited
in terms of scales and accuracy. They typically applied keywordbased approaches to
collect tweets explicitly mentioning specific drug names, such as Adderall, Oxycodone,
Quetiapine, Metformin, Cocaine, marijuana, weed, meth, tranquilizer, etc. [12, 17, 15, 19].
However, that may not reflect the actual distribution of drug abuse risk behaviors on online
social media, since: (1) The expressions of drug abuse risk behaviors are often vague,
in comparison to common topics, i.e., a lot of slang is used; and (2) Relying on only
keywordbased approaches is susceptible to lexical ambiguity in natural language [14].
In addition, the drug abuse risk behavior Twitter data is very imbalanced, i.e., dominated
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by nondrug abuse risk behavior tweets, such as drugrelated news, social discussions,
reports, advertisements, etc. The limited availability of annotated tweets makes it even
more challenging to distinguish drug abuse risk behaviors from drugrelated tweets. Yet,
existing approaches [12, 17, 15, 19] have not been designed to address these challenging
issues for drug abuse risk behavior detection on online social media.

1.2.2

Traditional Drug Abuse Monitoring Systems

Traditionally, drug abuse activities and trends are monitored through both largescale
surveys, such as NSDUH [2] and the Monitoring the Future project [20]; and reporting
systems, such as the FDA MedWatch program [21], the National Poisoning Data System
[22], the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) [23]. The results derived from these
surveys [24], clearly show that there is an epidemic of drug abuse across the United States.
Generally these systems and surveys are considered as trustworthy sources for getting the
general picture of the drug abuse epidemic. Nonetheless, a recent report [25] states that
the estimated number of deaths due to prescription drugs could be inflated due to the
difficulties in determining whether a drug is obtained by prescription or not. We assert that
the ambiguities highlighted in this new report raise questions about the reliability of the
earlier surveys, and thus, such a report illustrates the potential value of social mediabased
studies.

1.2.3

Social MediaBased Analytical Studies

In recent years, increasing number of studies utilize online social media data to find trends,
preform estimations, and conduct mass monitoring. Many of the existing studies were
focusing on the quantitative analysis utilizing data from online social media. Several studies
found positive correlations between Twitter data and real world data. Chary et al. [26]
performed semantic analysis on 3.6 million tweets with 5% labeled and found significant
agreement with the NSDUH data. Hanson et al. [17] conducted a quantitative analysis
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on 213,633 tweets discussing Adderall, and found positive geotemporal correlations.
Another study from their team [16] focused on how possible drugabusers interact with
and influence others in online social circles. The results showed that strong correlation
could be found: (1) Between the amount of interaction about prescription drugs and a level
of abusiveness shown by the network; and (2) Between the types of drugs mentioned by the
index user and his or her network. Shutler et al. [19] performed a qualitative analysis of six
prescription opioids, i.e., Percocet, Percs, OxyContin, Oxys, Vicodin, and Hydros. Tweets
were collected with exact word matching and manual classification. Their primary goal was
to identify the key terms used in tweets that likely indicate drug abuse. They found that the
use of Oxys, Percs and OxyContin was common among the tweets where there were positive
indications of abuse. Meng et al. [27] used traditional text and sentiment analysis methods
to investigate substance use patterns and underage use of substance, and the association
between demographic data and these patterns. Ding et al. [28] investigated the correlation
between substance (tobacco, alcohol, and drug) use disorders and words in Facebook users’
“Status Updates” and “Likes”. Their results showing word patterns are different between
users who have substance us disorder and users who do not have. McNaughton et al. [18]
measured online endorsement of prescription opioid abuse by developing an integrative
metric through the lens of Internet communities. Simpson et al. [29] demonstrated an
attempt to identify emerging drug terms using NLP techniques. Furthermore, Twitter and
social media have been shown to be reliable sources in analyzing drug abuse and public
healthrelated topics, such as cigarette smoking [10, 14], alcohol use [13], and even cardiac
arrest [11].

1.2.4

Studies Utilizing Social Media Data for Classification Tasks

There also have been studies that focused on designing machine learning models to
preform classification on online social media posts. Katsuki et al. [30] trained SVM
on a dataset of 1,000 tweets for classification of tweets for relevance and favorability of
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online drug sales. Coloma et al. [31] illustrated the potential of social media in drug
safety surveillance with two case studies multiple online social media platforms. Sarker
et al. [15] proposed a supervised classification model, in which different features such
as ngrams, abuseindicating terms, slang terms, synonyms, etc., were extracted from
manually annotated tweets. Then, these features were used to train traditional machine
learning models to classify drug abuse tweets and nonabuse tweets. Recently, many work,
including one of our work [32], explored the use of more advanced deep learning models
for drugrelated classification tasks on online social media. Following our work, Kong et
al. [33] proposed deep learning model that utilizes geographical prior information as input
features. Chary et al. [12] discussed how to use AI models to extract content useful for
purposes of toxicovigilance from social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+.
Weissenbacher et al. [34] proposed deep neural network based model to detect drug name
mentions in tweets. Mahata et al. [35] proposed an ensemble CNN model to classify tweets
from three classes, i.e., personal medication intakes, possible personal medication intake,
and nonintake. Work have also been done in perspectives other than contentbased analysis
and classification. Zhang et al. [36] proposed a complex schema, which models all possible
interactions between users and posts, for automatic detection of drug abusers on Twitter. Li
et al. [37] evaluated deep learning models against traditional machine learning models on
the task of detecting illicit drug dealers on Instagram.

1.2.5

In Attempt to Scale the Models Up

Although existing studies have shown promising approaches toward the detecting of drug
related posts and information on popular online social media platforms, such as Twitter
and Instagram, their limitations can be identified as: (1) Limited in scale, as the methods
proposed in many studies do not scale well, or rely on larger manually annotated training
dataset for higher performance; (2) Limited in scope, as most studies focus on a small
group of drugs; and (3) Limited in performance, as many methods use traditional machine
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learning models. In this dissertation, we propose a novel deep selftaught learning system
to leverage a huge number of unlabeled tweets. Selftaught learning [38] is a method that
integrated the concepts of semisupervised and multitask learning, in which the model
can exploit examples that are unlabeled and possibly come from a distribution different
from the target distribution. It has already been shown that deep neural networks can take
advantage of unsupervised learning and unlabeled examples [39, 40]. Different from other
approaches mainly designed for image processing and object detection [41, 42, 43, 44], our
deep selflearning model shows the ability to detect drug abuse risk behavior given noisy
and sparse Twitter data with a limited availability of annotated tweets.

1.2.6

In Need of an Realtime User Interface for Monitoring Online Social Media
Drug Abuse Data

Even though drug abuse has reached epidemic proportions [3], there still lacks tools and
means to prevent drug abuse epidemics effectively, especially for local communities and
organizations, who are at the front and center of the fight. Several wellknown resources
have been developed for toxicovigilance monitoring include the National Poisoning Data
System [22], the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the Drug Abuse Warning Network
[23] and the MedWatch program [21]. These existing systems usually provide statistical
data in the typical yearly fashion, which does not offer adequate information about drug
abuse activities in a timely manner. This leads to difficulty in managing available resources
and efforts (e.g., antidotes, recovery education, etc.), and to challenges in policymaking
towards achieving best practices in prevention and recovery.
In addition, the prevalent usage of social network sites, mobile apps, forums, and the
internet marketplace, has increasingly been recognized as a major factor in the spread of
drug abuse epidemics [45]. Social media apps and the internet also make the purchase of
illegal drugs more convenient; access to drugs can be just a few keystrokes away [46]. As
both the exchange of information and the obtaining of drugs become easier and faster, the
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drug use trends become more volatile, diversified, and potentially lethal. Increasingly, one
drug can result in damage, even loss of lives in a short time window (a few hours/days) [46].
It is an urgent demand to detect and monitor drug abuse activities on online social media.

1.2.7

Contributions in this Dissertation

In this chapter, we present work from three papers along the topic of drug abuse detection
through online social media.
In the first part, we propose an ensemble of two types of deep learningbased methods
as better options, among classifiers, for situations in which the collected data is inevitably
imbalanced, because they are more robust than traditional machine learning models. Our
ensemble deep learning model combines wordlevel CNN models and characterlevel CNN
models to perform classification. We compare our models with baseline models on a dataset
we collected, where we can configure the class distribution of positive versus negative
tweets in the training data and test data. By changing the percentage of positively and
negatively labeled data in the dataset, we can simulate the imbalanced datasets that were
collected by different means. We validate the performance of different models in a variety
of settings to get a clearer picture of how imbalanced data affect classification performance.
In the second part, to address the aforementioned challenges of the noisiness of the
Tweet data and the lack of labeled Tweet data, our main contributions are to propose:
(1) A largescale drug abuse risk behavior tweets collection mechanism based on supervised
machine learning and data crowdsourcing techniques; and (2) A deep selftaught learning
algorithm for drug abuse risk behavior detection. We first collect tweets through a filter,
in which a variety of drug names, colloquialisms and slang terms, and abuseindicating
terms (e.g., overdose, addiction, high, abuse, and even death) are combined together. We
manually annotate a small number of tweets as seed tweets, which are used to train machine
learning classifiers. Then, the classifiers are applied to large number of unlabeled tweets
to produce machinelabeled tweets. The machinelabeled tweets are verified again by

9

humans on Mechanical Turk, i.e., a crowdsourcing platform, with good accuracy but at
a much lower cost. The new labeled tweets and the seed tweets are combined to form a
sufficient and reliable labeled data set for drug abuse risk behavior detection by applying
deep learning models, i.e., convolution neural networks (CNN) [47] and longshort term
memory (LSTM) models [48]. Then, we propose a selftaught learning algorithm, in which
the training data of our deep selftaught learning models will be recursively augmented
with a set of new machinelabeled tweets. These machinelabeled tweets are generated by
applying the previously trained deep learning models to a random sample of a huge number
of unlabeled tweets. Based on our pervious work [49], we extended the analysis of the
classification results from our three million tweets dataset. We apply the proposed model
to our geolocationtagged dataset to acquire classification results for analysis. Results from
the analysis show that the drug abuse risk behaviorpositive tweets have distinctive patterns
of words, hashtags, drug namebehavior cooccurrence, timeofday distribution and spatial
distribution, compared with other tweets. These results show that our approach is highly
effective in detecting drug abuse risk behaviors.
Then in the third part of this chapter, we develop a communityfocused drug abuse
monitoring and supporting system, called DrugTracker, using social media and geospatial
data to provide local communities and organizations with the tools and capabilities to
identify and understand the specific needs of drug misusers and/or abusers in near realtime.
A such system will have crucial benefits to connect local communities and organizations
with individuals and families, who are struggling with drug abuse, towards a better
prevention and recovery outcome. In our system, welltrained deep learning models are
integrated into the data collection process to detect tweets that contain drug abuse risk
behaviors. Then endusers can operate the webbased interactive monitoring interface
to browse the collected data in a spatialtemporal context in order to acquire insightful
patterns about drug abuse risk behaviors. Our system is available on GitHub: https:
//github.com/hu7han73/DrugVis.
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1.3
1.3.1

Differential Privacy in Deep Learning with Certified Robustness Bounds
Background

Today, deep learning has become the tool of choice in many areas of engineering, such
as autonomous systems, signal and information processing, and data analytics. Deep
learning systems are, therefore, not only applied in classic settings, such as speech and
handwriting recognition, but also progressively operate at the core of security and privacy
critical applications.
For instance, selfdriving cars make use of deep learning for recognizing objects and
street signs [50]. Detection systems for email spam integrate learning methods for analyzing
data more effectively [51]. Furthermore, deep learning has applications in a number of
healthcare areas, e.g., phenotype extraction and health risk prediction [52], prediction of the
development of various diseases, including schizophrenia, cancers, diabetes, heart failure,
etc. [53], and many more. This presents an obvious threat to privacy in new deep learning
systems which are being deployed. Yet, there are only a few scientific studies in preserving
privacy in deep learning.
Lifelong learning (L2M) is crucial for machine learning to acquire new skills through
continual learning, pushing machine learning toward a more human learning in reality.
Given a stream of different tasks and data, a deep neural network (DNN) can quickly
learn a new task, by leveraging the acquired knowledge after learning previous tasks, under
constraints in terms of the amount of computing and memory required [54]. As a result, it
is quite challenging to train an L2M model with a high utility.

1.3.2

Privacy Protection in Deep Learning

In the past few decades, a subject of significant interest has been how to release the
sensitive results of statistical analyses and data mining, while still protecting privacy. One
stateoftheart privacy model is ϵdifferential privacy [55], which ensures that the adversary
cannot infer any information about any specific record with high confidence (controlled
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by a privacy budget) from the released learning models, even if all the remaining tuples
of the sensitive data are possessed by the adversary. The privacy budget controls the
amount by which the output distributions induced by two neighboring datasets may differ:
A smaller privacy budget value enforces a stronger privacy guarantee. Differential privacy
research has been studied from both theoretical and application perspectives [56, 57]. The
mechanisms of achieving differential privacy mainly include adding Laplace noise [55], the
exponential mechanism [58], and the functional perturbation method [56].
It is significant and timely to combine differential privacy and deep learning, i.e.,
the two stateoftheart techniques in privacy preserving and machine learning. However,
this is a challenging task, and only a few scientific studies have been conducted. In [59],
Shokri and Shmatikov proposed a distributed training method, which injects noise into
“gradients” of parameters, to preserve privacy in neural networks. In this method, the
magnitude of injected noise and the privacy budget ϵ are accumulated in proportion to the
number of training epochs and the number of shared parameters. Thus, it may consume an
unnecessarily large portion of the privacy budget, as the number of training epochs and the
number of shared parameters among multiple parties are often large [60].
To improve this, based on the composition theorem [61], Abadi et al. [62] proposed a
privacy accountant, which keeps track of privacy spending and enforces applicable privacy
policies. However, the approach is still dependent on the number of training epochs, as it
introduces noise into “gradients” of parameters in every training step. With a small privacy
budget ϵ, only a small number of epochs can be used to train the model [62]. In practice,
that could potentially affect the model utility, when the number of training epochs needs to
be large to guarantee the model accuracy.
A recent approach towards differentially private deep neural networks was explored
by Phan et al. [60]. This work proposed deep private autoencoders (dPAs), in which
differential privacy is enforced by perturbing the crossentropy errors in autoencoders [39].
Their algorithm was designed particularly for autoencoders, in which specific objective
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functions are applied. A different method, named CryptoNets, was proposed in [63]
towards the application of neural networks to encrypted data. A data owner can send their
encrypted data to a cloud service that hosts the network, and get encrypted predictions in
return. This method is different from our context, since it does not aim at releasing learning
models under privacy protections.

1.3.3

Privacy Protection with Adversarial Defence

The pervasiveness of machine learning exposes new vulnerabilities in software systems, in
which deployed machine learning models can be used (a) to reveal sensitive information in
private training data [64], and/or (b) to make the models misclassify, such as adversarial
examples [65]. Efforts to prevent such attacks typically seek one of three solutions:
(1) Models which preserve differential privacy (DP) [55], a rigorous formulation of privacy
in probabilistic terms; (2) Adversarial training algorithms, which augment training data to
consist of benign examples and adversarial examples crafted during the training process,
thereby empirically increasing the classification accuracy given adversarial examples
[66, 67]; and (3) Certified robustness, in which the model classification given adversarial
examples is theoretically guaranteed to be consistent, i.e., a small perturbation in the input
does not change the predicted label [68, 69, 70].
On the one hand, private models, trained with existing privacypreserving mechanisms
[62, 59, 60, 71, 72, 73, 74], are unshielded under adversarial examples. On the other hand,
robust models, trained with adversarial learning (with or without certified robustness to
adversarial examples), do not offer privacy protections to the training data [75]. That
onesided approach poses serious risks to machine learningbased systems; since adver
saries can attack a deployed model by using both privacy inference attacks and adversarial
examples. To be safe, a model must be i) private to protect the training data, and ii) robust
to adversarial examples. Unfortunately, there still lacks of study on how to develop such a
model, which thus remains a largely open challenge [76].
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Simply combining existing DPpreserving mechanisms and certified robustness
conditions [68, 69, 77] cannot solve the problem, for many reasons. (a) Existing sensitivity
bounds [60, 71, 72] and designs [73, 74, 76, 78, 79] have not been developed to protect
the training data in adversarial training. It is obvious that using adversarial examples
crafted from the private training data to train our models introduces a previously unknown
privacy risk, disclosing the participation of the benign examples [75]. (b) There is an
unrevealed interplay among DP preservation, adversarial learning, and robustness bounds.
(c) Existing algorithms cannot be readily applied to address the tradeoff among model
utility, privacy loss, and robustness. (d) It is challenging in applying existing algorithms to
train large DNNs given large data (i.e., scalability); since, they employ the vanilla iterative
batchbybatch training, in which only a single batch of data instances can be used at each
training step, such that the privacy loss can be estimated [74, 76, 73, 78, 79]. That prevents
us from applying scalable methods, e.g., distributed adversarial training [80], to achieve
the same level of DP on large DNNs and datasets. Therefore, bounding the robustness of a
model (which both protects the privacy and is robust against adversarial examples) at scale
is nontrivial.

1.3.4

Privacy Protection in Lifelong Learning

Orthogonal to the difficulties, L2M models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, i.e.,
privacy model attacks [81, 64, 82, 81, 83], when DNNs are trained on highly sensitive
data, e.g., clinical records [53, 84], user profiles [85, 86], and medical images [87, 88].
In practice, the privacy risk will be more significant since an adversary can observe
multiple versions of an L2M model released after training on each task. Different versions
of the model parameters can be considered as an additional information leakage, compared
with a model trained on a single task (shown in Theorem 3.7). Memorizing previous
tasks while learning new tasks further exposes private information in the training set, by
continuously accessing the data from the previously learned tasks (i.e., data stored in an
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episodic memory [54, 89, 90, 91, 92]); or accessing adversarial examples produced from
generative memories to imitate real examples of past tasks [93, 94, 95]. Unfortunately, there
is a lack of study offering privacy protection to the private training data in L2M.
To address this problem, we propose to preserve differential privacy (DP) [55],
a rigorous formulation of privacy in probabilistic terms, in L2M. Applying existing
DPpreserving mechanisms in deep learning [60, 96, 62, 59, 73, 74, 97], which have not
been designed for L2M, cannot solve the problem, for many reasons. Compared with
single trained models: (1) The continual learning and memorizing process consumes a large
privacy budget, since the privacy loss can be accumulated in both learning and memorizing
across tasks; (2) The growing of the episodic memory after each training task (i.e., by adding
data into the episodic memory) makes it hard to bound the privacy budget; (3) Releasing one
version of an L2M model will cause additional privacy risk in learning a new task or training
on new data of past tasks; and (4) The difference in terms of data sizes, i.e., heterogeneity,
among tasks introduces a challenge in addressing the tradeoff between privacy protection
and model utility, since i) different tasks requires different numbers of training steps, and
ii) tasks can be trained in different orders. Both factors can affect DP protection (Equation
(3.80), Theorem 3.7). These issues prevent us from training and releasing L2M models
on streaming tasks and data, under DP protection. Thus, preserving DP in L2M remains a
largely open challenge.

1.3.5

Contribution in this Dissertation

Our contribution in this dissertation is threefold.
Contribution to the Basic Differential Privacy Mechanism There is an urgent demand
for the development of a privacy preserving mechanism, such that: (1) It is totally
independent of the number of training epochs in consuming privacy budget; (2) It has the
ability to adaptively inject noise into features based on the contribution of each to the model
output; and (3) It can be applied in a variety of deep neural networks. Mechanisms with
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such characteristics will significantly enhance the operation of privacy preservation in deep
learning.
Motivated by this, we develop a novel mechanism, which is called Adaptive Laplace
Mechanism (AdLM), to preserve differential privacy in deep learning. Our idea is to
intentionally add “more noise” into features which are “less relevant” to the model output,
and viceversa. To achieve that, we inject Laplace noise into the computation of Layerwise
Relevance Propagation (LRP) [98] to estimate a differentially private relevance of each
input feature to the model output. Given the perturbed features, we figure out a novel way
to distribute adaptive noise into affine transformations and loss functions used in deep neural
networks as a preprocessing step, so that preserving differential privacy is feasible. As a
result, we expect to improve the utility of deep neural networks under ϵdifferential privacy.
It is worth noting that our mechanism does not access the original data again in the training
phase. Theoretical analysis derives the sensitivities and error bounds of our mechanism,
and shows that they are totally independent of the number of epochs.
Different from [62, 59], in our mechanism, the injected noise and the privacy budget
consumption do not accumulate in each training step. Consequently, the privacy budget
consumption in our mechanism is totally independent of the number of training epochs. In
addition, different from [60], our mechanism can be applied in a variety of deep learning
networks with different activation functions. Convolution neural networks (CNNs) [47] are
used as an example to validate the effectiveness of our mechanism. Rigorous experiments
conducted on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets [99] show that our mechanism is effective
and outperforms existing solutions.

Contribution to the Scalable Differential Privacy Mechanism Motivated by the open
problem of differential privacy with adversarial learning, we develop a novel stochastic
batch (StoBatch) mechanism to: 1) preserve DP of the training data, 2) be provably and
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practically robust to adversarial examples, 3) retain high model utility, and 4) be scalable
to large DNNs and datasets.
In StoBatch, privacypreserving noise is injected into inputs and hidden layers to
achieve DP in learning private model parameters (Theorem 3.2). Then, we incorporate
ensemble adversarial learning into our mechanism to improve the decision boundary under
DP protections, by introducing a concept of DP adversarial examples crafted using benign
examples in the private training data (Equation (3.49)). To address the tradeoff between
model utility and privacy loss, we propose a new DP adversarial objective function to
tighten the model’s global sensitivity (Theorem 3.4); thus, we reduce the amount of noise
injected into our function, compared with existing work [60, 71, 72]. An endtoend privacy
analysis shows that, by slitting the private training data into disjoint and fixed batches
across epochs, the privacy budget in our StoBatch is not accumulated across gradient
descentbased training steps (Theorems 3.4, 3.5).
After preserving DP in learning model parameters, we establish a new connection
between DP preservation in adversarial learning and certified robustness. Noise injected
into different layers is considered as a sequence of randomizing mechanisms, providing
different levels of robustness. By leveraging the sequential composition theory in DP
[100], we derive a generalized robustness bound, which is a composition of these levels
of robustness in both input and latent spaces (Theorem 3.6 and Corollary 3.1), compared
with only in the input space [70] or only in the latent space [101].
To bypass the iterative batchbybatch training, we develop a stochastic batch
training. In our algorithm, disjoint and fixed batches are distributed to local trainers, each
of which learns DP parameters given its local data batches. A synchronous scheme can be
leveraged to aggregate gradients observed from local trainers; thus enabling us to efficiently
compute adversarial examples from multiple data batches at each iteration. This allows us
to scale our mechanism to large DNNs and datasets, under the same DP guarantee. Rigorous
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experiments conducted on MNIST, CIFAR10 [47, 99], and [102] datasets show that our
mechanism notably enhances the robustness and scalability of DP DNNs.

Contribution to the Differential Privacy in Lifelong Learning Motivated by the
problem in L2M, we introduce a new definition of lifelong differential privacy (Lifelong
DP), in which the participation of any data tuple in any tasks is protected under a consistently
bounded DP guarantee, given the released parameters in both learning new tasks and
memorizing previous tasks (Definition 3.5). This is significant, by allowing us to train
and release new versions of an L2M model, given a stream of tasks and data, under DP
protection.
Based upon this, we propose a novel algorithm, denoted as L2DPML, to preserve
Lifelong DP. In L2DPML, privacypreserving noise is injected into inputs and hidden
layers to achieve DP in learning private model parameters in each task (Algorithm 3.6).
Then, we configure the episodic memory as a stream of fixed and disjoint batches of
data (Algorithm 3.7), to efficiently achieve Lifelong DP (Theorem 3.8). The previous
task memorizing constraint is solved, by inheriting the recipe of the wellknown Agem
algorithm [54], under Lifelong DP. To our knowledge, our study establishes the first formal
connection between DP preservation and L2M compared with existing work of DP in L2M
[103, 104], in which there is a lack of a concrete definition of adjacent databases with unclear
or not welljustified DP protection.
Rigorous experiments, conducted on permuted MNIST, permuted CIFAR10 datasets
[105], and an L2M task on our collected dataset for human activity recognition in the wild
show promising results in preserving DP in L2M. Lifelong DP opens a longterm avenue
to achieve better model utility with lower computational cost under DP protection in L2M.
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1.4
1.4.1

Federated Learning on Mobile Devices

Background

Federated Learning (FL) [106] has the potential to bring deep learning (DL) on mobile
devices, while preserving user privacy during model training. FL balances model perfor
mance and user privacy through three design features. First, each device trains a local
model on its raw data. Second, the gradients of the local models from multiple users
are sent to a server for aggregation to compute a global model that is more accurate than
individual local models. Third, the server shares the global model with all users. During
this federated training, the raw data from individual users never leave their devices. A
wide range of mobile apps, e.g., predicting or classifying health conditions based on mobile
sensing data, can benefit from running DL models on smart phones using FL, which offers
privacypreserving global training that incentivizes user participation.
Despite progress on theoretical aspects and algorithm/model design for FL [107, 108,
109, 110, 111], the lack of a publicly available FL system has precluded the widespread
adoption of FL models on smart phones, despite the potential of such models to apply DL on
mobile [sensing] data, in a privacypreserving manner, for novel mobile apps. Furthermore,
this has also limited our understanding of how realworld applications can benefit from
FL. To the best of our knowledge, the only existing FL systems are either unavailable
for the research and practice communities (e.g., Google [106], FedVision [112]), under
development [113], or do not support mobile devices [114]. Most of the existing FL
studies are based on simulations [115, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111], which may lead to an
oversimplified view of the applicability of FL models in realworld. In the meantime,
although demonstrated in several scenarios such as keyboard typing prediction [116], FL
lacks realworld applications, which can drive the design of FL systems. Indeed, realworld
benchmarks for FL are pivotal to help shape the developments of FL systems [117].
In this work, we take a unique applicationsystem codesign approach to design,
build, and evaluate an FL system. Our system design is informed by a critical mobile
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app: human activity recognition (HAR) on the phones, which is important for industry,
public health, and research.

Simply speaking, mobile apps using HAR can harness

recognized human physical activities using data collected from phone sensors. From an
industry point of view, accurate HAR can help the smart phone manufacturers to be smart
about allocating resources and extending battery life. The Covid19 pandemic highlights
the public health importance of understanding individual & population behaviors under
government orders and (health) emergencies [118]; furthermore, combining user activities
with mental wellness surveys and prediction has the potential to develop personalized
interventions to help individuals to better cope with anxiety, stress, and substance abuse,
and other important societal issues [119]. Current research on HAR models uses centralized
learning on data collected in controlled lab environments on standardized devices and
controlled activities [120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126]. Instead, we use HAR in the
wild (open environments, where the user mobility, activities, or application usage are not
controlled in any way). The privacysensitive nature of the mobile (sensor) data make this
application ideal for studying the design of FL systems. Furthermore, this paper presents
the first HAR study under FL.
In addition to HAR, we analyzed other reallife applications [127, 106, 128, 116, 112]
to inform our system design. A list of important questions emerges, and many of these
questions are not addressed in existing FL system designs [106, 116, 113, 128] that largely
ignored the constraints of mobile devices:
• How can we balance FL model performance with resource constraints on the phones?
• How to ensure the training conducted on phones is completed on time, despite limited
resources, i.e., computation power and battery life?
• How can the server achieve seamless scalability in the presence of large and variable
numbers of users who typically train different models and how can the system
simultaneously cope with potential communication failures (e.g., connectivity lost
on the phone)?
• How does the server aggregate individual training outcomes efficiently for an
accurate model? After a global model is shared with the phones, how can a thirdparty
DL app utilize this model?
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Currently, there is no FL system in the literature that can address most of these
questions. In terms of design, the closest related work is [106], which focuses on system
scalability, secure aggregation, and faulttolerance. However, it does not present a system
implementation and evaluation, and how to use thirdparty models and make them available
to thirdparty apps on mobile devices. Mobile operating system (OS) providers use FL in
their OSs for applications such as next word prediction on the keyboard [116], but their
solutions are applicationspecific and lack system details. Verma et al. [129] and Liu et
al. [112] introduce webservices based FL architectures, which are not tailored to mobile
devices. An under construction FL system [113] does not focus on applicationsystem
codesign aspects such as efficient data collection or scalability. Yet another open source
system, FATE [114], currently has only elementary support for deep learning and does not
have any support for mobile devices.

1.4.2

Federated Learning Systems

FL can be categorized into Horizontal FL, Vertical FL, and Federated Transfer Learning
(FTL) [128]. In Horizontal FL, data are partitioned by device user Ids, such that users
share the same feature space [128]. In Vertical FL, different organizations have a large
overlapping user space with different feature spaces. These organizations aim at jointly
training a model to predict the same model outcomes, without sharing their data. In FTL,
the datasets of these organizations differ in both the user space and the feature space.
In Vertical FL and FTL, different organizations need to align their common users
and exchange intermediate results by applying encryption techniques [130]. The server
cannot just average the gradients, but it needs to minimize a joint loss. At inference stage,
the organizations may have to send their individual intermediate results to the server to
compute a final result. The systems of these two categories rely on cryptography and their
interactions are more complex. Our FLSys focuses on Horizontal FL, with an option for
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extension to Vertical FL and FTL in the future. For simplicity, we will use FL to indicate
Horizontal FL in the rest of the work.
The work in [106] describes the design of a scalable FL system for mobile devices.
This system shares several of our design goals (e.g., scalability, faulttolerance). However,
this work does not present a system implementation and evaluation, as we do for FLSys.
Also, FLSys addresses additional unanswered design questions such as how to train
concurrently multiple models for different applications, and how third party app developers
to use the system. Furthermore, unlike this work, FLSys focuses on data collected from
the phone’s sensors, which adds challenges related to efficient and effective data collection.
Another system that shares some goals with FLSys is FedML [113], which is still under
construction. In addition, FedML focuses more on software engineering aspects, rather than
on system aspects such as efficient sensor data collection or scalability as in FLSys. A third
open source system FATE [114] is still in its infancy with limited support of deep learning
and does not work on mobile devices.
While a significant amount of FL research focuses on improving the security and
privacy of federated training procedures [131, 132], this is outside the scope of our research.
We focus on system design, implementation, and evaluation using HAR and SA models.

1.4.3

Coping with NonIID Data in FL Training

A wellreported issue restricting the performance of models trained by FL is nonIID data
distribution across users [133, 109]. Different from centralized learning, the datasets among
different users may follow different distributions in FL, because of the heterogeneous
devices, imbalanced class distribution, different user behaviors, etc. As a result, DL models
trained in FL algorithms usually suffer from inferior performance when compared with
centralized models [133].
To mitigate the nonIID issue, several algorithms have been proposed [107, 108,
109, 110, 111]. In FedProx [107], a regularization is introduced to mitigate the gradient
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distortion from each device. Sarkar et al. [108] presented a crossentropy loss to downweigh
easytoclassify examples and focus training on hardtoclassify examples. Verma et
al. [111] proposed to estimate the global objective function by averaging different objective
functions given a common region of features among users, and keep different objective
functions estimated from local users’ data in different regions of the feature space. Data
augmentation approaches have been proposed [109], including a global data distribution
based data augmentation [110]. The federated training of our HARWild and SA models
use a uniform data augmentation method, similar to these techniques.

1.4.4

Human Activity Recognition

Our HAR model focuses on sensing and classification of physical activities through smart
phone sensors. Recent work show that deep learning models are effective in HAR tasks.
For example, Ignatov [120] proposed a CNN based model to classify activities with raw
3axis accelerometer data and statistical features computed from the data. Several pieces of
work [121, 122, 126] proposed LSTMbased models and achieved similar performances.
Most research on HAR models uses centralized learning on data collected in controlled
lab environments with standardized devices and controlled activities, in which the partic
ipants only focus on collecting sensor data with a usually high and fixed sampling rate
frequency, i.e., 50Hz or higher. Although there are good publicly available HAR datasets,
e.g., WISDM [123], UCI HAR [124], and Opportunity [125], they are not representative
for reallife situations. Different from existing work, this work shows that HARWild over
FLSys performs well on the data collected in the wild, which are subject to fluctuating
sample rates and nonIID data distribution.

1.4.5

Contributions in this Dissertation

In this dissertation, we presents FLSys, the first FL system in the literature created using an
applicationsystem codesign approach to address the aforementioned research questions.

23

FLSys is a key component toward creating an open ecosystem of FL models and apps that
use these model. Such an FL ecosystem will allow thirdparty model/app developers to
easily develop and deploy FL models/apps on smart phones. Consequently, the users will
benefit from novel FL apps based on mobile [sensing] data collected on the phones.
To tackle faulttolerance and resource constraints on the phones, FLSys utilizes an
asynchronous interaction model between mobile devices and the cloud, which 1) allows the
devices to selfselect for training when they have enough data and resources, and 2) allows
the sever to operate correctly in the presence of communication failures with the phones.
For energy efficient data collection, FLSys supports ondemand configuration of sensor
types, sampling rates, and the period for data flushing from memory to storage. The FL
server in the cloud achieves good scalability through a design based on function as a service
computation and scalable storage. FLSys is flexible, in the sense that it can train multiple
models concurrently. It provides a common API for thirdparty apps to train different DL
models with different FL aggregation methods in the cloud. While implemented in Android
and AWS, FLSys has a general system design and API that can be extended to other mobile
OSs and cloud platforms.
To study how HAR can be supported by FLSys in the wild, we collected data from
100+ college students in two areas during April  August 2020. The students used their
own Android phones, and their dailylife activities were not constrained in any way by
our experiment. Data collected on mobile devices is nonIID, which affects FLtrained
models [127]. We have evaluated a variety of HAR models in both centralized and federated
training, and designed HARWild, a Convolution Neural Network (CNN) model with a
data augmentation mechanism to mitigate the nonIID problem. To showcase the ability of
FLSys to work with different FL models, we also built and evaluated a natural language
sentiment analysis (SA) model on a dataset with 46,000+ tweets from 436 users.
We carried out a comprehensive evaluation of FLSys together with HARWild and SA
to quantify the model utility and the system feasibility in real life conditions. We performed
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the evaluation under three training settings: 1) centralized training, 2) simulated FL, and
3) Android FL. Centralized training provides an upper bound on model accuracy and is
used to compare our HARWild model with baseline approaches. The results demonstrate
that HARWild outperforms the baseline models in terms of accuracy. Furthermore, the
federated HARWild performance using simulations (TensorFlow and DL4J), Android
emulations, and Android phone experiments is close to the upper bound performance
achieved by the centralized model. The results on smart phones demonstrate that FLSys
can perform communication and training tasks within the allocated time and resource limits,
while the FL server is able to handle a variable number of users. Finally, microbenchmarks
on Android phones show FLSys with HARWild and SA are practical in terms of training
and inference time, memory and battery consumption.
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CHAPTER 2
DRUG ABUSE DETECTION AND ANALYSIS IN ONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA

Chapter Abstract:

Abuse of prescription drugs and of illicit drugs has been declared

a “national emergency” [1]. This crisis includes the misuse and abuse of cannabinoids,
opioids, tranquilizers, stimulants, inhalants, and other types of psychoactive drugs, which
statistical analysis documents as a rising trend in the United States. Even though drug abuse
has reached epidemic proportions [3], there still lacks tools and means to prevent drug
abuse epidemics effectively, especially for local communities and organizations, who are
at the front and center of the fight. This section of work has three aims: (1) To design data
collection pipelines that collects potentially drug abuserelated posts, and deeplearning
models that classify collected posts as drug abuserelated or not, in order to facilitate large
scale and timesensitive detection of drug abuse trends through the lens of online social
media; (2) To analyze the collected data and the classification results in terms of patterns of
words, hashtags, drug namebehavior cooccurrence, timeofday distribution and spatial
distribution, which demonstrates the effectiveness of such method designed in the first aim,
as well as providing insights for future research; and (3) Design and implement a tool to
visualize the collected data, the classification results, and the analysis results in a webbased
interactive user interface to support local communities.

2.1
2.1.1

An Ensemble Deep Learning Model for Drug Abuse Detection
in Sparse TwitterSphere

Methods

In this subsection, we present the definition of the drug abuserelated risk behavior detection
problem, our methods for collecting tweets, our methods for labeling tweets, and our
ensemble deep learning approach.
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Problem Definition In this work, our first goal is to build a Twitter dataset consisting of
tweets that are related to drug abuse risk behaviors (positive tweets), and tweets that are
not (negative tweets). The “drugs”in the term “drug abuse risk behaviors”in this study
include Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 drugs and their derivatives [134], including marijuana,
heroin, cocaine, fentanyl, etc. The reasons that we include marijuana even though it is
legalized in several states are that: (1) Marijuana is still a controlled substance in the federal
law, whether for medical use or recreational use; and (2) Marijuana can still cause harm to
adolescents [7], can cause “use disorder”[24], and is related to traffic fatalities [6]. The
term “abuse risk behavior”can be defined as “The existence of likely abusive activities,
consequences, and endorsements of drugs.”Tweets that contain links to or summarize news
and reports related to drug abuse, and tweets that merely express opinions about drug abuse,
are counted as negative in this study. Our main goal in this dissertation is to train a model
that can accurately classify positive and negative tweets in a highly imbalanced (drug abuse)
dataset.

Data Collection

Although there are humanlabeled drug abuse Twitter datasets (e.g.,

Sarker’s dataset [15]) available, due to Twitter’s data policy, which prohibits the direct
sharing of tweet contents, by the time we access the tweets in that dataset, more than
40% of tweets are either removed or hidden from the public. This significantly affects
the quality and integrity of existing publicly available datasets. Therefore, we need to build
a new dataset from scratch. In our framework, raw tweets are collected through a set of
Application Programming Interfaces (Twitter APIs) via keyword filtering. By defining a
set of keywords, the API will fetch tweets that contain any of the keywords from either
the realtime stream of tweets or from archived tweets. For a more complete coverage
of drugrelated topics, we selected three types of keywords: (1) Formal drug names, e.g.,
marijuana, cocaine, OxyContin, fentanyl, etc.; (2) Slang terms for drugs, e.g., pot, blunt,
coke, crack, smack, etc.; and (3) Drug abuserelated behaviors and symptoms, e.g., high,
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amped, addicted, headache, dizzy, etc. The number of keywords we used is limited to 400
by the Twitter APIs.

Data Annotation

We build a comperhaensive guide, accessable at https:// goo.gl/tqWddS,

based on Sarker’s guide [15]. Each one of the three members in out research team with
experience in health informatics annotates the 1,794 tweets from Hu et al.’s study [49]
independently following the guide. A final label for each seed tweet is determined by
majority voting from three labels.
To acquire annotated tweets rapidly, at low cost, and with increased percentage of
positive tweets, we (1) use these labeled tweets as“seed”tweets to train a SVM classifier;
(2) run the SVM classifier on the unlabeled dataset, and randomly sample 5,000 machine
labeled tweets that have prediction probability (esitmated with Platt scaling) > 0.8; and
(3) post the 5,000 tweets (without identification information) onto the Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) crowdsourcing platform for annotation. AMT is a wellknown crowdsourcing
platform where Posters can post Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) and Workers finish HITs
for micropayments. A literature study [135] evaluated AMT as a thrustworthy platform to
obtain human labeled data. The same guide is used to guide the Workers how to annotate
the tweets. Each tweet is posted as one HIT that requires the Worker to label it as positive or
negative following the guide. Each HIT is replicated as three assignments to be completed
by three individual Workers. We set the price of each assignment to be $0.05, a very
generous price compared to what was reported in Buhrmester’s work [135] All HITs are
completed within hours after being posted. The final label of each tweet is aggregated
from the three labels by majority voting. Our annotators also label 1,000 tweets randomly
sampled from the 5,000 tweets with as a measure of quality check.

Feature Extraction Machine learning models require numerical features to work with.
Feature extraction transforms text features into numerical features in the form of vectors.
To cover the content ambiguity in drug abuserelated tweets, a variety of feature extraction
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methods are used in this study. In our wordlevel CNN models, we use pretrained word
embedding models that were trained on large corpora to transform words into dense vectors.
We test several pretrained models as Mahata’s work [136] suggested. With our wordlevel
CNN model, the Drug Chatter embedding has the best average performance on our dataset;
thus, it is chosen as the pretrained word embedding model for this study. The details of
the tested word embedding models are shown in Table 2.1. Each tweet is converted to
a sequence of 400dimensional vectors. Considering that the length limit of each tweet
nowadays is 280 chars, the sequence length is set to 40. In our charlevel CNN, the
preprocessing step only turns all characters to lower case as suggested by [137]. Each
character is then converted into a 128dimensional trainable randomlyinitialized vector.
Instead of being fixed, the character embeddings are trained along with other layers in the
model.
We also replicate the features extracted in Sarker et al. study [15], including: (1) The
tokenization process; (2) The abuseindicating term features, consisting of the presence
and the counts of abuseindicating terms obtained from Hanson et al. [17]; (3) The drug
slang lexicon features, consisting of the presence and the counts of terms longer than five
characters found in an online drug abuse dictionary [138]; (4) The word cluster features,
represented by 150dimensional onehot vectors, were constructed by identifying words that
belong to certain word clusters in a dataset [15] that contains 150 drugrelated word clusters;
and (5) The synonym expansion features, accomplished by identifying all synonyms of all
nouns, verbs, and adjectives in the tokenized tweets using WordNet [139].

An Ensemble Deep Learning Model for Drug Abuse Detection in Sparse Twitter
Sphere In this subsection, we present our novel ensemble deep learning model for drug
abuse risk behavior detection by integrating extracted features from tweets into CNN
models. Our ensemble model takes the outputs of multiple prediction models, wordlevel
CNN (WCNN) and charlevel CNN (CCNN) [137] in our case, and feed them to a
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Table 2.1 Details of Pretrained Word Embeddings
Name

Model

Corpus

Vocabulary Dim.

GoogleNews [140]

Word2vec

100 billion words

3 million

300

Glove_Comm [141]

Glove

42 billion words

1.9 million

300

Godin [142]

Word2vec

400 million tweets

3 million

400

Drug_chatter [143]

Word2vec

1 billion tweets

1.6 million

400

metalearner that gives the final predictions. We design WCNN and CCNN for this task.
In fact, both the WCNN and the CCNN share a similar structure as shown in Figure 1.
The inputs of our WCNN are vectors of shape [40, 400] where 40 is the maximum
sequence length (number of words allowed) in an input tweet, and 400 is the length of the
pretrained word embeddings. The input of our CCNN is shaped as [280, 128] where 280 is
the maximum possible length of a tweet, and 128 is the length of the vector representation of
each character in the charset. The auxiliary features in the input include: (1) The synonym
expansion features in the form of synonymous words are directly concatenated with the
input tweets (before they are transformed into vectors); and (2) The remaining auxiliary
features, in the form of 154dimensional vectors, are concatenated to the last hidden layer of
the dense layers. For each convolution kernel size, the WCNN model has two convolution
layers with ReLU activation functions stacked together. Each is followed by a maxpooling
layer.
The CCNN model has one convolution layer for each convolution kernel size
with Tanh activation function, followed by a globalmaxpooling layer that performs
maxpooling over all outputs of convolution layers with different kernel sizes. Both models
have one dense layer block, consisting of two dense layers with 1,024 hidden units each,
and one Softmax output layer with two units. The activation functions are slightly different,
as the WCNN model uses ReLU, while the CCNN model uses SELU. The output of the
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Figure 2.1 Ensemble CNN model structures.
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last hidden layer is concatenated with vectors of abuseindicating term features, drugslang
lexicon features, and word cluster features, before being fed into the output layer.
Finally, a number of independently trained CNN models of both types are ensembled
together by majority voting. Model ensembles were also used in Sarker et al. study [9] to
reduce variability and bias, in order to improve prediction performance. We apply the same
ensemble strategy to both our deep learning models and the baseline models.

Experimental Design

Our main objective in this experiment is to directly compare the

performances of the ensemble traditional machine learning model and the ensemble deep
learning model. For the ensemble traditional machine learning model, two of each type of
baseline models, six in total, are trained and ensembled together. For the ensemble deep
learning model, six models of three types (two for each type) are used. The three types are
denoted as follows. (1) “char_aux”is the charlevel CNN model with auxiliary features.
(2)“char_cnn”is the plain charlevel CNN without any auxiliary features. (3)“word_aux”
is the wordlevel CNN model with all auxiliary features. For deep learning models, it is
extremely easy to overfit, due to the rather small number of training and test data elements;
thus, the model is saved at each training epoch, and the best epoch is found among the saved
models. For each class distribution scenario, each model is trained with the same six sets
of training data and tested on the corresponding test data. All results reported are averaged
results from the 6fold crossvalidation.

2.1.2

Experimental Results

Data Annotation Results

From Jan 2017 to Feb 2017, we collected 3,265,153 tweets

in total. The “seed”dataset that we annotated to be used to train the prefilter consistes
of 1,794 tweets, including 280 positive labels and 1,514 negative labels. Our annotator
achieved the agreement score of 0.414, measured by Krippendoff’s Alpha. For the AMT
labeled dataset, we removed duplicate tweets from it, resulting dataset contains 4,736 tweets
with 2,657 positive labels and 2,079 negative labels. The agreement score is 0.456 measured
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by Alpha, which can be considered as a reliable result in our study as demostrated in [144],
since: (1) We are performing data annotation with data aggregation to reduce variability,
instead of typical content analysis [145]; (2) The Krippendoff’s Alpha is sensitive to data
imbalance; and (3) We focus on sparse and imbalanced data distributions. For the 1,000
tweets for quality check, we got the Kappa score of 0.910 between our final labels and
the labels we obtain from AMT. This is showing that our annotation guide was followed
consistently by both our annotators and AMT Workers.
To simulate the data imbalance scenarios, we configured the class distribution
and presampled the dataset into six blocks for each distribution scenario, for 6fold
crossvalidation. Each model was trained and tested on the same sets of training and test
data to ensure a fair comparison. The number of data points included in each distribution
scenario was maximized, but it was inevitably different between scenarios. Table 2.2 shows
the dataset in each class distribution scenario.
Table 2.2 Imbalanced Tweets Dataset Variants
Class Distribution

# of training data # of testing data

(positive: negative)
50:50 split

3450

690

40:60 split

2850

570

30:70 split

2450

490

20:80 split

2150

430

10:90 split

1900

380

Drug Abuse Detection Results

Table 2.3 shows the results for all individual models and

two ensemble models. The ensemble model results are separated from the individual models
for easier viewing. The highest value of each measure is marked in bold font. There
is an interesting trend in the results of ensemble models. When the data is balanced or
nearly balanced, the traditional ensemble machine learning model has a better performance
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than the ensemble deep learning model. At 50:50 and 40:60 splits, the ensemble machine
learning model is superior over the ensemble deep learning model for most of the criteria.
This is partially due to the relatively small dataset size. When the data becomes more
imbalanced, e.g., at a 30:70 split, the ensemble deep learning model becomes better and
has a higher F1score for positive labels, compared with the traditional ensemble machine
learning model. At 20:80 and 10:90 splits, the ensemble deep learning model takes the lead,
most significantly in each measure for positive labels. The larger model capacity and the
ability of the deep learning models to learn more complex nonlinear functions can better
distinguish the semantic differences between positive tweets and negative tweets, when the
distribution of classes is heavily imbalanced.
Looking at individual machine learning models, Random Forest and SVM show
a strong performance on all datasets, and they are especially good when the dataset is
balanced. Naïve Bayes also has a good performance on a balanced dataset, but on an
imbalanced dataset, it is heavily biased towards negative labels and has a poor performance
for positive labels.

Deep learning models generally have more stable performance,

compared to traditional machine learning models, across all datasets, and a smaller
difference between precision and recall, but their peak performances are not as good.
Comparing between deep learning models, auxiliary features do not give CCNN significant
performance boost, and WCNN is also not as good as the CCNN model. However, in
additional results that are not shown in this dissertation due to space limitations, auxiliary
features give the plain WCNN model a performance boost.
By investigating the performance of each individual model and the ensemble model
that includes it, we can see that our ensemble strategy works well for deep learning models,
as most of the measures for the ensemble model are higher than for any of its components
corresponding measures. This effect was only observed a few times for traditional machine
learning models. We expect that, by using more complicated ensemble strategies, deep
learning has the potential to reach an even better performance level.
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Table 2.3 Results of Each Dataset Variant
Class Distribution: 50:50 split
Measure

char_aux

char_cnn

word_aux

SVM

RF

NB

Ensemble CNN

Ensemble ML
0.8575

Accuracy

0.8506

0.8477

0.8466

0.8415

0.8586

0.8384

0.851

Precision_p

0.8315

0.824

0.8198

0.8063

0.8404

0.8319

0.8468

0.835

Recall_p

0.8797

0.8845

0.8894

0.9

0.886

0.8493

0.8575

0.8918

F1_score_p

0.8549

0.8531

0.8529

0.8504

0.8624

0.8402

0.852

0.8623

Measure

char_aux

char_cnn

word_aux

SVM

RF

NB

Ensemble CNN

Ensemble ML

Class Distribution: 40:60 split

Accuracy

0.8528

0.8563

0.843

0.8444

0.8494

0.8427

0.8567

0.8582

Precision_p

0.8007

0.8055

0.7818

0.8104

0.777

0.7862

0.8079

0.8047

Recall_p

0.8421

0.8454

0.8443

0.7982

0.8746

0.8341

0.8428

0.8531

F1_score_p

0.8207

0.8248

0.8113

0.8041

0.8229

0.8093

0.8249

0.828

Class Distribution: 30:70 split
Measure

char_aux

char_cnn

word_aux

SVM

RF

NB

Ensemble CNN

Ensemble ML

Accuracy

0.8522

0.8507

0.8483

0.8429

0.8537

0.8452

0.8599

0.8595

Precision_p

0.7253

0.7223

0.718

0.7467

0.7137

0.7218

0.7402

0.7426

Recall_p

0.8209

0.818

0.8158

0.7234

0.8583

0.7914

0.8231

0.8163

F1_score_p

0.7695

0.7666

0.7635

0.7336

0.7789

0.7538

0.7792

0.7771

Class Distribution: 20:80 split
Measure

char_aux

char_cnn

word_aux

SVM

RF

NB

Ensemble CNN

Ensemble ML

Accuracy

0.8624

0.8568

0.8506

0.8384

0.8475

0.8527

0.8674

0.8508

Precision_p

0.6325

0.6128

0.5965

0.564

0.5838

0.6261

0.6416

0.5908

Recall_p

0.7558

0.7868

0.8023

0.8547

0.8295

0.6609

0.7713

0.8295

F1_score_p

0.6878

0.6878

0.6823

0.6792

0.685

0.6425

0.7001

0.69

Class Distribution: 10:90 split
Measure

char_aux

char_cnn

word_aux

SVM

RF

NB

Ensemble CNN

Ensemble ML

Accuracy

0.8638

0.8664

0.8445

0.8355

0.8592

0.8961

0.8728

0.8636

Precision_p

0.4112

0.4153

0.376

0.3609

0.3875

0.4762

0.4338

0.3975

Recall_p

0.7368

0.7346

0.7171

0.8114

0.6776

0.2939

0.7281

0.6754

F1_score_p

0.5243

0.5275

0.4882

0.499

0.4925

0.3611

0.5389

0.4999
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2.1.3

Conclusions

In this study, we investigated how the data imbalance issue influences the performance
of classifiers that are trained for identifying tweets that are related to drug abuse. We
first collected a dataset with a broad selection of drug abuserelated keywords and slang
terms. We explored the use of the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform as a reliable source
for acquiring humanlabeled tweets, and we obtained a solid dataset. We designed an
ensemble deep learning classification model with both wordlevel and charlevel CNNs,
and we conducted a direct comparison with traditional machine learning models on our
dataset, with simulated class imbalance. Experimental results show that our ensemble deep
learning models have better performance than traditional machine learning models when
the data is offbalance. Results also show that the ensemble strategy we used is effective
for improving deep learning models. Finally, our analysis of the collected three million
tweets, labeled by our model, shows an interesting temporal pattern that agrees with our
intuition.

2.2
2.2.1

An Insight Analysis and Detection of DrugAbuse Risk Behavior on Twitter
with SelfTaught Deep Learning
Method

In this subsection, we present the definition of the drug abuse risk behavior detection
problem, our system for collecting tweets, labeling tweets, and our deep selftaught learning
approach. The system overview is shown in Figure 2.2.

Problem Definition We use the term “drug abuse risk behavior” in the wider sense,
including misuse and use of Schedule 1 drugs that are illegal; and misuse of Schedule 2
drugs, e.g., Oxycodone, which includes the use thereof for nonmedical purposes, and the
symptoms and sideeffects of misuse. Our task is to develop classification models that can
classify a given unlabeled tweet into one of the two classes: a drug abuse risk behavior

36

tweet (positive), or a nondrug abuse risk behavior (negative) tweet. The main criteria for
classifying a tweet as drug abuse risk can be condensed into: “The existence of abusive
activities or endorsements of drugs.” Meanwhile, news, reports, and opinions about drug
abuse are the signals of tweets that are not considered as containing abuse risk.

Tweet Data Collection

In our crawling system, raw tweets are collected through Twitter

APIs. For the collection of focused Twitter data, we use a list of the names of illegal and
prescription drugs [146] that have been commonly abused over time, e.g., Barbiturates,
OxyContin, Ritalin, Cocaine, LSD, Opiates, Heroin, Codeine, Fentanyl, etc. However, the
data is very noisy, since: (1) There is no indication of how to distinguish between drug abuse
and legitimate use (of prescription drugs) in collected Tweets, and (2) Many of slang terms
are used in expressing drug abuse risk behavior. To address this problem, we added slang
terms for drugs and abuseindicating terms, e.g., “high,” “stoned,” “blunt,” “addicted,” etc.,
into our keyword search library. These slang terms are clearly expressing that the tweets in
question were about drug abuse. As a result, most of the collected data is drug abuserelated.

Figure 2.2 Drug Abuse Detection System. There are 4 steps as follows: (1) Tweets will
be collected through Twitter APIs. (2) Preprocessed tweets will be labeled by humans, AI
techniques, and crowdsourcing techniques. (3) Labeled tweets will be used to augment the
training data of our AI models and data analysis tasks to identify tweets with drug abuse
risk behaviors, through a selftaught algorithm. And (4) Trained systems will be used in
different drug abuse monitoring services and interactive user interfaces.
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To obtain trustworthy annotated data, we design two integrative steps in labeling
tweets. In the first step, 1,794 tweets randomly chosen from collected tweets were manually
annotated as positive or negative by three team members who have experience in health
informatics. Several instances of positive tweets and negative tweets are illustrated in
Table 2.4. These labeled tweets are considered seed tweets, which then are used to train
traditional binary classifiers, e.g., SVM, Naive Bayes, etc., to predict whether a tweet is
a drug abuse risk behavior tweet or not. The trained classifiers are applied to unlabeled
tweets to predict their labels, which are called machine labels. In the second step, 5,000
positive machinelabeled tweets with high classification confidence are verified again on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), which is a wellknown crowdsourcing platform. To
improve the trustworthiness and to avoid bias in the annotated data, each tweet is labeled
by three individual workers. The workers are instructed to follow with the same annotation
instructions that our annotators have followed. Our annotators also labeled a random sample
of 1,000 tweets and compare the labels with the results from AMT, as a quality check.
Table 2.4 Instances of Manually Annotated Positive Tweets and Negative Tweets
Tweets
Positive

“Ever since my Acid trips like whenever I get super high I just start 
lightly hallucinating and it’s tbh creepy.”
“drove like 10 miles on these icy ass roads all to get some weed if imma 
be locked up in my house for awhile imma need some weed.”
“Smoking a blunt at home so much better than going to the woods in 
Brooksville and puking on yourself Bc you drank too much reball.”

Negative

“Just watched Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas for the first time 
and I think I should have been on acid to fully understand it.”
“today I was asked if I do heroin because I went to Lancaster????”
“Morgan told me my Bitmoji looks like a heroin addict?”
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Tweet Vectorization Raw tweets need to be first preprocessed, then represented as
vectors, before they can be used in training machine learning models. In this study, we
choose a commonly used preprocessing pipeline, followed by three different vectorization
methods. The preprocessing pipeline consists of following steps:
• The tweets are tokenized and lowercased. The special entities, i.e., including Emojis,
URLs, mentions, and hashtags, are removed or replaced with special keywords. The
nonword characters, i.e., including HTML symbols, punctuation marks, and foreign
characters, are removed. Words with three or more repeating characters are reduced
to at most three successive characters.
• Stopwords are removed according to a custom stopword list. Stemming is applied
using the standard Porter Stemmer.
After the preprocessing steps, common vectorization methods are used to extract
features from tweets, including: (1) Term frequency, denoted as tf, (2) Tfidf, and
(3) Word2vec [140]. Word2vec is an advanced and effective word embedding method
that converts each word into a dense vector of fixed length. We considered two different
Word2vec models: (i) A custom Word2vec model, which was trained on our three million
drug abuserelated tweets. The model contains 300dimensional vectors for 1,130,962
words and phrases; and (ii) Google Word2vec, which is a wellknown pretrained Word2vec
model built from part of a Google News dataset with about 100 billion words, and the model
contains 300dimensional vectors for three million words and phrases.

2.2.2

Deep SelfTaught Learning Approach

By applying both traditional and advanced machine learning models, such as SVM, Naive
Bayes, CNN, and LSTM to the small and static annotated data, i.e., 6,794 tweets, we
can achieve reasonable classification accuracies of nearly 80%, as indicated in Figure 2.4
when the number of iteration k is zero, which is equivalent to applying models without
the proposed selftaught method. To develop a scalable and trustworthy drug abuse risk
behavior detection model, we need to: (1) Improve classification models to achieve higher
accuracy and performance; and (2) Leverage the large number of unlabeled tweets, i.e.,
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three million tweets related to drug abuse, to improve the system performance. Therefore,
we propose a deep selftaught learning model by repeatedly augmenting the training data
with machinelabeled tweets. The pseudocode of our algorithm is as follows:
• [Step 1:] Randomly initialize labeled data D consisting of 5,794 annotated tweets as
the training set. Initialize a test data T consisting of the remaining 1,000 annotated
tweets.
• [Step 2:] Train a binary classification model M using the labeled data D. M could
be a CNN model or an LSTM model.
• [Step 3:] Use the model M to label the unlabeled data U , which simply consists of
three million unlabeled tweets. The set of new labeled tweets is denoted as D, which
is also called machinelabeled data.
• [Step 4:] Sample tweets from the machinelabeled dataset D with a high classi
+
fication confidence, and then add the sampled
S +tweets D into the labeled data D
to form a new training dataset: D = D D . A tweet is considered to have a
high classification confidence if it has a classification probability p ∈ [0, 1] higher
than a predefined sampling threshold δ. Sampled machinelabeled tweets will not be
sampled again: U = U − D+ .
• [Step 5:] Repeat Steps 24 for k iterations, where k is a userpredefined number.
Return the trained model M .
With the selftaught learning method, the training data contains the annotated data D,
which is automatically augmented with highly confident, machinelabeled tweets, in each
iteration. This approach has the potential of increasing the classification performance of our
model over time. In addition, the unlabeled data can be collected from the Twitter APIs in
real time, to capture the evolving of English (slang) terms about drug abuse risk behaviors.
In the literature, data augmentation approaches have been applied to improve the accuracy
of deep learning models [39]. However, the existing approaches [39, 42, 43, 44] are quite
different from our proposed model, since they focused on image classification tasks, instead
of drug abuse risk behavior detection as in our study. Note that, to ensure fairness, test data
T is separated from other data sources during the training process.

2.2.3

Experiments

Dataset

The seed dataset contains 1,794 tweets that were manually labeled by three

annotators, including 280 positive tweets and 1,514 negative tweets. The agreement score
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among three annotators is 0.414, measured by Krippendoff’s Alpha. We then selected
5,000 tweets labeled by the machine learning model (i.e., SVM) with a high confidence
level (δ > 0.7), and rendered them verified on AMT. The AMT workers have the
agreement score of 0.456, measured by Krippendoff’s Alpha. Note that both agreement
scores should be considered as reliable result in out study settings [144], since: (1) Our
task is to reduce variability in data annotation, instead of typical content analysis [145];
(2) The Krippendoff’s Alpha is sensitive to data imbalance and sparseness, which are
the characteristics of our dataset. Our integrative labeling approach resulted in a reliable
and wellbalanced annotated data set, with 6,794 labeled tweets, including 3,102 positive
labels and 3,677 negative labels. For the unlabeled data, we have the three million drug
abuserelated tweets with geolocation information covering the entire continental U.S.
(lower 48 states and D.C.).

Baseline methods

In our experiments, Random Forest (RF), Naive Bayes (NB), and

SVM are employed as baseline approaches for the binary classification task, i.e., to classify
whether a tweet is a drug abuse risk behavior tweet or not. Table 2.5 shows the parameter
settings of baseline approaches and the proposed models. Note that for the Naive Bayes
method, we use Gaussian Naive Bayes with Word2vec embedding. Meanwhile, we use term
frequency (i.e., tf ) and tfidf vectorization for Multinominal Naive Bayes. This is because:
(1) The vectors generated by term frequencybased vectorization has a very high number of
dimensions and could be only represented by sparsematrix, which was not supported by the
chosen implementation of Gaussian Naive Bayes; and (2) The Multinominal Naive Bayes
require nonnegative inputs, but vectors generated by Word2vec embedding has negative
values. Regarding our selftaught CNN (stCNN) and selftaught LSTM (stLSTM)
models, the Adam Optimizer algorithm with default learning rate is used for training. The
number of iterations k is set to 6, and the sampling threshold δ is set to 0.7, for all methods.
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All the experiments have been conducted on a single GPU, i.e., NVIDIA TITAN Xp with
12 GB memory and 3,072 CUDA cores.
Table 2.5 Parameter Settings for All Models
Baseline Model
SVM
Random Forest
Naive Bayes
(Gaussian)
Naive Bayes
(Multinominal)
Proposed Model

Parameter Setting
c=5.0, gamma=0.01, kernel:rbf
n_estimators=500, class_weight=balanced, max_depth=20
default
default
Layers
embedding
dropout

Parameter Setting
size: 300, max_length: 20
dropout_rate: 0.2
kernerl_sizes: [2,3,4], number_kernels: 20
convolutional
activation_function: Relu, strides: 1
Selftaught CNN
(stCNN)
max pooling
pool_size: 2
flatten
no parameter
concatenate
no parameter
dropout
dropout_rate: 0.5
dense_layer_1: size: 520x500;
two dense layers
dense_layer_2: size: 500x2
embedding
size: 300, max_length: 20
dropout
dropout_rate: 0.2
Selftaught LSTM
LSTM
sequence_output: False
(stLSTM)
dropout
dropout_rate: 0.5
dense_layer_1: size: 300x500;
two dense layers
dense_layer_2: size: 500x2

Measures Accuracy, recall, and F1value are used to validate the effectiveness of the
proposed and baseline approaches.

Due to the small size and the imbalanced label

distribution, we adopted the Monte Carlo CrossValidation technique. In each run, a fixed
number of data instances is sampled (i.e., without replacement) as the test dataset, and the
rest of the data as the training dataset. Multiple runs (i.e., 3 times) are generated for each
model in each set of parameters and experimental configurations. We report the average of
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these runs as result. Definitions of the accuracy, recall, and F1value are given as follows,
where TP ,TN ,FP ,FN are the number of true positives, true negatives, false positives, and
false negatives, correspondingly.
Accuracy =

TP +TN
;
TP +TN +FP +FN

Experiment questions:

Recall =

TP
;
TP +FN

F1value =

2TP
2TP +FP +FN

Our task of validation concerns three key issues: (1) Which

parameter configurations are optimal for the baseline models on the seed dataset, i.e., SVM,
RF, and NB? (2) Which selftaught learning model is the best in terms of accuracy, recall,
and F1value, given the 6,794 annotated tweets and the three million unlabeled tweets? and
(3) Which vectorization setting is more effective? To address these concerns, our series of
experiments are as follows.

2.2.4

Experimental Results

Experiment on seed dataset with baseline models

Figure 2.3 illustrates the accuracy,

recall, and F1value of each algorithm with different parameter configurations, i.e., term
frequency tf, tfidf, and Word2vec, on the (annotated) seed dataset. The term “custom” is
used to indicate the Word2vec embedding trained with our own drug abuserelated tweets,
compared with the pretrained Google News Word2vec embedding, denoted as “google.”
It is clear that the SVM model using the customtrained Word2vec embedding achieves
the best and the most balanced performance in terms of all three measures, i.e., accuracy,
recall, and F1value, at approximately 67%. Other configurations usually have a lower
recall, which suggests that the decisions they make bias towards the major class, i.e.,
nondrug abuse risk behavior tweets. From the angle of classifiers, SVM model achieves
the best overall performance. Random Forest has slightly less average accuracy than the
SVM model, but worse recall and F1value. Furthermore, from the view of vectorization
approach, it is clear that Word2vec embedding outperforms term frequency and tfidf in
most of the cases. Several possible combinations of settings are not shown in Figure 2.3
due to poor performances.
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Figure 2.3 Accuracy, Recall, and F1value of each baseline model on the seed dataset.

Experiment on selftaught learning models As shown in the previous experiment, SVM
model using the customtrained Word2vec embedding achieves the best performance, we
decided to apply the same model structure to compare with our deep selftaught learning
approaches. In this experiment, at each epoch, 10,000 machinelabeled tweets were
randomly sampled and merged into the training set. Figure 2.4 shows the experimental
results of the five selftaught models, including selftaught CNN (stCNN), selftaught
LSTM (stLSTM), selftaught SVM (stSVM), selftaught NB (stNB), and selftaught
RF (stRF). All configurations of classifiers and vectorization methods are tested. For the
sake of clarity, we only illustrate the bestperforming setting for each model in Figure 2.4. It
is clear that our proposed deep selftaught learning approaches (i.e., stLSTM and stCNN)
outperform traditional models, i.e., stSVM, stNB, and stRF, in terms of accuracy, recall,
and F1value, in all cases. Deep learning models achieve 86.53%, 88.6%, and 86.63% in
terms of accuracy, recall, and F1value correspondingly.

Experiment on vectorization settings The impact of two different Word2vec represen
tations on the stCNN, i.e., the custom Word2vec embedding we trained from our corpus,

44

Figure 2.4 Accuracy, Recall, and F1value of the five selftaught learning models,
including stCNN, stLSTM, stSVM, stNB, and stRF.

Figure 2.5 Performance comparison between custom Word2vec embedding and Google
News Word2vec embedding.

and pretrained Google News Word2vec embedding, is shown in Figure 2.5. The Google
News Word2vec achieves 0.1%, 0.4%, and 0.3% improvements in terms of accuracy, recall,
and F1value (86.63%, 89%, 86.83%, respectively) compared with the custom trained
Word2vec embedding. In addition, it is clear that Google News Word2vec embedding
outperforms the custom trained Word2vec in most of the cases. This is because the Google
News Word2vec embedding was trained on a largescale corpus, which is significantly
richer in contextual information, compared with our short, noisy, and sparse Twitter
datasets.
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2.2.5

An Insight Analysis of Drug Abuse Risk Behavior on Twitter

To gain insights in drug abuse risk behaviors on Twitter, we use our best performing deep
selftaught learning model to annotate over three million drug abuserelated tweets with
geotags and perform quantitative analysis. There are 117,326 tweets classified as positive,
and 3,077,827 tweets classified as negative. The positive tweets correspond to 3.67% of the
whole dataset. We performed analysis from three aspects: word and phase distributions,
temporal distributions, and spatial distributions.

Word and phase distributions
as shown in Figure 2.6.

We first visualize the top frequent words by word cloud,

The word distribution in positive tweets (Figure 2.6(a)) is

remarkably different from word distribution in negative tweets (Figure 2.6(b)). In fact,
drug abuse tweets usually consist of abuseindicating terms, and drug names, such as
“blunt,” “high,” “smoke,” “weed,” “marijuana,” “grass,” “juic,” etc., (Figure 2.6(a)). In
addition, the high concentration of dirty words, e.g., “s**t,” “f**k,” “as*,” “bit**,” etc.,
clearly suggests the expression patterns that the drug abusers may have (Figure 2.6(a)).
This expression pattern does not likely exist in negative tweets. Then, we further show
the comparison of normalized word frequency between positive tweets and negative tweets
(words from positive tweets got normalized by the number of positive tweets, and negative
words by negative tweets), regarding the 25 most frequent words in positive tweets (Figure
2.7) and 25 most frequent words in negative tweets (Figure 2.8). Note that in Figure
2.7, the yaxis is clipped at 0.25, which is the value of word “weed”, while the word
“smoke” has the normalized frequency of 0.44. These two figures further show that:
(1) Positivefrequent words are more likely to have lower normalized frequency in negative
tweets, and viseversa; and (2) Some ordinary words, i.e., “go”, “want”, “day”, and “good”,
still share similar normalized frequency between positive and negative tweets.
Hashtags also play an import role in the Twitter sphere as a way for users to:
(1) To express their opinion more clearly; and (2) To improve information sharing
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(a) Positive tweets

(b) Negative tweets

Figure 2.6 Word frequency distribution of the classification results.

Figure 2.7 Normalized frequency of top 20 frequent words in positive tweets, compared
with in negative tweets.

efficiency. Tweets that share same Hashtags can be grouped together and easily found,
while popular Hashtags can make the tweets more visible to wider audience. Table 2.6
shows the most frequent Hashtags in positive tweets and negative tweets. It is clear that the
Hashtags in positive tweets are almost exclusively related to drug abuse, while the Hashtags
in negative tweets cover much wider range of topics.
Finally for word and phase analysis, we extract the cooccurrence frequencies of
combinations of drug name and drug abuse behavior. For each combination, we count the
number of positive tweets and negative tweets that contain all words in that combination,
then sort it by the absolute difference of normalized frequency between positive tweets and
negative tweets. Table 2.7 shows the top 25 observed combinations. The “Relative_ratio”
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Figure 2.8 Normalized frequency of top 20 frequent words in negative tweets, compared
with in positive tweets.

Table 2.6 Most Frequent Hashtags in Positive Tweets and Negative Tweets
#weed, #smoke, #cannabis, #marijuana, #glassofig, #scientificglass,
#WeedFirm, #maryjane, #dabs, #kush, #3wordsbetterthanIloveyou,
Positive tweets

#MarijuanaFunFacts, #pot, #dank, #high, #thc, #stoner, #blunt,
#highlife, #AcademyAward, #OscarNominations, #ganja, #waterpipes,
#np, #herblife
#job, #snow, #hiring, #photo, #traffic, #CareerArc, #NBAVote, #Simon,

Negative tweets

#winter, #jobs, #Hospitality, #peace, #WomensMarch, #love, #Toronto,
#Trump, #STAR, #nowplaying, #Orlando, #AZ, #np, #Veterans,
#Retail, #SoundCloud, #nyc, #Inauguration, #cat, #weather, #MAGA

column is showing the ratio that the combination appears in positive tweets over the appears
in all tweets. This analysis spots the more frequently used drug abuse risk behavior
indication word combinations, which will support further data collection.

Temporal analysis

To examine if there are different time patterns for positive tweets and

negative tweets to be posted, we extract the local posting time of each tweet, then perform
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Table 2.7 Drug Name and Abuse Behavior Cooccurrence Frequency Differences Between
Positive Tweets and Negative Tweets
Combo
trash high
acid trip
acid drop
glass amp
acid take
lean amp
coke high
coke take
lean hit
acid amp
molly pop
acid hit
lean pop
acid use
shrooms trip
lean high
lean use
blow high
upper high
dope high
coke amp
acid high
coke snort
molly amp
crack hit

Pos_count
1131
547
256
374
222
280
195
185
180
162
160
132
121
115
105
108
159
125
112
106
137
65
82
88
108

Neg_count
1387
239
168
3472
167
2391
186
512
745
367
328
138
118
238
55
136
1479
675
382
509
1413
57
571
777
1360
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Ratio_diff
0.9189%
0.4585%
0.2127%
0.2060%
0.1838%
0.1610%
0.1602%
0.1410%
0.1292%
0.1262%
0.1257%
0.1080%
0.0993%
0.0903%
0.0877%
0.0876%
0.0875%
0.0846%
0.0830%
0.0738%
0.0709%
0.0535%
0.0513%
0.0498%
0.0479%

Relative_ratio
1166.04%
1863.66%
1603.13%
171.11%
1509.61%
192.55%
1343.14%
646.57%
446.33%
761.96%
823.11%
1278.34%
1327.49%
817.21%
1751.49%
1147.54%
170.62%
337.93%
537.16%
383.46%
146.07%
1402.44%
251.20%
183.80%
104.18%

Figure 2.9 Time of day distribution comparison between positive tweets and negative
tweets.

1hourinterval binning. As shown in Figure 2.9, where xaxis are time slots, and yaxis
is the proportion (normalized count) of tweets. The results shown in Figure 2.9 are very
interesting. The time patterns are obviously different between positive tweets and negative
tweets. In fact, the chisquare test results on the data in Figure 2.9 shown in Table 2.8
clarifies that the pattern differences are significant for the time frames of ‘All day’ and
‘Night time.’ This result shows a very plausible phenomenon that tweets with drug abuse
risk behaviors are more active in night time than in day time.
Table 2.8 ChiSquare Test of Time of Day Distribution
Type

Chi square

Pvalue(95%)

All day

46.467257

0.002615305***

Day time (8 A.M. to 6 P.M.)

6.87318202 0.650321116

Night time (6 P.M. to 8 A.M.) 39.5940753 0.000160637***

Spatial analysis

The geolocation information tags in tweets are very useful for capturing

the distribution of drug abuse risk behaviors. The geotagging information on Twitter
usually comes in two forms: GPS coordinates, or a “Place Object” associated with the
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Figure 2.10 Dot map of positive tweets across the United States.

tweet. We first visualize geodistribution of the positive tweets by plotting each geotag
across the continental United States in Figure 2.10. By making this fine granularity, we
can confirm that the collected tweets generally follow the population distribution. Then,
we aggregate the geotags into state level, normalized with state’s population of age group
12 or older, and draw the Figure 2.11 with the numbers scaled to [1,1]. From Figure 2.11,
we can see that the District of Columbia has an extremely high ratio of positive tweets,
follow by Louisiana, Texas, and Nevada that have relative high rate. Other states with high
rate including California, Georgia, Maryland and Delaware. Furthermore, the distribution
of other states’ data showing that the collected tweets align relatively well with state level
population distribution.
The other spatial analysis we perform is the alignment between our state level counts
of positive tweets, normalized with state population, and the 20162017 National Survey on
Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) survey data. Here the normalization is meant to decorrelate
the count of tweets from the population of each state, and is done by simply dividing the
count of positive tweets by the population (2017 census estimation) for each state. We
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Figure 2.11 Number of positive tweets, per state, normalized by state population of 12 or
older.

choose to perform normalization with population for two reasons: (1) We have little to no
control of the sampling process, in terms of geolocation distribution, when crawling data
from Twitter, which means the bias is unavoidable and uncontrollable; and (2) Thus the
state population figures are more reliable, stable, and representative. NSDUH is a creditable
source of drug abuserelated population scale estimation. If our Twitter data can align with
the reliable survey data, we can argue that the Twitter based studies have the prediction
power that should not to be ignored. By computing the Pearson’s R between the normalized
number of tweets and the NSDUH prevalence rate, over the same age group (12 or older),
it is surprising to find that in our study even without further categorization, the Twitter
data is significantly correlated (p < 0.05) with some of the most important categories in the
NSDUH study: (1) “Illicit Drug Use Other Than Marijuana in the Past Month” (r = 0.387);
(2) “Cocaine Use in the Past Year” (r = 0.421); (3) “Methamphetamine Use in the Past
Year” (r = −0.372); (4) “Pain Reliever Use Disorder in the Past Year” (r = −0.375); and
(5) “Needing But Not Receiving Treatment at a Specialty Facility for Illicit Drug Use in the
Past Year” (r = 0.336). We argue that, when large quantity of Twitter data is available, we
can perform more detailed and creditable studies on the population scale.
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2.2.6

Discussion and Limitations

According to our experimental results, our deep selftaught learning models achieved
promising performance in drug abuse risk behavior detection in Twitter. Many assumptions
call for further experiments. First, how to optimize the classification performance by
exploring the correlations among parameters and experimental configurations. For instance,
for SVM and RF models, unigram feature works better than ngram feature on term
frequency; however, for tfidf, it is the opposite situation. Second, the pretrained Google
News Word2vec embedding performs better than the customtrained Word2vec embedding
may also be situational. These findings indicate the necessity of leveraging size and quality
of the training data for training word embedding, given that the available data may better
fit the classification task but be short in quantity. Nevertheless, among the measures, recall
receives a more significant boost than accuracy and F1value. We may argue that the
proposed selftaught algorithm helped correcting the bias in the classifiers caused by the
imbalanced nature of the training dataset. More experiments need to be conducted to verify
this interesting point.

2.2.7

Future Research

The study we presented in this dissertation can be improved in many ways. Here we
elaborate several of the future research directions. Firstly, we plan to incorporate the well
trained classifier into a realtime drug abuse risk behavior monitoring and analysis system
that aims at providing communitylevel stakeholders with timely accessible detection
results for supporting their efforts, such as recovery services and public educations, on
combating the opioid crisis. Secondly, we can utilize more information that can be
extracted from tweets, such as user tweeting history, user demographic attributes, and user
interactions, to further improve the model in terms of performance, scope, and credibility.
Thirdly, the extra information that we extract further enables the analysis of connections
among users and tweets, on both social network plane and geospatial network plane, which
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can help to acquire knowledge regarding how the drug trend propagates through both planes.
Last but not least, we may expand the study to other major online social media platforms,
i.e., Reddit and Instagram, and more specialized online forum Blulelight.

2.2.8

Conclusion

In this study, we proposed a largescale drug abuse risk behavior tweet collection mechanism
based on supervised machine learning and data crowdsourcing techniques. Challenges
came from the noisy and sparse characteristics of Twitter data, as well as the limited
availability of annotated data. To address this problem, we propose deep selftaught learning
algorithms to improve drug abuse risk behavior tweet detection models by leveraging a large
number of unlabeled tweets. An extensive experiment and data analysis were carried out
on three million drug abuserelated tweets with geolocation information, to validate the
effectiveness and reliability of our system. Experimental results shown that our models
significantly outperform traditional models. In fact, our models correspondingly achieve
86.53%, 88.6%, and 86.63% in terms of accuracy, recall, and F1value. This is a very
promising result, which significantly improves upon the stateoftheart results.
Further data analysis gain insights into the expression patterns and the geodistribution
that the drug abusers may have on Twitter. For example, the words and phrases used in
drug abuse risk behaviorpositive tweets have distinctive frequencies that can be used in
data collection to improve the quality of raw data. The uneven geographical distribution
of tweets makes it appealing to perform further analysis that associates tweets with other
geographical data.
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Figure 2.12 Basic architecture of the DrugTracker system.

2.3 DrugTracker: A Communityfocused Drug Abuse Monitoring and Supporting
System using Social Media and Geospatial Data
2.3.1

DrugTracker System

We opt to implement DrugTracker as a webbased visualization system, since webbased
systems are more flexible and requires virtually no setup process for endusers. Our system
(Figure 2.12) includes two major parts: (1) The backend, which runs on a server and
provides data services, including data collection, data preprocessing, deep learning models
for drug abuse risk behavior detection, and data management; and (2) The frontend, which
runs on web browsers to provide interactive User Interfaces (UIs), for making queries and
visualizing analysis results.

Backend Services The backend does the heavy lifting in the system, which runs a
complete pipeline of collecting and processing data coming from social media and other
sources (e.g., census data). There are three major modules in the backend, including the
data collection module, the data processing module, and the data management module.
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Table 2.9 Geotag Types and Frequency
Geo Type

Subtype

Percentage

Country

0.29%

Admin

13.63%

City

70.69%

Neighborhood

0.32%

POI

1.06%



14.01%

Place

Coordinates

For the data collection, we use tweets as a major source of geotagged social media
data for its availability and abundance. We collect tweets through the publicly available
Streaming API [147] using a typical keywordbased crawler wellintegrated with trained
deep learning models (i.e., CNN and LSTM models) designed to detect drug abuse risk
behaviors in tweets [49, 148]. In our previous work [49, 148], we built our human labeled
drug abuse risk behavior dataset, and demonstrated that a deep learning model, which was
trained with both labeled data and large number of unlabeled data, can achieve stateofart
classification performance (86.63% of Accuracy, 89% of Recall, 86.83% of F1value) on
our dataset. The module is able to continuously collect newest tweets, to feed tweets to
deep learning models, and to update the system with live data, so that the drug trend can be
tracked and analyzed in near realtime.
The use of geotags in tweets is not straight forward. Statistics of the 2017 dataset,
as shown in Table 2.9, tell us that there are two major types of available geotags: ‘place’
Object and ‘coordinates’ Object. The ‘coordinates’ Objects are GPS points that comes
from Twitter users who have location service turned on, while each ‘place’ Object refers to
a named place entity that the tweet is associated with (but not necessarily originating from)
[147]. However, the ‘place’ Objects have several types but the resolution/granularity of
each Object of same type may vary. In this demonstration, we opt to only use ‘coordinates’
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as geotags, as they provide the highest location precision with an adequate quantity of data
points.
For offline data, such as geographical data and demographic data, we use publicly
available data from trusted sources (e.g., Census Bureau). A workflow is built to prejoin
the tweets data with offline data as a preprocessing step for performance reason. In our
system, we first collect Census Tract data, in the format of Shapefile, and population census
data, in the form of spreadsheets. Then we joined (tablejoin and spatialjoin) these data
with tweets, so that each tweet record in our database is associated with offline data.
The preprocessed tweets data is stored and managed in a NoSQL database (e.g.,
MongoDB). For the fields in the original tweet objects, only those fields that are used by
the frontend are stored. Several further preprocessing steps are preformed, including:
(1) The timestamp of each tweet, which is in UTC, is converted to local time using
geolocation information; (2) Reidentification information in each tweet’s texts, i.e., User
Mention and URL, are removed; and (3) The subcategory of each tweet is extracted by
identifying drug abuserelated keywords. Indexes are created for the fields of timestamp,
text, keywords, and geolocation to support fast text queries and spatial queries. Python and
PHP scripts are served as the interface between the backend and the frontend that execute
queries and generate responses to the frontend.

Frontend Interactive Visualization The frontend is built based on the opensourced
NeighborVis System [149]. The basic UI layout and some components are inherited,
while new functions are added to incorporate the different functions offered in our system.
The frontend is a dynamic web page constructed with HTML and Javascript. Javascript
framework Leaflet is used for the core mapping functionality. Other frameworks, such as
Heatmapjs and D3 are used for drawing heatmap and charts, respectively.
One noticeable change we made to the system is that the tweets displayed to the
users in the frontend are always aggregated into some desired form instead of individually.
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(a) Choropleth

(b) Heatmap
Figure 2.13 Mapping Area: (a) Choropleth and (b) Heatmap.

This is done for two reasons: (1) To protect the sensitive information that the tweets and
the classification results contain; and (2) To enable the displaying and analysis of tweets at
population scale, as it is impractical to show millions of tweets on the map. The aggregation
can be done on different types of administrative regions or entities, depending on the users’
needs. For demonstration, we aggregate our data into Census Tract level. The UI of our
system is demonstrated in Figures 2.132.15. The visualization layout is divided into three
sections from left to right: (1) Query Management; (2) Mapping Area; and (3) Statistical
Information.
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Figure 2.14 An example of polygonshaped query area.

Query Management. To begin, users should provide a query by clicking a button
on the left panel to launch a query interface (Figure 2.13). A query has two mandatory
constraints: temporal constraint and spatial constraint, and one optional constraint: content
constraint. The temporal constraint limits the local postingtime of tweets and is specified
by a start and an end date. The spatial constraint limits the location where the tweets are
from and can be either a user defined area (optional shapes are circle, rectangle, and polygon
Figure 2.14), or a list of states. The actual query area has a minimum granularity (Census
Tract level in demonstration) to prevent the disclosure of individual tweet’s location. The
content constraint can be a list of keywords and phrases, e.g., “get high,” “smoke blunt,”
etc. Users can also query multiple datasets at once to improve efficiency.
Once the query is submitted, the backend will process the query and send aggregated
results to frontend for displaying in the mapping area. Our system provides two basic
mapping options: Choropleth and Heatmap (Figure 2.13). Choropleth displays the number
of tweets that match the query within each area with a color mapping from green (low) to red
(high). Jenks natural breaks is the default classification (binning) method. The choropleth
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(a) Tweet samples

(b) Temporal analysis

(c) Category frequency

(d) Word cloud

Figure 2.15 Analysis functions: (a) Tweet samples, (b) Temporal analysis, (c) Category
frequency, and (d) Word cloud.

can also display the tweets data conjugated with selected offline data (e.g., normalize the
number of tweets by the population in each Census Tract). Heatmap provides a way to view
the data in a more analog way, by showing the density in a spectrum of colors from blue
(low) to red (high). On the leftside panel, users can select which dataset and query to view,
and can finetune the parameters of the generated maps (e.g., opacity, number of bins, and
heatmap intensity).
There is a collapsible panel (Figure 2.15) on the right consisting of five subpanels,
each of which presents a set of information corresponding to the current query that aids
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the analysis, including: (1) Query information, shows the parameters that are used for this
query; (2) Random samples of tweets in the query (Figure 2.15a); (3) Temporal analysis
of different scopes, including by year, by month, by week, by day, by weekday, and by
hourofday (Figure 2.15b); (4) Word cloud of most popular words in among the tweets in
the query (Figure 2.15d); and (5) Bar chart of frequency of each category (e.g., type of drug
mentioned in each tweet) (Figure 2.15c). If the user is interested in more detailed analysis,
by clicking the items in these panels, e.g., a keyword in (Figure 2.15d), and a category in
(Figure 2.15c), a subquery with updated parameters will be launched and new results will
be displayed. The user can easily switch between queries to compare them.

2.3.2

Conclusion and Future Work

In this study, we developed a communityfocused drug abuse monitoring and supporting
system, called DrugTracker, using social media and geospatial data in near realtime.
Our DrugTracker system provides vital source of information when combating the drug
abuse epidemiology, and proposed a function rich visualization system that can help local
communities and organizations being informed about drug trends, locating drug abuse
hotspots, and reaching online users who may in need for help.
Some future work can be done on the proposed system. Here we just name a few:
(1) Integrates more varieties of offline geospatial data that fits the needs of different
aggregation levels; (2) Integrates more advanced privacy preserving methods that enables
more detailed analysis with lower risk of unwanted leak of privacy; and (3) Further enrich
the system with social connections (e.g., following, user mention) to enable the association
of social connection information with geospatial data that aids the analysis.
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CHAPTER 3
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN DEEP LEARNING WITH CERTIFIED
ROBUSTNESS BOUNDS

Chapter Abstract

Today, deep learning has become the tool of choice in many areas

of engineering, such as autonomous systems, signal and information processing, and data
analytics. Deep learning systems are, therefore, not only applied in classic settings, such as
speech and handwriting recognition, but also progressively operate at the core of security
and privacy critical applications. The pervasiveness of machine learning exposes new
vulnerabilities in software systems, in which deployed machine learning models can be
used (a) to reveal sensitive information in private training data [64], and/or (b) to make
the models misclassify, such as adversarial examples [65]. In this subsection, we present
our effort in three aspects of privacy preserving in deep learning: (1) The developing a
novel mechanism to preserve differential privacy in deep neural networks, such that:1. The
privacy budget consumption is totally independent of the number of training steps; 2. It has
the ability to adaptively inject noise into features based on the contribution of each to the
output; and 3. It could be applied in a variety of different deep neural networks; (2) The
preserving of differential privacy (DP) in lifelong learning (L2M); and (3) The developing
of a scalable algorithm to preserve differential privacy (DP) in adversarial learning for deep
neural networks (DNNs), with certified robustness to adversarial examples.
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3.1
3.1.1

Adaptive Laplace Mechanism: Differential Privacy
Preservation in Deep Learning

Preliminaries and Related Work

In this subsection, we revisit differential privacy, existing techniques in preserving differ
ential privacy in deep learning, and the Layerwise Relevance Propagation (LRP) algorithm
[98].
Let D be a database that contains n tuples x1 , x2 , . . . , xn and d+1 attributes X1 , X2 , . . .
, Xd , Y , and for each tuple xi = (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xid , yi ). We assume, without loss of
qP
d
2
generality,
j=1 xij ≤ 1 where xij ≥ 0. This assumption can be easily enforced by
changing each xij to

xij −αj
√ ,
(βj −αj )· d

where αj and βj denote the minimum and maximum values

in the domain of Xj .
To be general, let us consider a classification task with M possible categorical
outcomes, i.e., the data label yi given xi ∈ L is assigned to only one of the M categories.
Each yi can be considered as a vector of M categories yi = {yi1 , . . . , yiM }. If the lth
category is the class of xi , then yil = 1, otherwise yil = 0. Our objective is to construct a
differentially private deep neural network from D that (i) takes xi = (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xid ) as
input and (ii) outputs a prediction of yi that is as accurate as possible. To evaluate whether
model parameters θ lead to an accurate model, a cost function FD (θ) is used to measure the
difference between the original and predicted values of yi .

3.1.2

ϵDifferential Privacy

As the released model parameter θ may disclose sensitive information of D, to protect the
privacy, we require that the model training should be performed with an algorithm that
satisfies ϵdifferential privacy. The definition of differential privacy is as follows:
Definition 3.1. ϵDifferential Privacy [55]. A randomized algorithm A fulfills ϵdifferential
privacy, if for any two databases D and D′ differing at most one tuple, and for all O ⊆
Range(A), we have:
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P r[A(D) = O] ≤ eϵ P r[A(D′ ) = O]

(3.1)

where the privacy budget ϵ controls the amount by which the distributions induced by
D and D′ may differ. A smaller ϵ enforces a stronger privacy guarantee of A.
A general method for preserving ϵdifferential privacy of any function F (on D) is
the Laplace mechanism [55], where the output of F is a vector of real numbers. In fact, the
mechanism exploits the global sensitivity of F over any two neighboring data sets (differing
at most one record), which is denoted as GSF (D). Given GSF (D), the Laplace mechanism
ensures ϵdifferential privacy by injecting noise η into each value in the output of F(D):
pdf (η) =

ϵ
exp(−|η|
2GSF (D)

·

ϵ
),
GSF (D)

where η is drawn i.i.d. from Laplace distribution

with zero mean and scale GSF (D)/ϵ.
Research in differential privacy has been significantly studied, from both the theoreti
cal perspective, e.g., [56, 150], and the application perspective, e.g., data collection [151],
spatiotemporal correlations [152, 153], data streams [154], stochastic gradient descents
[155], recommendation [57], regression [56], online learning [156], publishing contingency
tables [157], and spectral graph analysis [158].

3.1.3

Differential Privacy in Deep Learning

Deep neural networks define parameterized functions from inputs xi ∈ D to outputs,
i.e., a prediction of yi , as compositions of many layers of hidden neurons and nonlinear
functions. For instance, Figure 3.1 illustrates a multilayer neural network, in which there are
k hidden layers H = {h1 , . . . , hk }. Rectified linear units (ReLUs) and sigmoids are widely
used examples of activation functions. By adjusting parameters of these neurons, such
parameterized functions can be trained with the goal of fitting a finite set of inputoutput
data instances. We specify a loss function FD (θ) that represents the penalty for mismatching
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Figure 3.1 An instance of differentially private neural networks.

between the predicted and original values of yi . FD (θ) on parameters θ is the average of the
loss over the training examples {x1 ,..., xn }. Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm is
used to minimize the crossentropy error [39], given the model outputs and true data labels.
In the work of Abadi et al. [62], to preserve differential privacy, normal (Gaussian)
distribution noise is added into the gradients g̃ of parameters W as follows. At each training
step t, the algorithm first takes a random sample Lt with sampling probability L/n, where
L is a group size and n is the number of tuples in D. For each tuple xi ∈ Lt , the gradient
gt (xi ) = ∇θt Fxi (θt ) is computed. Then the gradients will be bounded by clipping each
gradient in l2 norm, i.e., the gradient vector gt is replaced by gt / max(1, ∥g2t ∥/C) for a
predefined threshold C. Normal distribution noise is added into gradients of parameters θ
as:
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g̃t ←


1 X
gt (xi )
2 2
+
N
(0,
σ
C
I)
L i max(1, ∥gt (xi )2 ∥ )

(3.2)

C

θt ← θt − ξt g̃t

(3.3)

where ξt is a learning rate at the training step t.
Finally, differentially private parameters θ, denoted θ, learned by the algorithm
are shared to the public and other parties. Overall, the algorithm introduces noise into
“gradients” of parameters at every training step. The magnitude of injected noise and the
privacy budget ϵ are accumulated in proportion to the number of training epochs.
Compared with the work in [62], the goal is similar: learning differentially private
parameters θ. However, we develop a novel mechanism in which the privacy budget
consumption is independent of the number of training epochs. Our mechanism is different.
We redistribute the noise so that “more noise” will be added into features which are “less
relevant” to the model output, and viceversa. Moreover, we inject noise into coefficients
of affine transformations and loss functions, such that differentially private parameters can
be learned.

3.1.4

Layerwise Relevance Propagation

Layerwise Relevance Propagation (LRP) [98] is a wellaccepted algorithm, which is
applied to compute the relevance of each input feature xij to the model outcome Fxi (θ).
(k)

Given the relevance, denoted Rm (xi ), of a certain neuron m at the layer k, i.e., m ∈ hk ,
for the model outcome Fxi (θ), LRP algorithm aims at obtaining a decomposition of such
relevance in terms of messages sent to neurons of the previous layers, i.e., the layer (k1)th.
(k−1,k)

These messages are called Rp←m (xi ). The overall relevance of each neuron in the lower
layer is determined by summing up the relevance coming from all upperlayer neurons:
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Rp(k−1) (xi ) =

X

(k−1,k)
Rp←m
(xi )

(3.4)

m∈hk

where the relevance decomposition is based on the ratio of local and global affine
transformations and is given by:

(k−1,k)
(xi )
Rp←m



=



(k)
zpm (xi )
R (xi )
zm (xi )+µ m
(k)
zpm (xi )
R (xi )
zm (xi )−µ m

zm (xi ) ≥ 0
zm (xi ) < 0

(3.5)

with: zm (xi ) is the affine transformation of neuron m ∈ hk :

zpm (xi ) = pxi × Wpm
X
zpm (xi ) + bm
zm (xi ) =

(3.6)
(3.7)

p∈hk

s.t. pxi is the value of neuron p given xi , Wpm is a weight connecting the neuron p to
neuron m, and bm is a bias term. A predefined stabilizer µ ≥ 0 is introduced to overcome
unboundedness.
In Equation (3.5), in order to back propagate the relevance, we need to compute the
(k)

relevance Rm (xi ) at the last hidden layer, i.e., the kth layer, from the output layer. Given
(k)

the output variable o, Rm (xi ) is computed as follows:

(k)
(xi )
Rm



=



zmo (xi )
F (θ)
zo (xi )+µ xi
zmo (xi )
F (θ)
zo (xi )−µ xi
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zo (xi ) ≥ 0
zo (xi ) < 0

(3.8)

Given k hidden layers {h1 , . . . , hk }, by using Equations (3.4), (3.5), and (3.8), we can
compute the relevance of every hidden neuron and input feature. As in [98], the following
equation holds:

Fxi (θ) =

X

(k)
Rm
(xi ) = . . . =

X

Rxij (xi )

(3.9)

xij ∈xi

m∈hk

where Rxij (xi ) is the relevance of the feature xij given the model outcome Fxi (θ). To
Rx (xi )−χ

ij
ensure that the relevance Rxij (xi ) ∈ [−1, 1], each Rxij (xi ) is normalized to (φ−χ)
, where

φ and χ denote the maximum and minimum values in the domain of Rxi1 (xi ), . . . , Rxid (xi ) .

Figure 3.2 An instance of relevance of each input feature given to the classification output
(MNIST dataset). Red neurons indicate stronger relevances, and green neurons indicate
weaker relevances.

3.1.5

Adaptive Laplace Mechanism (AdLM)

In this subsection, we formally present our mechanism. Given a loss function F(θ) with
model parameters θ, the network is trained by optimizing the loss function F(θ) on D by
applying SGD algorithm on T random training batches consequently. At each training step,
a single training batch L is used. A batch L is a random set of training samples in D with
a predefined batch size |L|.
The pseudocodes of Algorithm 3.1 outline five basic steps in our mechanism to learn
differentially private parameters of the model. The five basic steps are as follows:
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Step 1 (Lines 17). In the first step, we obtain the average relevances of all the jth
input features, denoted as Rj (D), by applying the LRP algorithm on a welltrained deep
neural network on the database D. Rj (D) is computed as follows:

Rj (D) =

1 X
Rx (xi )
|D| x ∈D ij

(3.10)

i

Then, we derive differentially private relevances, denoted as Rj , by injecting Laplace
noise into Rj for all the jth input features. The total privacy budget in this step is ϵ1 .
Step 2 (Lines 814). In the second step, we derive a differentially private affine
transformation layer, denoted h0 . Every hidden neuron h0j ∈ h0 will be perturbed
by injecting adaptive Laplace noise into its affine transformation to preserve differential
privacy given a batch L. Based on Rj , “more noise” is injected into features which are
“less relevant” to the model output, and viceversa. The total privacy budget used in this
step is ϵ2 . The perturbed affine transformation layer is denoted as h0L (Figure 3.1).
Step 3 (Line 15). In the third step, we stack hidden layers {h1 , . . . , hk } on top of the
differentially private hidden layer h0L to construct the deep private neural network (Figure
3.1). The computations of h1 , . . . , hk are done based on the differentially private layer
h0L without accessing any information from the original data. Therefore, the computations
do not disclose any information. Before each stacking operation, a normalization layer,
denoted h, is applied to bound nonlinear activation functions, such as ReLUs (Figure 3.1).
Step 4 (Lines 1619).

After constructing a private structure of hidden layers

{h0L , h1 , . . . , hk }, we need to protect the labels yi at the output layer. To achieve this,
we derive a polynomial approximation of the loss function F. Then, we perturb the loss
function F by injecting Laplace noise with a privacy budget ϵ3 into its coefficients to
preserve differential privacy on each training batch L, denoted F L (θ).
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Step 5 (Lines 2030). Finally, the parameter θT is derived by minimizing the loss
function F L (θ) on T training steps sequentially. In each step t, stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) algorithm is used to update parameters θt given a random batch L of training samples
in D. This essentially is an optimization process, without using any additional information
from the original data.
In our mechanism, differential privacy is preserved, since it is enforced at every
computation task that needs to access the original data D. Laplace noise is injected into our
model only once, as a preprocessing step to preserve differential privacy in the computation
of the relevance Rj (D), the first layer h0L , and the loss function F L (θ). Thereafter, the
training phase will not access the original data again. The privacy budget consumption
does not accumulate in each training step. As such, it is independent of the number of
training epochs.

3.1.6

Private Relevance

In this subsection, we preserve differential privacy in the computation of the relevance
of each jth input feature on database D by injecting Laplace noise into Rj (D). We set
∆R =

2d
|D|

based on the maximum values of all the relevances Rj (D) (line 4, Algorithm

3.1). In lines 56, the relevance of each jth input feature Rj (D) is perturbed by adding
Laplace noise Lap( ∆ϵ1R ). The perturbed relevance is denoted as Rj . In line 7, we obtain the
set of all perturbed relevances R(D):


R(D) = Rj
where Rj =

(3.11)

j∈[1,d]

1 X
∆R
Rxij (xi ) + Lap(
)
|D| x ∈D
ϵ1
i

70

(3.12)

Algorithm 3.1 Adaptive Laplace Mechanism (Database D, hidden layers H, loss function
F(θ), and privacy budgets ϵ1 , ϵ2 , and ϵ3 , the number of batches T , the batch size |L|)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

Compute the average relevance by applying the LRP Algorithm
1 P
∀j ∈ [1, d] : Rj (D) = |D|
xi ∈D Rxij (xi ) #Equation3.10#
Inject Laplace noise into the average relevance of each jth input feature
∆R = 2d/|D| #Lemma 3.1#
for j ∈ [1, d] do
∆R
1 P
Rj ← |D|
xi ∈D Rxij (xi ) + Lap( ϵ1 )

7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

R(D) = {Rj }j∈[1,d]
Inject Laplace noise into coefficients of the differentially private layer h0
P
∆h0 = 2 h∈h0 d #Lemma 3.3#
for j ∈ [1, d] do
ϵj ← βj × ϵ2 #Equation (3.18)#

12: for xi ∈ D, j ∈ [1, d] do
∆
1
13:
xij ← xij + |L|
Lap( ϵhj0 ) #perturb input feature xij #
14: b ← b +
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:

∆h 0
1
|L| Lap( ϵ2 )

#perturb bias b#

Construct hidden layers {h1 , . . . , hk } and normalization layers {h1 , . . . , h(k) }
Inject Laplace noise into coefficients of the approximated loss function Fb
∆F = M (|h(k) | + 14 |h(k) |2 ) #Lemma 3.5#
for xi ∈ D, R ∈ [0, 2], l ∈ [1, M ] do
(R)
(R)
1
ϕlxi ← ϕlxi + |L|
Lap( ∆ϵ3F ) #perturb coefficients of Fb

20: Initialize θ0 randomly
21: for t ∈ [T ] do
22:
Take a random training batch L
23:
Construct differentially private affine transformation layer
24:
h0L (W0 ) ← {hL (W )}h∈h0

P
25:
s.t. hL (W ) = xi ∈L xi W T + b)
26:
Construct differentially private loss function
R
P2
P P
(R)
T
27:
F L (θt ) = M
R=0 ϕlxi Wl(k)
l=1
xi ∈L
28:
Compute gradient descents
1
29:
θt+1 ← θt − ηt |L|
▽θt F L (θt ) #ηt is a learning rate#
30: Return θT #(ϵ1 + ϵ2 + ϵ3 )differentially private#
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The computation of R(D) is ϵ1 differential private. The correctness is based on the
following lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. Let D and D′ be any two neighboring databases. Given R(D) and R(D′ )
be the relevance of all input features on D and D′ , respectively, and denote their
representations as

1 X
Rx (xi )
|D| x ∈D ij
i
X

1
R(D′ ) = Rj (D′ ) j∈[1,d] s.t. Rj (D′ ) = ′
Rx′ (x′ )
|D | ′ ′ ij i

R(D) = Rj (D)

s.t. Rj (D) =
j∈[1,d]

xi ∈D

Then, we have the following inequality:
1 X
|D| j=1
d

X

Rxij (xi ) −

X

Rx′ij (x′i )

x′i ∈D′

xi ∈D

1

≤

2d
|D|

(3.13)

where d is the number of features in each tuple xi ∈ D.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Assume that D and D′ differ in the last tuple. Let xn (x′n ) be the last tuple in D (D′ ).
We have that

1 X
|D| j=1
d

∆R =

X

Rxij (xi ) −

X

Rx′ij (x′i )

x′i ∈D′

xi ∈D

1 X
Rxnj (xn ) − Rx′nj (x′n )
|D| j=1
d

=

d
X
2
2d
≤
∥Rxij (xi )∥1 ≤
max
|D| xi ∈D j=1
|D|
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1

1

Equation (3.13) holds.
Lemma 3.2. Algorithm 3.1 preserves ϵ1 differential privacy in the computation of R(D).
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
Proof. Let D and D′ be two neighbor databases. Without loss of generality, assume that D
and D′ differ in the last tuple xn (x′n ). Rj (D) is calculated as done in line 6, Algorithm 3.1,

and R(D) = Rj (D) j∈[1,d] is the output of the Algorithm 3.1 (line 7). The perturbation
of the relevance Rj (D) can be rewritten as:

Rj =

1 X
∆R
Rxij (xi ) + Lap(
)
|D| x ∈D
ϵ1

(3.14)

i

Since all the input features are perturbed, we have that

Qd

exp
P r R(D)
 = j=1
Qd
P r R(D′ )
j=1 exp
≤

d
Y

exp(

j=1

≤

d
Y

exp(

j=1
d
Y

ϵ1
|D|∆R

X

1
ϵ1 ∥ |D|
1
ϵ1 ∥ |D|

P

i

∆R

X

Rj (x′i ) )

x′i ∈D′

ϵ1
Rj (xn ) − Rj (x′n ) )
|D|∆R
1

ϵ1
2 max Rj (xn ) 1 )
|D|∆R xn ∈D
j=1
P
2 maxxn ∈L dj=1 ∥Rj (xn )∥1
)
≤ exp(ϵ1
|D|∆R

≤

Rj (xi )−Rj ∥1 

∆R
P
′
′
x ∈D Rj (xi )−Rj ∥1 

Rj (xi ) −

xi ∈D

xi ∈D

exp(

≤ exp(ϵ1 )
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1

Consequently, the computation of R(D) preserves ϵ1 differential privacy in Algorithm
3.1.

Figure 3.3 The average differentially private relevance of each input feature given MNIST
dataset.

Lemma 3.2 shows that the computation of the relevances R(D) is differentially
private. Figure 3.3 illustrates the differentially private relevance Rj (Equation (3.12)) of
each jth coefficient given the database D. It is worth noting that the relevance distribution
is not identical. In the next subsection, R(D) is used to redistribute the noise injected into
the affine transformation layer h0 in our deep neural network.

3.1.7

Private Affine Transformation Layer with Adaptive Noise

In general, before applying activation functions such as ReLU and sigmoid, the affine
transformation of a hidden neuron h ∈ h0 can be presented as:

hxi (W ) = b + xi W T

(3.15)

where b is a static bias, and W is the parameter of h. Given a training batch L, h can
be rewritten as:

hL (W ) =

X

(b + xi W T )

xi ∈L
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(3.16)

Given the above representation of each neuron hL (Wh ), we preserve differential
privacy in the computation of h0 on L by injecting Laplace noise into inputs b and xi of every
∆

1
neuron hL (W ) ∈ h0 . Intuitively, we can apply an identical noise distribution |L|
Lap( ϵh20 )
P
to all input features, where ∆h0 = 2 h∈h0 d (line 9, Algorithm 3.1). This approach works

well when every input feature has an identical contribution to the model outcome. This
approach is described in the following subsection Identical Laplace Mechanism (ILM).

Identical Laplace Mechanism (ILM) We can add an identical noise distribution of
P
∆
1
Lap( ϵh20 ) to all input features, where ∆h0 = 2 h∈h0 d (line 9, Algorithm 3.1) to preserve
|L|
differential privacy in the computation of h0 . In fact, we have that ∀xi ∈ D, j ∈ [1, d] :
xij = xij +

∆
1
Lap( ϵh20 ).
|L|

hL (W ) =

d hX
X
j=1

For each h ∈ h0L , h can be rewritten as:

xij +

xi ∈L

i X
1
∆h 
∆h 
1
Lap( 0 ) W T +
Lap( 0 )
b+
|L|
ϵ2
|L|
ϵ2
x ∈L

(3.17)

i

Let us consider the static bias b = 1 as the 0th input feature and its associated
parameter Wb , i.e., xi0 = b = 1 and W = Wb ∪ W , we have that

hL (W ) =

d hX
X
j=0

=

d h
X
j=0

h

where ϕj =

P
xi ∈L

xij +

xi ∈L

i
1
∆h 
Lap( 0 ) W T
|L|
ϵ2

d
∆h0 i T X h T
xij + Lap(
) W =
ϕj W
ϵ2
j=0
x ∈L

X
i

xij + Lap(

∆h 0 
) .
ϵ2
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h

We can see that ϕj is the perturbation of the input feature xij associated with the jth
parameter Wj ∈ W of the hidden neuron h on L. Since all the hidden neurons h in h0 are
perturbed, we have that:
d
 YY
ϵ2 ∥
P r h0L (W0 ) =
exp

P

h

xi ∈L

∆h0

h∈h0 j=0

∆h0 is set to 2

P
h∈h0

d and h0L (W0 ) = {hL (W )}h∈h0 is the output, we have that

Q
Qd

P r h0L (W0 )
h∈h0
j=0 exp
=
Q
Qd
P r h0L′ (W0 )
h∈h0
j=0 exp
≤

Y

d
Y

exp(

h∈h0 j=0

≤

Y

d
Y

exp(

d
YY
h∈h0 j=1

≤ exp(ϵ2

2

exp(
P

P
ϵ2 ∥ x
ϵ2 ∥

xi ∈L

ϵ2
xnj − x′ nj
∆h0
ϵ2
2 max xnj
∆h0 xn ∈L

h∈h0

∆h0

d

xij −ϕj ∥1 
h

i ∈L

∆h 0

P

x′ ∈L′
i

x′ ij −ϕj ∥1 
h

∆h 0

X
ϵ2 X
x′ ij
xij −
∆h0 x ∈L
′
′
i

h∈h0 j=1

≤

xij − ϕj ∥ 

)
1

)
1

)≤
1

d
YY
h∈h0 j=1

exp(

2ϵ2
)
∆h0

) = exp(ϵ2 )

Consequently, based on the above analysis, the computation of h0L (W0 ) preserves
ϵ2 differential privacy in Algorithm 3.1 by injecting an identical Laplace noise

∆
1
Lap( ϵh20 )
|L|

into all input features. In addition, given the identical Laplace noise, we do not need to use
the differentially private relevance R(D), since we do not need to redistribute the noise in
the first affine transformation layer h0 .
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Problems with the ILM In practice, this assumption usually is violated. For instance,
Figure 3.2 illustrates the relevance, estimated by the LRP algorithm [98], of each input
feature given different handwritten digits. It is clear that the relevances are not identical.
The differentially private relevances are not identical as well (Figure 3.3). Therefore,
injecting the same magnitude of noise into all input features may affect the utility of
differentially private neural networks.
To address this problem, we propose an Adaptive Laplace Mechanism (AdLM), to
adaptively redistribute the injected noise to improve the performance. Given hidden units
hxi (W ) in Equation (3.15), our key idea is to intentionally add more noise into input features
which are less relevant to the model output Y , and viceversa. As a result, we expect to
improve the utility of the model under differential privacy. In fact, we introduce a privacy
budget ratio βj and the privacy budget ϵj for each jth input feature as follows:

d × |Rj |
s.t. ϵj = βj × ϵ2
βj = Pd
j=1 |Rj |

We set ∆h0 = 2

P
h∈h0

(3.18)

d based on the maximum values of all the input features xij

(line 9, Algorithm 3.1). In line 11, βj can be considered as the fraction of the contribution
to ∆h0 from the jth input feature to the hidden neuron h ∈ h0 . In lines 1213, each input
feature xij of every hidden neuron h in the first affine transformation layer h0 is perturbed
1
Lap(∆h0 /ϵj ). The perturbed input features are denoted
by adding adaptive Laplace noise |L|

as xi . In lines 2021, given a random training batch L, we construct the differentially private
affine transformation layer h0L , which consists of perturbed hidden neurons hL (W ):

h0L (W0 ) = hL (W )

h∈h0

s.t. hL (W ) =

X
xi ∈L
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xi W T + b



where b = b +

∆
1
Lap( ϵh20 )
|L|

is the perturbed bias (line 14). The following lemma

shows that Algorithm 3.1 preserves ϵ2 differential privacy in the computation of h0L .
Lemma 3.3. Let L and L′ be any two neighboring batches. Given parameter W0 , let h0L
and h0L′ be the first affine transformation layers on L and L′ , respectively, and denote their
representations as follows:

h0L (W0 ) = {hL (W )}h∈h0 s.t. hL (W ) =

X

(b + xi W T )

xi ∈L

X

h0L′ (W0 ) = {hL′ (W )}h∈h0 s.t. hL′ (W ) =

(b + x′i W T )

x′i ∈L′

Then, we have the following inequality:

∆h0 =

d
XX
X
h∈h0 j=1

xij −

X

x′ij

x′i ∈L′

xi ∈L

1

≤2

X

d

(3.19)

h∈h0

where d is the number of features in each tuple xi ∈ D.
Proof of Lemma 3.3:
Proof. Assume that L and L′ differ in the last tuple. Let xn (x′n ) be the last tuple in L (L′ ).
We have that

∆h0 =

d
XX
X
h∈h0 j=1

xij −

X

x′ij

x′i ∈L′

xi ∈L

1

d
d
XX
XX
′
∥xij ∥1
=
∥xnj − xnj ∥1 ≤ 2 max
xi ∈L

h∈h0 j=1
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h∈h0 j=1

(3.20)

Since ∀xi , j : xij ∈ [0, 1], from Equation (3.20) we have that: ∆h0 ≤ 2

P
h∈h0

d.

Equation (3.19) holds.
Lemma 3.4. Algorithm 3.1 preserves ϵ2 differential privacy in the computation of h0L (W0 )
(lines 2425).

Proof of Lemma 3.4:
Proof. From lines 2425 in the Algorithm 3.1, for each h ∈ h0L , h can be rewritten as:

hL (W ) =

d hX
X
j=1

xij +

xi ∈L

i X
1
∆h 
1
∆h 
Lap( 0 ) W T +
b+
Lap( 0 )
|L|
ϵj
|L|
ϵ2
x ∈L

(3.21)

i

Let us consider the static bias b = 1 as the 0th input feature and its associated
parameter Wb , i.e., xi0 = b = 1 and W = Wb ∪ W , we have that

i
1
∆h 
Lap( 0 ) W T
|L|
ϵj

(3.22)

d
∆h0 i T X h T
) W =
ϕj W
xij + Lap(
ϵj
j=0
x ∈L

(3.23)

hL (W ) =

d hX
X
j=0

=

d h
X
j=0

h

where ϕj =

xij +

xi ∈L

X
i

P

xi ∈L xij + Lap(

∆h 0 
) .
ϵj

h

We can see that ϕj is the perturbation of the input feature xij associated with the jth
parameter Wj ∈ W of the hidden neuron h on L. Since all the hidden neurons h in h0 are
perturbed, we have that:


P r h0L (W0 ) =

d
YY

exp

h∈h0 j=0
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ϵj ∥

P

h

xi ∈L

xij − ϕj ∥ 

∆h0

∆h0 is set to 2

P
h∈h0

d (line 9 in Algorithm 3.1). h0L (W0 ) is the output (lines 2425

in Algorithm 3.1). We have that

Q
Qd

P r h0L (W0 )
h∈h0
j=0 exp
=
Q
Qd
P r h0L′ (W0 )
h∈h0
j=0 exp
≤

Y

d
Y

exp(

h∈h0 j=0

≤

Y
h∈h0

≤

exp(ϵ2

d×|Rj |
2 Pd |R
j|
j=1

∆h0
 Pd
P
2 h∈h0 d
j=1

h∈h0 j=1

1

xij −ϕj ∥1 
h

xi ∈L

∆h 0
P
h
ϵj ∥ x′ ∈L′ x′ ij −ϕj ∥1 

xi ∈L

i

ϵj
exp(
2 max xnj
xn ∈L
∆
h
0
j=1

≤ exp(ϵ2

P

i

∆h 0

X
ϵj X
x′ ij
xij −
∆h0 x ∈L
′
′

d
Y

d
YY

ϵj ∥

)≤

)
1

d
YY

exp(

h∈h0 j=1

2ϵj
)
∆h0

)

|Rj |
Pd
j=1 |Rj |

∆h0

) = exp(ϵ2 )

Consequently, the computation of h0L (W0 ) preserves ϵ2 differential privacy in Algor
ithm 3.1.
Lemma 3.4 shows that we can redistribute the noise in the computation of the first
hidden layer h0L under differential privacy. In addition, given a batch L, without accessing
additional information from the original data, none of the computations on top of h0L risk
the privacy protection under differential privacy. These computation tasks include the
application of activation functions, e.g., ReLU and sigmoid, on h0L , the computation of
hidden layers h1 , . . . , hk , local response normalizations, dropout operations, polling layers,
etc. (line 15, Algorithm 3.1). This result can be applied to both fullyconnected layers and
convolution layers. In this work, we applied ReLU on top of h0L and other layers h1 , . . . , hk .
Local response normalization layers are used after the application of ReLUs in each hidden
layer to bound ReLU functions.
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Local Response Normalization

The hidden units of the lower layer will be considered

as the input of the next layer (Figure 3.1). To ensure that this input is bounded hxi ∈ [0, 1],
as in [159, 60], we add a local response normalization (LRN) layer on top of each hidden
layer. Given a fullyconnected layer, as in [60], given an input xi , each perturbed neuron


hxi (W ) can be directly normalized as follows: hxi ← hxi (W ) − χ /(φ − χ), where φ
and χ denote the maximum and minimum values in the domain of {hxi }i∈L .
k

Given a convolution layer with a perturbed neuron hij at location (i, j) in the k
th feature map, based on [159], our local response normalization (LRN) is presented as
follows:

k
hij

←

k
hij / max



min(N −1,k+l/2)
k
hij ,

X

q+α

m

(hij )2

β 

(3.24)

m=max(0,k−l/2)

where the constants q, l, α, and β are hyperparameters, N is the total number of
feature maps. As in [159], we used q = 2, l = 5, α = 10−4 , and β = 0.75 in our
experiments.

3.1.8

Perturbation of the Loss Function FL (θ)

On top of our private deep neural network (Figure 3.1), we add an output layer with the
loss function FL (θ) to predict Y . Since the loss function FL (θ) accesses the labels yi given
xi ∈ L from the data, we need to protect the labels yi at the output layer. First, we derive a
polynomial approximation of the loss function based on Taylor Expansion [160]. Then, we
inject Laplace noise into coefficients of the loss function F to preserve differential privacy
on each training batch L.
The model output variables {ŷ1 , . . . , ŷM } are fully linked to the normalized highest
hidden layer, denoted h(k) , by weighted connections W(k) (Figure 3.1). As common, the
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logistic function can be used as an activation function of the output variables. Given, lth
output variable ŷl and xi , we have:

T
ŷil = σ hxi (k) Wl(k)



(3.25)

where hxi (k) is the state of h(k) derived from h0xi by navigating through the neural
network.
Crossentropy error [39] can be used as a loss function. It has been widely used
and applied in realworld applications [39]. Therefore, it is critical to preserve differential
privacy under the use of the crossentropy error function. Other loss functions, e.g., square
errors, can be applied in the output layer, as well. In our context, the crossentropy error
function is given by:

FL (θ) = −

M X
X


yil log ŷil + (1 − yil ) log(1 − ŷil )

l=1 xi ∈L

=−

M X
X


T
T
yil log(1 + e−hxi (k) Wl(k) ) + (1 − yil ) log(1 + ehxi (k) Wl(k) )

(3.26)

l=1 xi ∈L

Based on [60] and Taylor Expansion [160], we derive the polynomial approximation
of FL (θ) as:
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FbL (θ) =

(R)
M XX
2 X
2
X
fql (0)
l=1 xi ∈L q=1 R=0

=

M X hX
2
X
l=1 xi ∈L

(0)
fql (0)

+

q=1

+

R!
2
X

T
hxi (k) Wl(k)

R


(1)
T
fql (0) hxi (k) Wl(k)

q=1
2
X
q=1

(2)
fql (0) 

2!

T
(hxi (k) Wl(k)
)2

i
(3.27)

where ∀l ∈ [1, M ] : f1l (z) = yil log(1 + e−z ) and f2l (z) = (1 − yil ) log(1 + ez ).
To achieve ϵ3 differential privacy, we employ functional mechanism [161] to perturb
the loss function FbL (θ) by injecting Laplace noise into its polynomial coefficients. So,
we only need to perturb FbL (θ) just once in each training batch. To be clear, we denote
P2
(2)
(0)
(1)
(0)
(2)
(1)
(0)
{ϕlxi , ϕlxi , ϕlxi } as the coefficients, where ϕlxi =
q=1 fql (0) and ϕlxi and ϕlxi are
(1)
coefficients at the first order and the second order of the function FbL (θ). In fact, ϕlxi and
(2)
P
P
f (0)
(1)
(2)
ϕlxi will be combinations between the approximation terms 2q=1 fql (0), 2q=1 ql2! , and

hxi (k) .
In Algorithm 3.1, we set ∆F = M (|h(k) |+ 14 |h(k) |2 ) (line 17). In essence, coefficients
(R)

ϕlxi with R ∈ [0, 2] are functions of the label yil only. Therefore, we can perform the
(R)

perturbation by injecting Laplace noise 1/|L|Lap( ∆ϵ3F ) into ϕlxi for every training label
(R)

yil ∈ D (lines 1819). Then, the perturbed coefficients, denoted ϕlxi are used to construct
the differentially private loss function F L (θt ) (line 27) during the training process without
accessing the original label yil again (lines 2030). Stochastic gradient descent and back
propagation algorithms are used to minimize the perturbed loss function F L (θt ).
Now, we are ready to state that the computation of F L (θt ) is ϵ3 differentially private,
and our mechanism preserves (ϵ1 + ϵ2 + ϵ3 )differential privacy in the following lemmas.
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Lemma 3.5. Let L and L′ be any two neighboring batches. Let FbL (θ) and FbL′ (θ) be the
loss functions on L and L′ , respectively, then we have the following inequality:

∆F =

M X
2
X
X

(R)

ϕlxi −

1
≤ M (|h(k) | + |h(k) |2 )
4

(R)

ϕlx′

i

x′i ∈L′

xi ∈L

l=1 R=0

X

where |h(k) | is the number of hidden neurons in h(k) .
Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof. Assume that L and L′ differ in the last tuple. Let xn (x′n ) be the last tuple in L (L′ ).
We have that

∆F =

2
M X
X
X
l=1 R=0

=

2
M X
X

X

(R)

ϕlxi −

x′i ∈L′

xi ∈L
(R)

(R)

ϕlx′

i

(R)

ϕlxn − ϕlx′n

(3.28)

l=1 R=0

(0)

We can show that ϕlxn =
(0)

P2
q=1

(0)

fql (0) = ynl log 2+(1−ynl ) log 2 = log 2. Similarly,
(0)

(0)

we can show that ϕlx′n = log 2. As a result, ϕlxn = ϕlx′n . Therefore
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∆F =

M X
2
X

(R)
ϕlxn

−

(R)
ϕlx′n

M X
2
X

=

l=1 R=0

≤

M X
2
X

(R)

(R)

ϕlxn − ϕlx′n

l=1 R=1
(R)



(R)

ϕlxn + ϕlx′n

≤ 2 max

M X
2
X

xn

l=1 R=1

(R)

∥ϕlxn ∥

l=1 R=1

|h(k) |

M
M
hX
X
X
i
1
1X
≤ 2 max
hexn (k) +
h
h
( − ynl )
xn
2
8 e,g exn (k) gxn (k)
e=1
l=1
l=1

1
1
≤ 2( M × |h(k) | + M × |h(k) |2 )
2
8
1
= M (|h(k) | + |h(k) |2 )
4

where hexn (k) is the state of eth hidden neuron in h(k) .
Lemma 3.6. Algorithm 3.1 preserves ϵ3 differential privacy in the computation of F L (θt )
(line 27).

Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof. Let L and L′ be two neighbor batches. Without loss of generality, assume that L and
L′ differ in the last tuple xn (x′n ). ∆F is calculated as done in line 17, Algorithm 3.1, and
R
P2
P P
(R)
T
F L (θt ) = M
is the output of line 27 of the Algorithm
R=0 ϕlxi hxi (k) Wl(k)
l=1
xi ∈L
3.1. Note that hxi (k) is the state of h(k) derived from h0xi by navigating through the neural
(R)

(R)

network. The perturbation of the coefficient ϕl , denoted as ϕl , can be rewritten as:

(R)

ϕl

=

hX

(R)

ϕlxi + Lap(

xi ∈L

(R)

We can see that ϕl

∆F i
)
ϵ3

(3.29)

(R)

is the perturbation of the coefficient ϕl

labels yil in the training batch L. We have that
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associated with the

QM Q2

P r F L (θt )
l=1
R=0 exp
=
QM Q2
P r F L′ (θt )
l=1
R=0 exp
≤

M
Y

2
Y

exp(

l=1 R=0

≤

M Y
2
Y
l=1 R=0
M Y
2
Y

(R)

ϵ3 ∥

P

(R)

ϕlx −ϕl

i ∈L

i

∥1 

∆F

x′ ∈L′
i

(R)

(R)

ϕlx −ϕl
i

∥1 

∆F

ϵ3 X (R) X (R)
ϕ −
ϕlx′ )
i
∆F x ∈L lxi
1
′
′
xi ∈L

i

exp(

P
ϵ3 ∥ x

ϵ3
(R)
(R)
ϕlxn − ϕlx′n )
∆F
1

ϵ3
(R)
2 max ϕlxn 1 )
∆F xn ∈L
l=1 R=0
P P2
(R)
2 maxxn ∈L M
l=1
R=0 ∥ϕlxn ∥1
)
≤ exp(ϵ3
∆F
M (|h(k) | + 14 |h(k) |2 )
≤ exp(ϵ3
) = exp(ϵ3 )
∆F
≤

exp(

Consequently, the computation of F L (θt ) preserves ϵ3 differential privacy in Algori
thm 3.1.

3.1.9

The Correctness and Characteristics of the AdLM

The following theorem illustrates that the Algorithm 3.1 preserves ϵdifferential privacy,
where ϵ = ϵ1 + ϵ2 + ϵ3 .
Theorem 3.1. Algorithm 3.1 preserves ϵdifferential privacy, where ϵ = ϵ1 + ϵ2 + ϵ3 .
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. At a specific training step t ∈ T , it is crystal clear that the computation of h0L
is ϵ2 differentially private (Lemma 3.4). Therefore, the computation of the hidden layers
h1 , . . . , hk and normalization layers h are differentially private. This is because they do
not access any additional information from the data. At the output layer, the loss function
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1
F L (θt ) is ϵ3 differentially private (Lemma 3.6). The computation of gradients |L|
▽θt F L (θt )

and descents is an optimization process, without using any additional information from the
original data. Thus, θt+1 is differentially private (line 29, Algorithm 3.1).
This optimization process is repeated through T steps without querying the original
data D (lines 2130). This is done because Laplace noise is injected into input features
(R)

(R)

xij and coefficients ϕlxi as preprocessing steps (lines 319). Note that xij and ϕlxi are
associated with features xi and the label yi , respectively. h0L and F L (θt ) are computed
(R)

based on xij and ϕlxi . As a result, the noise and privacy budget consumption will not be
accumulated during the training process.
Finally, F L (θt ) uses the outputs of h0L , which essentially uses the differentially
private relevances R(D) as of one inputs. R(D), h0L , and F L (θt ) are achieved by applying
ϵ1 , ϵ2 , and ϵ3 differential privacy mechanisms. Furthermore, F L (θt ) and h0L access the
same training batch L at each training step. Therefore, based on the composition theorem
[61], the total privacy budget in Algorithm 3.1 must be the summation of ϵ1 , ϵ2 , and ϵ3 .
Consequently, Algorithm 3.1 preserves ϵdifferential privacy, where ϵ = ϵ1 + ϵ2 +
ϵ3 .
Note that ∆R and ∆h0 are dependent on the number of input features d. ∆R is
negatively proportional to the number of tuples in D. The larger the size of D, the less
noise will be injected into the private relevance R. ∆F is only dependent on the number of
neurons in the last hidden layer and the output layer. In addition, ∆R , ∆h0 , and ∆F do not
depend on the number of training epochs. Consequently:
• (1) The privacy budget consumption in our model is totally independent of the number
of training epochs.
• (2) In order to improve the model utility under differential privacy, our mechanism
adaptively injects Laplace noise into features based on the contribution of each to the
model output.
• (3) The average error incurred by our approximation approach, FbL (θ), is bounded
2 +2e−1
by a small number M × ee(1+e)
as stated in the Lemma 3.7 in the subsection
2
Approximation Error Bounds below.
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• (4) The proposed mechanism can be applied to a variety of deep learning models,
e.g., CNNs [47], deep autoencoders [39], Restricted Boltzmann Machines [162],
convolution deep belief networks [163], etc., as long as we can perturb the first affine
transformation layer.
With these characteristics, our mechanism has a great potential to be applied in large
datasets, without consuming excessive privacy budgets. In the experiment subsection, we
will show that our mechanism leads to accurate results.

Approximation Error Bounds

The following lemma illustrates the result of how much

error our approximation approach, FbL (θ) (Equation (3.27)), incurs. The error only depends
on the number of possible classification outcomes M . In addition, the average error of the
approximations is always bounded. As in [60, 161], the approximation of the loss function
FL (θ) by applying Taylor Expansion without removing all polynomial terms with order
larger than 2 is as follows:

FeL (θ) =

(R)
2 X
∞
M XX
X
fql (zql )
l=1 xi ∈L q=1 R=0

R!

gql (hxi (k) , Wl(k) ) − zql

R

∀l ∈ {1, . . . , M }, let f1l , f2l , g1l , and g2l be four functions defined as follows:

T
g1l (hxi (k) , Wj ) = hxi (k) Wl(k)
T
g2l (hxi (k) , Wj ) = hxi (k) Wl(k)

f1l (z1l ) = yil log(1 + e−z1l )
f2l (z2l ) = (1 − yil ) log(1 + ez2l )

where ∀q, l : zql is a real number.
∀q, l, by setting zql = 0, the above equation can be simplified as:
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(3.30)

FeL (θ) =

(R)
M XX
2 X
∞
X
fql (0)
l=1 xi ∈L q=1 R=0

R!

T
hxi (k) Wl(k)

R

(3.31)

As in [60], our approximation approach works by truncating the Taylor series in
Equation (3.31) to remove all polynomial terms with order larger than 2. This leads to
a new objective function in Equation (3.27) with loworder polynomials as follows:

FbL (θ) =

(R)
M XX
2 X
2
X
fql (0)
l=1 xi ∈L q=1 R=0

=

M X hX
2
X
l=1 xi ∈L

(0)
fql (0)

+

q=1

+

R!
2
X

T
hxi (k) Wl(k)

R


(1)
T
fql (0) hxi (k) Wl(k)

q=1
2
X
q=1

(2)
fql (0) 

2!

T
(hxi (k) Wl(k)
)2

i

We are now ready to state the following lemma to show the approximation error bound
of our approach.
Lemma 3.7. Given two polynomial functions FeL (θ) (Equation (3.31)) and FbL (θ) (Equation
(3.27)), the average error of the approximation is always bounded as follows:

2
b − FeL (θ)|
e ≤ M × e + 2e − 1
|FeL (θ)
e(1 + e)2

where θe = arg minθ FeL (θ) and θb = arg minθ FbL (θ).
Proof of Lemma 3.7:
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(3.32)


Proof. Let θe = arg minθ FeL (θ) and θb = arg minθ FbL (θ), U = maxθ FeL (θ) − FbL (θ)

b − FbL (θ)
b and ∀θ∗ : S ≤
and S = minθ FeL (θ) − FbL (θ) . We have that U ≥ FeL (θ)
FeL (θ∗ ) − FbL (θ∗ ). Therefore, we have:

b − FbL (θ)
b − FeL (θ∗ ) + FbL (θ∗ ) ≤ U − S
FeL (θ)

b − FeL (θ∗ ) ≤ U − S + FbL (θ)
b − FbL (θ∗ )
⇔ FeL (θ)

b − FbL (θ∗ ) ≤ 0, so FeL (θ)
b − FeL (θ∗ ) ≤ U − S. If U ≥ 0 and S ≤ 0
In addition, FbL (θ)
then we have:
b − FeL (θ∗ )| ≤ U − S
|FeL (θ)

(3.33)

e Equation (3.33)
Equation (3.33) holds for every θ∗ . Therefore, it still holds for θ.
shows that the error incurred by truncating the Taylor series approximate function depends
on the maximum and minimum values of FeL (θ) − FbL (θ). To quantify the magnitude of the
error, we first rewrite FeL (θ) − FbL (θ) as:

FeL (θ) − FbL (θ) =
=

M h
i
X
FeL (Wl(k) ) − FbL (Wl(k) )

l=1
2
∞
X X fql(R) (zql )

M h
X

X

l=1

xi ∈L q=1 R=3

R!

gql (hxi (k) , Wl(k) ) − zql

R i

To derive the minimum and maximum values of the function above, we look into the
remainder of the Taylor Expansion for each l. Let zl ∈ [zql − 1, zql + 1]. According
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1
to the wellknown result [164], |D|
FeL (Wl(k) ) − FbL (Wl(k) ) must be in the interval
h P min f (3) (z )(z −z )3 P max f (3) (z )(z −z )3 i
zl ql
zl ql
l
l
ql
l
l
ql
, l
.
q
6
6
(3)
P maxzl fql (zl )(zl −zql )3
P minzl fql(3) (zl )(zl −zql )3
If q
≥
0
and
≤ 0, then we have that:
q
6
6

i
1 he
FL (θ) − FbL (θ)
|L|
(3)
(3)
M X
X
maxzl fql (zl )(zl − zql )3 − minzl fql (zl )(zl − zql )3
≤
(3.34)
6
l=1 q

This analysis applies to the case of the crossentropy errorbased loss function as
follows. First, for the functions f1l (z1l ) = yil log(1 + e−z1l ) and f2l (z2l ) = (1 − yil ) log(1 +
ez2l ), we have

2yil ez1l
=
(1 + ez1l )3
e−z2l (e−z2l − 1)
(3)
f2l (z2l ) = (1 − yil )
(1 + e−z2l )3
(3)
f1l (z1l )

(3)

It can be verified that arg minz1l f1l (z1l ) =
2e
(1+e)3

(3)

> 0, arg minz2l f2l (z2l ) =

1−e
e(1+e)3

−2e
(1+e)3

(3)

< 0, arg maxz1l f1l (z1l ) =
(3)

< 0, and arg maxz2l f2l (z2l ) =

e(e−1)
(1+e)3

> 0.

Thus, the average error of the approximation is at most

b − FeL (θ)
e ≤M×
FeL (θ)

h

2e
−2e 
−
3
(1 + e)
(1 + e)3
1 − e i
e2 + 2e − 1
e(e − 1)
−
=
M
×
+
(1 + e)3
e(1 + e)3
e(1 + e)2

91

Therefore, Equation (3.32) holds.

(a) accuracy vs. ϵ

(b) ϵ = 0.5 (large noise)

(c) ϵ = 2.0 (small noise)
Figure 3.4 Accuracy for different noise levels on the MNIST dataset.

3.1.10

Experimental Results

We have carried out an extensive experiment on two wellknown image datasets, MNIST
and CIFAR10. The MNIST database of handwritten digits consists of 60,000 training
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(a) accuracy vs. ϵ

(b) ϵ = 2.5 (large noise)

(c) ϵ = 8.0 (small noise)
Figure 3.5 Accuracy for different noise levels on the CIFAR10 dataset.
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examples, and a test set of 10,000 examples [47]. Each example is a 28 × 28 size graylevel
image. The CIFAR10 dataset consists of color images categorized into 10 classes, such as
birds, dogs, trucks, airplanes, etc. The dataset is partitioned into 50,000 training examples
and 10,000 test examples [99].

Competitive Models We compare our mechanism with the stateoftheart differentially
private stochastic gradient descent (pSGD) for deep learning proposed by [62]. CNNs are
used in our experiments for both algorithms. The hyperparameters in pSGD are set to
the default values recommended by Abadi et al. [62]. To comprehensively examine the
proposed approaches, our mechanism is implemented in two different settings: (1) The
Adaptive Laplace Mechanism (Algorithm 3.1)based CNN with ReLUs, simply denoted
AdLM; and (2) An Identical Laplace Mechanismbased CNN with ReLUs (ILM), in
which an identical Laplace noise

∆
1
Lap( ϵh20 )
|L|

is injected into each feature xij to preserve

ϵ2 differential privacy in the computation of the affine transformation layer h0 . In the ILM
algorithm (described in Subsection 3.1.7), we do not need to use the differentially private
relevances R(D).

MNIST Dataset

The designs of the three models are the same on the MNIST dataset. We

used two convolution layers, one with 32 features and one with 64 features. Each hidden
neuron connects with a 5x5 unit patch. A fullyconnected layer with 25 units and an output
layer of 10 classes (i.e., 10 digits) with crossentropy loss with LRN are used. The batch
size is 1,800. This also is the structure of the pretrained model, which is learned and used to
compute the average relevances R(D). The experiments were conducted on a single GPU,
i.e., NVIDIA GTX TITAN X, 12 GB with 3,072 CUDA cores.
Figure 3.4 a illustrates the prediction accuracy of each model as a function of the
privacy budget ϵ on the MNIST dataset. It is clear that our models, i.e., AdLM and ILM,
outperform the pSGD, especially when the privacy budget ϵ is small. This is a crucial result,
since smaller privacy budget values enforce stronger privacy guarantees. When the privacy
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budget ϵ is large, e.g., ϵ = 2, 4, 8, which means small noise is injected into the model, the
efficiencies of all the models are almost converged to higher prediction accuracies.
The AdLM model achieves the best performance. Given a very small privacy budget
ϵ = 0.25, it achieves 90.2% in terms of prediction accuracy, compared with 88.46%
obtained by the ILM and 82.09% obtained by the pSGD. Overall, given small values of
the privacy budget ϵ, i.e., 0.2 ≤ ϵ ≤ 0.5, the AdLM improves the prediction accuracy
by 7.7% on average (i.e., 91.62%) compared with the pSGD (i.e., 83.93%). The result is
statistically significant with p < 0.01 (ttest).
Figures 3.4bc illustrate the prediction accuracy of each model vs. the number of
epochs under ϵ = 0.5 and ϵ = 2.0, respectively. Given large noise, i.e., ϵ = 0.5, the pSGD
quickly achieves higher prediction accuracies (i.e., 88.59%) after a small number of epochs,
compared with other models (Figure 3.4b). However, the pSDG can only be applied to train
the model by using a limited number of epochs; specifically because the privacy budget is
accumulated after every training step. Meanwhile, our mechanism is totally independent of
the number of epochs in the consumption of privacy budget. Therefore, after 500 epochs,
our models outperform the pSGD. The AdLM achieves the best performance, in terms of
prediction accuracy: 93.66%, whereas the ILM and the pSGD reached only 92.39% and
88.59%, respectively. Interestingly, given small noise, i.e., ϵ = 2.0, our models achieve
higher accuracies than the pSGD after a small number of epochs (Figure 3.4c). This result
illustrates the crucial benefits of being independent of the number of training epochs in
preserving differential privacy in deep learning. With our mechanism, we can keep training
our models without accumulating noise and privacy budget.

CIFAR10 Dataset

The designs of the three models are the same on the CIFAR10

dataset. We used three convolution layers, two with 128 features and one with 256 features.
Each hidden neuron connects with a 3x3 unit patch in the first layer, and a 5x5 unit patch in
other layers. One fullyconnected layer with 30 neurons, and an output layer of 10 classes
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with a crossentropy loss with LRN are used. The batch size is set to 7,200. This also is
the structure of the pretrained model, which is learned and used to compute the average
relevances R(D).
Figure 3.5a shows the prediction accuracies of each model as a function of the privacy
budget ϵ on the CIFAR10 dataset. Figures 3.5bc illustrate the prediction accuracy of each
model vs. the number of epochs under different noise levels. Similar to the results on the
MNIST dataset, the results on CIFAR10 strengthen our observations: (1) Our mechanism
outperforms the pSGD in terms of prediction accuracy, given both modest and large values
of the privacy budget ϵ (Figure 3.5a); and (2) Our mechanism has the ability to work with
largescale datasets, since it is totally independent of the number of training epochs in the
consumption of privacy budget (Figures 3.5bc).
In fact, the AdLM improves the prediction accuracy by 5.9% on average (i.e., to
77%) compared with the pSGD (i.e., 71.1%). The result is statistically significant with
p < 0.01 (ttest). Given large noise, i.e., ϵ = 2.5, our models including the AdLM and ILM
outperform the pSGD after 800 epochs (Figure 3.5b).

Adaptive Laplace Noise

It is important to note that by adaptively redistributing the noise

into input features based on the relevance of each to the model output, we can achieve much
better prediction accuracies in both MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets given both small and
large values of privacy budget ϵ. This is clearly demonstrated in Figures 3.4a and 3.5a, since
the AdLM outperforms the ILM in all cases. Overall, the AdLM improves the prediction
accuracy by 2% and 5% on average on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets correspondingly,
compared with the ILM. The result is statistically significant with p < 0.05 (ttest). Note
that the ILM injected an identical amount of noise into all input features, regardless of their
contributions to the model output. This is an important result, since our mechanism is the
first of its kind, which can redistribute the noise injected into the deep learning model to
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improve the utility. In addition, the reallocation of ϵ1 , ϵ2 , and ϵ3 could further improve the
utility. This is an open research direction in the future work.

Computational Efficiency

In terms of computation efficiency, there are two differences

in our mechanism, compared with a regular deep neural network: (i) The pretrained model;
and (ii) The noise injection task. In practice, the pretrained model is not necessarily
identical to the differentially private network trained by our AdLM. A simple model can
be used as a pretrained model to approximate the average relevance R(D), as long as the
pretrained model is effective in terms of prediction accuracy even over a small training
dataset. Achieving this is quite straightforward, because: (1) The pretrained model is
noiseless; and (2) The number of training epochs used to learn a pretrained model is small
compared with the one of differentially private models. In fact, we only correspondingly
need 12 and 50 extra epochs to learn the pretrained models on MNIST and CIFAR10
datasets. Training pretrained models takes about 10 minutes on a single GPU, i.e., NVIDIA
GTX TITAN X, 12 GB with 3,072 CUDA cores. Therefore, the model pretraining for the
computation of R(D) is efficient.
Another difference in our mechanism is the noise injection into input attributes and
b In this task, the computations of ∆R , ∆h0 , ∆F , Rj , βj ,
coefficients of the loss function F.
x, and ϕ are efficient and straightforward, since there is not any operation such as arg min,

arg max, sorting, etc. The complexity of these computations is O |D|(d + M ) , which
is linear to the size of the database D. In addition, these computations can be efficiently
performed in either a serial process or a parallel process. Therefore, this task does not affect
the computational efficiency of our mechanism much.

3.1.11 Conclusions
In this part of the dissertation, we proposed a novel mechanism, called Adaptive Laplace
Mechanism (AdLM), to preserve differential privacy in deep learning. Our mechanism
conducts both sensitivity analysis and noise insertion on deep neural networks. It is totally
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independent of the number of training epochs in the consumption of privacy budget. That
makes our mechanism more practical. In addition, our mechanism is the first of its kind
to have the ability to redistribute the noise insertion toward the improvement of model
utility in deep learning. In fact, our mechanism has the ability to intentionally add more
noise into input features which are less relevant to the model output, and viceversa.
Different activation functions can be applied in our mechanism, as well. These distinctive
characteristics guarantee the ability to apply our mechanism on large datasets in different
deep learning models and in different contexts. Our mechanism can clearly enhance the
application of differential privacy in deep learning. Rigorous experimental evaluations
conducted on wellknown datasets validated our theoretical results and the effectiveness
of our mechanism.

3.2 Scalable Differential Privacy with Certified Robustness
in Adversarial Learning
3.2.1

Background

In this subsection, we revisit DP, adversarial learning, and certified robustness.

Differential Privacy Let D be a database that contains N tuples, each of which contains
data x ∈ [−1, 1]d and a groundtruth label y ∈ ZK (onehot vector), with K possible
categorical outcomes y = {y1 , . . . , yK }. A single true class label yx ∈ y given x ∈ D is
assigned to only one of the K categories. On input x and parameters θ, a model outputs
class scores f : Rd → RK that maps x to a vector of scores f (x) = {f1 (x), . . . , fK (x)} s.t.
P
∀k ∈ [1, K] : fk (x) ∈ [0, 1] and K
k=1 fk (x) = 1. The class with the highest score value
is selected as the predicted label for x, denoted as y(x) = maxk∈K fk (x). A loss function
L(f (x), y) presents the penalty for mismatching between the predicted values f (x) and
original values y. The notations and terminologies used in this work are summarized in
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Table 3.1 of Subsection 3.2.2). Let us briefly revisit DP DNNs, starting with the definition
of DP.
Definition 3.2. (ϵ, δ)DP [55]. A randomized algorithm A fulfills (ϵ, δ)DP, if for any two
databases D and D′ differing at most one tuple, and for all O ⊆ Range(A), we have:

P r[A(D) = O] ≤ eϵ P r[A(D′ ) = O] + δ

ϵ controls the amount by which the distributions induced by D and D′ may differ, δ is
a broken probability.
DP also applies to general metrics ρ(D, D′ ) ≤ 1, where ρ can be lp norms [165].
DPpreserving algorithms in DNNs can be categorized into three lines: 1) introducing noise
into parameter gradients [62, 166, 59, 73, 74, 76], 2) injecting noise into objective functions
[60, 71, 72], and 3) injecting noise into labels [167].

Adversarial Learning For some target model f and inputs (x, yx ), the adversary’s goal
is to find an adversarial example xadv = x + α, where α is the perturbation introduced by
the attacker, such that: (1) xadv and x are close, and (2) the model misclassifies xadv , i.e.,
y(xadv ) ̸= y(x). In this work, we consider wellknown lp∈{1,2,∞} (µ)norm bounded attacks
[168], where µ is the radius of the pnorm ball. To improve the robustness of models,
prior work focused on two directions: 1) Producing correct predictions on adversarial
examples, while not compromising the accuracy on legitimate inputs [66, 67, 169, 170, 171,
172, 173, 174]; and 2) Detecting adversarial examples [175, 176, 177, 178, 179]. Among
existing solutions, adversarial training appears to hold the greatest promise for learning
robust models [180]. A wellknown algorithm was proposed in [181]. The algorithm is
revisited in the Algorithm 3.2 in the following subsection.
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(a) An instance of DP DNNs and verified inference

(b) An instance of stochastic batch training
Figure 3.6 Stochastic Batch mechanism.

Pseudocode of Adversarial Training [181]

Let lp (µ) = {α ∈ Rd : ∥α∥p ≤ µ} be

the lp norm ball of radius µ. One of the goals in adversarial learning is to minimize the


risk over adversarial examples: θ∗ = arg minθ E(x,ytrue )∼D max∥α∥p ≤µ L f (x + α, θ), yx ,
where an attack is used to approximate solutions to the inner maximization problem, and
the outer minimization problem corresponds to training the model f with parameters θ
over these adversarial examples xadv = x + α. There are two basic adversarial example
attacks. The first one is a singlestep algorithm, e.g., FGSM algorithm [168], in which only
a single gradient computation is required to find adversarial examples by solving the inner

maximization max∥α∥p ≤µ L f (x + α, θ), yx . The second one is an iterative algorithm, e.g.,
IterativeFGSM algorithm [182], in which multiple gradients are computed and updated
in Tµ small steps, each of which has a size of µ/Tµ .
Given a loss function:

L(θ) =

 X
X


1
L f (xi , θ), yi + ξ
Υ f (xadv
,
θ),
y
j
j
m1 + ξm2 x ∈B
adv
adv
i

xj ∈Bt

t
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where m1 and m2 correspondingly are the numbers of examples in Bt and Btadv at
each training step. Algorithm 3.2 presents the vanilla adversarial training.
Algorithm 3.2 Adversarial Training [181]
Input: Database D, loss function L, parameters θ, batch sizes m1 and m2 , learning rate ϱt ,
parameter ξ
1: Initialize θ randomly
2: for t ∈ [T ] do
3:
Take a random batch Bt with the size m1 , and a random batch Ba with the size m2
4:
Craft adversarial examples Btadv = {xadv
j }j∈[1,m2 ] from corresponding benign
examples xj ∈ Ba
5:
Descent: θ ← θ − ϱt ∇θ L(θ)

Certified Robustness and DP

Recently, some algorithms [68, 69, 77, 183, 184, 70] have

been proposed to derive certified robustness, in which each prediction is guaranteed to
be consistent under the perturbation α, if a robustness condition is held. Given a benign
example x, we focus on achieving a robustness condition to lp (µ)norm attacks, as follows:

∀α ∈ lp (µ) : fk (x + α) > max fi (x + α)
i:i̸=k

(3.35)

where k = y(x), indicating that a small perturbation α in the input does not change
the predicted label y(x). To achieve the robustness condition in Equation (3.35), [101]
introduce an algorithm, called PixelDP. By considering an input x (e.g., images) as
databases in DP parlance, and individual features (e.g., pixels) as tuples, PixelDP shows
that randomizing the scoring function f (x) to enforce DP on a small number of pixels in an
image guarantees robustness of predictions. To randomize f (x), random noise σr is injected
into either input x or an arbitrary hidden layer, resulting in the following (ϵr , δr )PixelDP
condition:
Lemma 3.8. (ϵr , δr )PixelDP [101]. Given a randomized scoring function f (x) satisfying
(ϵr , δr )PixelDP w.r.t. a lp norm metric, we have:
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∀k, ∀α ∈ lp (1) : Efk (x) ≤ eϵr Efk (x + α) + δr

(3.36)

where Efk (x) is the expected value of fk (x), ϵr is a predefined budget, δr is a broken
probability.
At the prediction time, a certified robustness check is implemented for each prediction,
as follows:
Êlb fk (x) > e2ϵr max Êub fi (x) + (1 + eϵr )δr
i:i̸=k

1
n

P
n

(3.37)

where Êlb and Êub are the lower and upper bounds of the expected value Êf (x) =
f (x)n , derived from the Monte Carlo estimation with an ηconfidence, given n is the

number of invocations of f (x) with independent draws in the noise σr . Passing the check
for a given input guarantees that no perturbation up to lp (1)norm can change the model’s
prediction. PixelDP does not preserve DP in learning private parameters θ to protect the
training data.

Functional Mechanism Functional mechanism [161] achieves ϵDP by perturbing the
objective function LD (θ) and then releasing the model parameter θ minimizing the perturbed
objective function LD (θ) instead of the original θ, given a private training dataset D. The
mechanism exploits the polynomial representation of LD (θ). The model parameter θ is a
vector that contains d values θ1 , . . . , θd . Let ϕ(θ) denote a product of θ1 , . . . , θd , namely,
ϕ(θ) = θ1c1 ·θ2c2 ···θdcd for some c1 , . . . , cd ∈ N. Let Φj (j ∈ N) denote the set of all products of

Pd
θ1 , . . . , θd with degree j, i.e., Φj = θ1c1 ·θ2c2 ···θdcd
a=1 ca = j . By the StoneWeierstrass
Theorem [185], any continuous and differentiable L(xi , θ) can always be written as a
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polynomial of θ1 , . . . , θd , for some J ∈ [0, ∞], i.e., L(xi , θ) =

PJ

P

j=0

ϕ∈Φj

λϕxi ϕ(θ)

where λϕxi ∈ R denotes the coefficient of ϕ(θ) in the polynomial.
For instance, the polynomial expression of the loss function in the linear regression
Pd
P
2
2
is as follows: L(xi , θ) = (yi − x⊤
i θ) = yi −
j=1 (2yi xij )θj +
1≤j,a≤d (xij xia )θj θa ,
where d (= d) is the number of features in xi . In fact, L(xi , θ) only involves monomials
in Φ0 = {1}, Φ1 = {θ1 , . . . , θd }, and Φ2 = {θi θa i, a ∈ [1, d]}. Each ϕ(θ) has its own
coefficient, e.g., for θj , its polynomial coefficient λϕxi = −2yi xij . Similarly, LD (θ) can be
expressed as a polynomial of θ1 , . . . , θd , as

LD (θ) =

X

L(xi , θ) =

J X X
X

xi ∈D

λϕxi ϕ(θ)

(3.38)

j=0 ϕ∈Φj xi ∈D

To achieve ϵDP, LD (θ) is perturbed by injecting Laplace noise Lap( ∆ϵ ) into its
polynomial coefficients λϕ , and then the model parameter θ is derived to minimize the
P P
perturbed function LD (θ), where the global sensitivity ∆ = 2 maxx Jj=1 ϕ∈Φj ∥λϕx ∥1
is derived given any two neighboring datasets. To guarantee that the optimization of
θ = arg minθ LD (θ) achieves ϵDP without accessing the original data, i.e., that may
potentially incur additional privacy leakage, grid searchbased approaches are applied to
learn the ϵDP parameters θ with low loss LD (θ). Although this approach works well in
simple tasks, i.e., logistic regression, it may not be optimal in large models, such as DNNs.

3.2.2

Notations and Terminologies

All notations and terminologies used in this work are described in Table 3.1.

3.2.3

Stochastic Batch (StoBatch) Mechanism

StoBatch is presented in Algorithm 3.5. Our DNN (Figure 3.6a) is presented as: f (x) =
g(a(x, θ1 ), θ2 ), where a(x, θ1 ) is a feature representation learning model with x as an input,
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Table 3.1 Notations and Terminologies.
Training data with benign examples x ∈ [−1, 1]d

D and x
y = {y1 , . . . , yK }

Function/model f that maps inputs x

f : Rd → RK

to a vector of scores f (x) = {f1 (x), . . . , fK (x)}

yx ∈ y

A single true class label of example x

y(x) = maxk∈K fk (x)
xadv = x + α

The lp norm ball of attack radius µ

(ϵr , δr )

Robustness budget ϵr and broken probability δr

Efk (x)

The expected value of fk (x)
Lower and upper bounds of

Êlb and Êub

the expected value Êf (x) =

a(x, θ1 )

n

f (x)n

Data reconstruction function given Bt in a(x, θ1 )

h1Bt = {θ1T xi }xi ∈Bt
e B (θ1 ) and R (θ1 )
R
t
Bt
xi and x
ei

of a(x, θ1 ) given the batch Bt
Approximated and perturbed functions of RBt (θ1 )
e B (θ1 )
Sensitivity of the approximated function R
t
Perturbed affine transformation h1Bt

h1Bt
1
+m
Lap( ∆ϵR )
1
adv
B t and B t

xadv
j

LB t θ2

The values of all hidden neurons in the hidden layer h1

Perturbed and reconstructed inputs xi

∆R = d(β + 2)



Υ f (xadv
j , θ2 ), yj

LB t θ2



L2B t (θ2 )
f (M1 , . . . , Ms |x)
and

P

A batch of benign examples xi

RBt (θ1 )

∆x
r

1
n

Feature representation learning model with x and parameters θ1

Bt

=

Predicted label for the example x given the function f
Adversarial example where α is the perturbation

lp (µ) = {α ∈ Rd : ∥α∥p ≤ µ}

xadv
j

Onehot label vector of K categories

∆h
r

(ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )
κφ
( κ+φ
)max

DP adversarial examples crafting from benign example xj
Sets of perturbed inputs xi and DP adversarial examples xadv
j
Loss function of perturbed benign examples in B t , given θ2
Loss function of DP adversarial examples xadv
j , given θ2
DP loss function for perturbed benign examples B t

A part of the loss function LB t θ2 that needs to be DP
Composition scoring function given
independent randomizing mechanisms M1 , . . . , Ms
Sensitivities of x and h, given the perturbation α ∈ lp (1)
Privacy budget to protect the training data D
Robustness size guarantee given an input x at the inference time
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and g will take the output of a(x, θ1 ) and return the class scores f (x). At a high level,
there are four key components: (1) DP a(x, θ1 ), which is to preserve DP in learning the
feature representation model a(x, θ1 ); (2) DP Adversarial Learning, which focuses on
preserving DP in adversarial learning, given DP a(x, θ1 ); (3) Certified Robustness and
Verified Inferring, which are to compute robustness bounds given an input at the inference
time; and (4) Stochastic batch training (Figure 3.6b). To establish theoretical results in
DP preservation and in deriving robustness bounds, let us first present our mechanism in
the vanilla iterative batchbybatch training (Algorithm 3.3). The network f (Lines 23,
Algorithm 3.3) is trained over T training steps. In each step, a disjoint and fixed batch of m
perturbed training examples and a disjoint and fixed batch of m DP adversarial examples,
derived from D, are used to train our network (Lines 412, Algorithm 3.3).
Algorithm 3.3 Adversarial Learning with DP
Input: Database D, loss function L, parameters θ, batch size m, learning rate ϱt , privacy
budgets: ϵ1 and ϵ2 , robustness parameters: ϵr , ∆xr , and ∆hr , adversarial attack size µa , the
number of invocations n, ensemble attacks A, parameters ψ and ξ, and the size |hπ | of hπ
1: Draw Noise χ1 ← [Lap( ∆ϵ1R )]d , χ2 ← [Lap( ∆ϵ1R )]β , χ3 ← [Lap( ∆ϵL2
)]|hπ |
2
2: Randomly Initialize θ = {θ1 , θ2 }, B = {B1 , . . . , BN /m } s.t. ∀B ∈ B : B is a batch
with the size m, B1 ∩. . .∩BN /m = ∅, and B1 ∪. . .∪BN /m = D, B = {B 1 , . . . , B N /m }
where ∀i ∈ [1, N /m] : B i = {x ← x + χm1 }x∈Bi
2
3: Construct a deep network f with hidden layers {h1 + 2χ
, . . . , hπ }, where hπ is the
m
last hidden layer
4: for t ∈ [T ] do
5:
Take a batch B i ∈ B where i = t%(N /m), B t ← B i
6:
Ensemble DP Adversarial Examples:
7:
Draw Random Perturbation Value µt ∈ (0, 1]
adv
8:
Take a batch B i+1 ∈ B, Assign B t ← ∅
9:
for l ∈ A do
10:
Take the next batch B a ⊂ B i+1 with the size m/|A|
adv
11:
∀xj ∈ B a : Craft xadv
by using attack algorithm A[l] with l∞ (µt ), B t ←
j
adv

B t ∪ xadv
j
12:
Descent: θ1 ← θ1 − ϱt ∇θ1 RB t ∪B adv (θ1 ); θ2 ← θ2 − ϱt ∇θ2 LB t ∪B adv (θ2 ) with the
t
t
noise χm3
Output: ϵ = (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP parameters θ = {θ1 , θ2 }, robust model with
an ϵr budget
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3.2.4

DP Feature Representation Learning

Our idea is to use autoencoder to simultaneously learn DP parameters θ1 and ensure that
the output of a(x, θ1 ) is DP, since: (1) It is easier to train, given its small size; and (2) It
can be reused for different predictive models. A typical data reconstruction function (cross
entropy), given a batch Bt at the training step t of the input xi , is as follows: RBt (θ1 ) =

P
Pd 
−θ1j hi
) + (1 − xij ) log(1 + eθ1j hi ) , where hi = θ1T xi , the hidden
xi ∈Bt
j=1 xij log(1 + e
layer h1 of a(x, θ1 ) given the batch Bt is denoted as h1Bt = {θ1T xi }xi ∈Bt , and x
ei = θ1 hi is
the reconstruction of xi .
To preserve ϵ1 DP in learning θ1 where ϵ1 is a privacy budget, we first derive
the 1storder polynomial approximation of RBt (θ1 ) by applying Taylor Expansion [160],
e Bt (θ1 ). Then, Functional Mechanism [161] (revisited in Subsection 3.2.1)
denoted as R
e Bt (θ1 ) =
is adapted to inject noise into coefficients of the approximated function R
r
Pd P2 P1 Flj(r) (0)
P
θ
h
, where F1j (z) = xij log(1 + e−z ), F2j (z) =
1j
i
j=1
l=1
r=0
xi ∈Bt
r!
 i
Pd h
1
e Bt (θ1 ) = P
log
2
+
θ
−
x
hi .
(1 − xij ) log(1 + ez ), we have that: R
1j
ij
xi ∈Bt
j=1
2
e Bt (θ1 ), parameters θ1j derived from the function optimization need to be ϵ1 DP. To
In R

achieve that, Laplace noise m1 Lap( ∆ϵ1R ) is injected into coefficients 21 − xij hi , where ∆R
e Bt (θ1 ), as follows:
is the sensitivity of R

e Bt (θ1 ) =
R

d h
X X
xi ∈Bt j=1

=

 1

1
∆R i
θ1j
− xij hi + Lap(
)
2
m
ϵ1

d
i
X hX
1
( θ1j hi ) − xi x
ei
2
j=1
x ∈B
i

(3.39)

t

To ensure that the computation of x
ei does not access the original data, we further
inject Laplace noise

1
Lap( ∆ϵ1R )
m

into xi . This can be done as a preprocessing step for all the

benign examples in D to construct a set of disjoint batches B of perturbed benign examples
(Lines 2 and 5, Algorithm 3.3). The perturbed function now becomes:
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d
i
X hX
1
RB t (θ1 ) =
ei
( θ1j hi ) − xi x
2
j=1

(3.40)

xi ∈B t

where xi = xi + m1 Lap( ∆ϵ1R ), hi = θ1T xi , hi = hi + m2 Lap( ∆ϵ1R ), and x
ei = θ1 hi . Let us
denote β as the number of neurons in h1 , and hi is bounded in [−1, 1], the global sensitivity
∆R is as follows:
e over any two neighboring batches, Bt and Bt′ , is:
Lemma 3.9. The global sensitivity of R
∆R ≤ d(β + 2).
Proof of Lemma 3.9
Proof. Assume that Bt and Bt′ differ in the last tuple, xm (x′m ). Then,

d h X
X
X 1
1
∆R =
hi −
h′i
2
2
′
′
j=1
x ∈B
i

t

xi ∈Bt

1

+

X
xi ∈Bt

xij −

X
x′i ∈Bt′

x′ij 1

i

d
X
1
≤ 2 max
(∥ hi ∥1 + ∥xij ∥1 )
xi
2
j=1

≤ d(β + 2)

By setting ∆R = d(β + 2), we show that the output of a(·), which is the perturbed
affine transformation h1B t = {θ1T xi +

2
Lap( ∆ϵ1R )}xi ∈B t ,
m

is (ϵ1 /γ)DP, given γ =

2∆R
m∥θ1 ∥1,1

and ∥θ1 ∥1,1 is the maximum 1norm of θ1 ’s columns [186]. This is important to tighten
the privacy budget consumption in computing the remaining hidden layers g(a(x, θ1 ), θ2 ).
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In fact, without using additional information from the original data, the computation of
g(a(x, θ1 ), θ2 ) is also (ϵ1 /γ)DP.
Similarly, the perturbation of each benign example x turns B t = {xi ← xi +
1
Lap( ∆ϵ1R )}xi ∈Bt
m

into a (ϵ1 /γx )DP batch, with γx = ∆R /m.

We do not use the

postprocessing property of DP to estimate the DP guarantee of h1B t based upon the DP
guarantee of B t , since ϵ1 /γ < ϵ1 /γx in practice. So, the (ϵ1 /γ)DP h1B t provides a more
rigorous DP protection to the computation of g(·) and to the output layer.
Lemma 3.10. The computation of the batch B t as the input layer is (ϵ1 /γx )DP, and the
computation of the affine transformation h1B t is (ϵ1 /γ)DP.
Proof of Lemma 3.10
T

T

Proof. Regarding the computation of h1B t = {θ1 xi }xi ∈B t , we can see that hi = θ1 xi is a
linear function of x. The sensitivity of a function h is defined as the maximum change in
output, that can be generated by a change in the input [101]. Therefore, the global sensitivity
of h1 can be computed as follows:

∆h1

P
P
T
T
T
∥ xi ∈B t θ1 xi − x′ ∈B ′t θ1 x′i ∥1
∥θ1 xi ∥1
T
i
P
P
=
≤ max
≤ ∥θ1 ∥1,1
′
xi ∈Bt ∥xi ∥1
∥ xi ∈B t xi − x′ ∈B ′t xi ∥1
i

T

following matrix norms [186]: ∥θ1 ∥1,1 is the maximum 1norm of θ1 ’s columns. By
injecting Laplace noise Lap(

∆h 1
)
ϵ1

T

into h1Bt , i.e., h1B t = {θ1 xi + Lap(
T

∆h 1
)}xi ∈B t ,
ϵ1

can preserve ϵ1 DP in the computation of h1B t . Let us set ∆h1 = ∥θ1 ∥1,1 , γ =

we

2∆R
,
m∆h1

and χ2 drawn as a Laplace noise [Lap( ∆ϵ1R )]β , in our mechanism, the perturbed affine
transformation h1B t is presented as:
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2χ2
2
∆R β
T
}xi ∈B t = {θ1 xi + [Lap(
)] }xi ∈B t
m
m
ϵ1
γ∆h1 β
∆h
T
T
= {θ1 xi + [Lap(
)] }xi ∈B t = {θ1 xi + [Lap( 1 )]β }xi ∈B t
ϵ1
ϵ1 /γ
T

h1B t = {θ1 xi +

T

∆

h1
This results in an (ϵ1 /γ)DP affine transformation h1Bt = {θ1 xi +[Lap( ϵ1 /γ
)]β }xi ∈B t .

Similarly, the perturbed inputs B t = {xi }xi ∈B t = {xi +

χ1
}
m xi ∈Bt

= {xi +

[Lap( ϵ1∆/γx x )]d }xi ∈Bt , where ∆x is the sensitivity measuring the maximum change in the input
layer that can be generated by a change in the batch Bt and γx =
can be computed as follows: ∆x =

P
P
∥ x ∈B xi − x′ ∈B ′ x′i ∥1
t
i
P
P i t
∥ x ∈B xi − x′ ∈B ′ x′i ∥1
i

t

i

∆R
.
m∆x

Following [101], ∆x

= 1. As a result, the computation

t

of B t is (ϵ1 /γx )DP. Consequently, Lemma 3.10 does hold.
Departing from the vanilla Functional Mechanism, in which only grid searchbased
approaches can be applied to find DPpreserving θ1 with a low loss RB t (θ1 ), our following
Theorem 3.2 shows that gradient descentbased optimizing RB t (θ1 ) is (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )DP in
learning θ1 given an (ϵ1 /γx )DP B t batch. In fact, in addition to hi , hi , x
ei , based on Lemma
δR

(θ1 )

Bt
=
3.10, we further show that the computation of gradients, i.e., ∀j ∈ [1, d] : δθ
1j
Pm
1
i=1 hi ( 2 − xij ), and descent operations given the (ϵ1 /γx )DP B t batch are (ϵ1 /γx )DP,

without incurring any additional information from the original data. As a result, gradient
descentbased approaches can be applied to optimize RB t (θ1 ) in Algorithm 3.3, since all
the computations on top of B t are DP, without using any additional information from the
original data.
Theorem 3.2. The gradient descentbased optimization of RB t (θ1 ) preserves (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )
DP in learning θ1 .
Proof of Theorem 3.2
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Proof. Given χ1 drawn as a Laplace noise [Lap( ∆ϵ1R )]d and χ2 drawn as a Laplace noise
[Lap( ∆ϵ1R )]β , the perturbation of the coefficient ϕ ∈ Φ = { 12 hi , xi }, denoted as ϕ, can be
rewritten as follows:

X

for ϕ ∈ {xi } : ϕ =

(ϕxi +

xi ∈B

X

X
χ1
)=
ϕxi + χ1
m
x ∈B
i

∆R d
)]
ϵ1
xi ∈B
X1
X
1
2χ2
χ2
for ϕ ∈ { hi } : ϕ =
(hi +
)=
(ϕxi + )
2
2
m
m
xi ∈B
xi ∈B
X
X
∆R β
ϕxi + [Lap(
=
ϕxi + χ2 =
)]
ϵ
1
x ∈B
x ∈B
=

ϕxi + [Lap(

(3.41)

(3.42)

i

i

we have


P r RB t (θ1 ) =

d Y
Y

ϵ1 ∥

exp −

P
xi ∈Bt

ϕxi − ϕ∥1 

∆R

j=1 ϕ∈Φ

∆R is set to d(β + 2), we have that:

Qd Q

P r RB t (θ1 )
j=1
ϕ∈Φ exp −
=
Qd Q
P r RB ′t (θ1 )
j=1
ϕ∈Φ exp −
≤

d Y
Y

exp(

j=1 ϕ∈Φ

≤

d Y
Y
j=1 ϕ∈Φ

exp(

ϵ1
∆R

P
ϵ1 ∥ x

i ∈Bt

ϕxi −ϕ∥1 

∆R

P
ϵ1 ∥ x′ ∈B ′ ϕx′ −ϕ∥1 

X

t

i

i

∆R

X

ϕxi −

ϕx′i

x′i ∈Bt′

xi ∈Bt

ϵ1
2 max ϕxi
∆R xi ∈Bt
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1

) ≤ exp(

)
1

ϵ1 d(β + 2)
) = exp(ϵ1 ) (3.43)
∆R

Consequently, the computation of RB t (θ1 ) preserves ϵ1 DP in Algorithm 3.3 (Result
1). To show that gradient descentbased optimizers can be used to optimize the objective
function RB t (θ1 ) in learning private parameters θ1 , we prove that all the computations on
top of the perturbed data B t , including hi , hi , x
ei , gradients and descent, are DP without
incurring any additional information from the original data, as follows.
First, by following the postprocessing property in DP [100], it is clear that the
computations of h1B t = {hi }xi ∈B t = θ1T {xi }xi ∈B t is (ϵ1 /γx )DP. As in Lemma 3.10,
we also have that h1B t = {hi +

2χ2
}
m xi ∈B t

is (ϵ1 /γ)DP. Given this, it is obvious that

e
xi = {e
xi }xi ∈B t = θ1 {hi }xi ∈B t is (ϵ1 /γ)DP, i.e., the postprocessing property in DP.
In addition, the computations of h1B t , h1B t , and e
xi do not access the original data Bt .
Therefore, they do not incur any additional information from the private data, except the
xi are based on
privacy loss measured by (ϵ1 /γx )DP, since the computations of h1B t and e
the (ϵ1 /γx )DP h1B t . (Result 2)
Second, the gradient of a particular parameter θ1j , with ∀j ∈ [1, d], can be computed
as follows:

δRB t (θ1 ) X 1
=
hi ( − xij )
∀j ∈ [1, d] : ∇θ1j RB t (θ1 ) =
δθ1j
2
i=1
m

=
=

m
X
2χ2 1
(hi +
)( − xij )
m
2
i=1
m
X
i=1

m

 2χ2 X

1
hi ( − xij ) + χ2 −
xij
2
m i=1

(3.45)
(3.46)

P
∆R
xij = ( m
i=1 xij ) + Lap( ϵ1 ) (Equation
Pm
2
(3.41)), which is (ϵ1 /γx )DP. Therefore, the term 2χ
i=1 xij also is (ϵ1 /γx )DP (the
m
In Equation (3.46), we have that

Pm

(3.44)

i=1

postprocessing property in DP). (Result 3)
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Regarding the term

Pm
i=1

hi ( 12 − xij ) in Equation (3.46), its global sensitivity given

two arbitrary neighboring batches, denoted as ∆g , can be bounded as follows: ∆g ≤
2 maxxi ∥hi ( 12 − xij )∥1 = 3β. As a result, we have that:
m
X
i=1

m

X

1
1
∆g
hi ( − xij ) + χ2 =
hi ( − xij ) + [Lap( ∆R )]β
2
2
ϵ1 / ∆
i=1

(3.47)

g

which is (ϵ1 / ∆∆Rg )DP. (Result 4)
From Results 3 and 4, the computation of gradients ∇θ1j RB t (θ1 ) is (ϵ1 / ∆∆Rg + ϵ1 /γx )
DP, since: (1) The computations of the two terms in Equation (3.46) can be treated as two
independent DPpreserving mechanisms applied on the perturbed batch B t ; and (2) This
is true for every dimension j ∈ [1, d], each of which ∇θ1j is independently computed and
bounded. It is important to note that this result is different from the traditional DPSGD
[62], in which the parameter gradients are jointly clipped by a l2 norm constant bound,
such that Gaussian noise can be injected to achieve DP. In addition, as in Equation (3.44),
the computation of ∇θ1j RB t (θ1 ) only uses (ϵ1 /γx )DP B t = {xi }xi ∈B t and (ϵ1 /γ)DP
h1B t , without accessing the original data. Basically, h1B t is computed on top of B t , without
touching any benign example. Therefore, it does not incur any additional information from
the private data, except the privacy loss (ϵ1 / ∆∆Rg + ϵ1 /γx )DP. In practice, we observed that
ϵ1 /γx ≫ ϵ1 / ∆∆Rg ≊ ϵ1 × 1e − 3, which is tiny. We can simply consider that the computation
of gradients ∇θ1j RB t (θ1 ) is (ϵ1 /γx )DP without affecting the general DP protection. In
addition to the gradient computation, the descent operations are simply postprocessing
steps without consuming any further privacy budget. (Result 5)
From Results 1, 2, and 5, we have shown that all the computations on top of
(ϵ1 /γx )DP B t , including parameter gradients and gradient descents, clearly are DP without
accessing the original data; therefore, they do not incur any additional information from
the private data (the postprocessing property in DP). As a result, gradient descentbased
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approaches can be applied to optimize RB t (θ1 ) in Algorithm 3.3. The total privacy budget
to learn the perturbed optimal parameters θ1 in Algorithm 3.3 is (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )DP, where the
ϵ1 /γx is counted for the perturbation on the batch of benign examples Bt .
Consequently, Theorem 3.2 does hold.

3.2.5

Adversarial Learning with Differential Privacy

To integrate adversarial learning, we first draft DP adversarial examples xadv
j using perturbed
benign examples xj , with an ensemble of attack algorithms A and a random perturbation
budget µt ∈ (0, 1], at each step t (Lines 611, Algorithm 3.3). This will significantly
enhances the robustness of our models under different types of adversarial examples with
an unknown adversarial attack size µ.


xadv
x
+
µ
·
sign
∇
L
f
(x
,
θ),
y(x
)
=
j
xj
j
j
j

(3.48)

with y(xj ) is the class prediction result of f (xj ) to avoid label leaking of xj during
adv

the adversarial example crafting. Given a set of DP adversarial examples B t , training the
adv

autoencoder with B t preserves (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )DP.
Theorem 3.3. The gradient descentbased optimization of RB adv (θ1 ) preserves (ϵ1 /γx +
t

ϵ1 )DP in learning θ1 .
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is in Result 4 of the proof in Page 117. It can be extended
to iterative attacks as: xadv
j,0 = xj ,

adv
xadv
j,t+1 = xj,t +



µ
adv
adv
· sign ∇xadv
L
f
(x
,
θ),
y(x
)
j,t
j,t
j,t
Tµ

adv
where y(xadv
j,t ) is the prediction of f (xj,t , θ), t ∈ [0, Tµ − 1].
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(3.49)

Second, we propose a novel DP adversarial objective function LBt (θ2 ), in which the
loss function L for benign examples is combined with an additional loss function Υ for
DP adversarial examples, to optimize the parameters θ2 . The objective function LBt (θ2 ) is
defined as follows:

 X

1
L f (xi , θ2 ), yi
LB t ∪B adv (θ2 ) =
t
m(1 + ξ)
xi ∈B t

X

+ξ

Υ f (xadv
j , θ2 ), yj



(3.50)

adv

xadv
j ∈B t

where ξ is a hyperparameter. For the sake of clarity, in Equation (3.50), we denote
yi and yj as the true class labels yxi and yxj of examples xi and xj . xadv
and xj share the
j
same label yxj .


Now we are ready to preserve DP in objective functions L f (xi , θ2 ), yi and Υ f (xadv
j ,

θ2 ), yj in order to achieve DP in learning θ2 . Since the objective functions use the true
class labels yi and yj , we need to protect the labels at the output layer. Let us first present
our approach to preserve DP in the objective function L for benign examples. Given hπi
computed from the xi through the network with Wπ is the parameter at the last hidden

P
P 
layer hπ . Crossentropy function is approximated as: LB t θ2 ≊ K
k=1
xi hπi Wπk −




(hπi Wπk )yik − 12 |hπi Wπk | + 18 (hπi Wπk )2 ≊ L1B t θ2 − L2B t θ2 , where L1B t θ2 =

 PK P
PK P 
1
1
2
k=1
k=1
xi hπi Wπk − 2 |hπi Wπk | + 8 (hπi Wπk ) , and L2B t θ2 =
xi (hπi yik )Wπk .
Based on the postprocessing property of DP [100], hπB t = {hπi }xi ∈B t is (ϵ1 /γ)
DP, since the computation of h1B t is (ϵ1 /γ)DP (Lemma 3.10). Hence, the optimization

P r(L
(θ2 ))
of L1B t θ2 does not disclose any information from the training data, and P r(L1Bt′ (θ2 )) =
P r(hπB )

t
P r(hπB ′ )
t

≤e

ϵ1 /γ

, given neighboring batches B t and
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′
Bt.

1B t

Thus, we only need to preserve ϵ2 

DP in the function L2B t (θ2 ), which accesses the groundtruth label yik . Given coefficients
hπi yik , the sensitivity ∆L2 of L2B t (θ2 ) is computed as:
′

Lemma 3.11. Let B t and B t be neighboring batches of benign examples, we have the
following inequality: ∆L2 ≤ 2|hπ |, where |hπ | is the number of hidden neurons in hπ .
Proof of Lemma 3.11
′

Proof. Assume that B t and B t differ in the last tuple, and xm (x′m ) be the last tuple in B t
′

(B t ), we have that

∆L2 =

K
X
k=1

X

(hπi yik ) −

xi ∈B t

X

′
(h′πi yik
)

′

x′i ∈B t

=
1

K
X

′
hπm ymk − h′πm ymk

1

k=1

′
Since ymk and ymk
are onehot encoding, we have that ∆L2 ≤ 2 maxxi ∥hπi ∥1 . Given

hπi ∈ [−1, 1], we have
∆L2 ≤ 2|hπ |

(3.51)

Lemma 3.11 does hold.
The sensitivity of our objective function is notably smaller than the stateoftheart
bound [72], which is crucial to improve our model utility. The perturbed functions become:


P P
∆L2
1
Lap(
)
Wπk .
LB t θ2 = L1B t (θ2 )−L2B t (θ2 ), where L2B t (θ2 ) = K
h
y
+
πi
ik
k=1
xi
m
ϵ2
Theorem 3.4. Algorithm 3.3 preserves (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP in the gradient descentbased

optimization of LB θ2 .
Proof of Theorem 3.4
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′

Proof. Let B t and B t be neighboring batches of benign examples, and χ3 drawn as Laplace
)]|hπ | , the perturbations of the coefficients hπi yik can be rewritten as:
noise [Lap( ∆ϵL2
2

hπi y ik =

X

(hπi yik +

xi

X
χ3
∆L2 |hπ |
)=
(hπi yik ) + [Lap(
)]
m
ϵ
2
x
i

Since all the coefficients are perturbed, and given ∆L2 = 2|hπ |, we have that

P r(L1B t (θ2 )) P r(L2B t (θ2 ))
P r(LB t (θ2 ))
=
×
P r(LB ′t (θ2 ))
P r(L1B ′t (θ2 )) P r(L2B ′ (θ2 ))
t
≤ eϵ1 /γ

≤e

ϵ1 /γ

K
X

exp(−

k=1

exp(−

K
X

exp(

k=1

≤ eϵ1 /γ exp(

P
ϵ2 ∥ x hπi yik −hπi y ik ∥1
i

∆L2
P
ϵ2 ∥ x′ hπi yik −hπi y ik ∥1
i

∆L2

)
)

X
ϵ2 X
hπi yik −
hπi yik
∆L2 x
′
i

1

)

xi

ϵ2
2 max∥hπi ∥1 ) = eϵ1 /γ+ϵ2
∆L2 xi


The computation of L2B t θ2 preserves (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )differential privacy. Similar

to Theorem 3.2, the gradient descentbased optimization of L2B t θ2 does not access
additional information from the original input xi ∈ Bt . It only reads the (ϵ1 /γ)DP
2
}
. Consequently, the optimal perturbed parameters θ2 derived from
h1B t = {hi + 2χ
m xi ∈B t

L2B t θ2 are (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP.

We apply the same technique to preserve (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP in the optimization of

adv
adv
the function Υ f (xadv
∈ B t . As the
j , θ2 ), yj over the DP adversarial examples xj
perturbed functions L and Υ are always optimized given two disjoint batches B t and
adv

B t , the privacy budget used to preserve DP in the adversarial objective function LBt (θ2 )
is (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ), following the parallel composition property [100]. The total budget to
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learn private parameters θ = {θ1 , θ2 } = arg min{θ1 ,θ2 } (RB t ∪B adv (θ1 ) + LB t ∪B adv (θ2 )) is
t

t

ϵ = (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ) (Line 12, Algorithm 3.3).
DP at the Dataset Level

adv

Our mechanism achieves DP at the batch level B t ∪ B t given

a specific training step t. By constructing disjoint and fixed batches from D, we leverage
both parallel composition and postprocessing properties of DP to extend the result to ϵDP
in learning {θ1 , θ2 } on D across T training steps. There are three key properties in our
model: (1) It only reads perturbed inputs B t and perturbed coefficients h1 , which are DP
across T training steps with a single draw of Laplace noise (i.e., no further privacy leakage);
(2) Given N /m disjoint batches in each epoch, ∀x, x is included in one and only one batch,
denoted Bx ∈ B. As a result, the DP guarantee to x in D is equivalent to the DP guarantee to
x in Bx ; since the optimization using any other batches does not affect the DP guarantee of x,
even the objective function given Bx can be slightly different from the objective function
given any other batches in B; and (3) All the batches are fixed across T training steps
to prevent additional privacy leakage, caused by generating new and overlapping batches
(which are considered overlapping datasets in the parlance of DP) in the typical training.
Theorem 3.5. Algorithm 3.3 achieves (ϵ1 +ϵ1 /γx +ϵ1 /γ +ϵ2 )DP parameters θ = {θ1 , θ2 }
on the private training data D across T gradient descentbased training steps.

Proofs of Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.5
Proof. First, we optimize for a single draw of noise during training (Line 3, Algorithm
3.3) and all the batches of perturbed benign examples are disjoint and fixed across epochs.
As a result, the computation of xi is equivalent to a data preprocessing step with DP,
which does not incur any additional privacy budget consumption over T training steps (the
postprocessing property of DP) (Result 1). That is different from repeatedly applying a
DP mechanism on either the same or overlapping datasets causing the accumulation of the
privacy budget.
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Now, we show that our algorithm achieves DP at the dataset level D. Let us consider
the computation of the first hidden layer, given any two neighboring datasets D and D′
Q /m
QN /m
differing at most one tuple xe ∈ D and x′e ∈ D′ . For any O = N
i=1 oi ∈
i=1 h1B i (∈
Rβ×m ), we have that


P (h1B 1 = o1 ) . . . P (h1B N /m = oN /m )
P h1D = O
=
P h1D′ = O
P (h1B ′1 = o1 ) . . . P (h1B ′N /m = oN /m )

(3.52)

By having disjoint and fixed batches, we have that:

′

∃!B̃ ∈ B s.t. xe ∈ B̃ and ∃!B̃ ′ ∈ B s.t. x′e ∈ B̃ ′

(3.53)

From Equations (3.52), (3.53), and Lemma 3.10, we have that


P h1B = o
 =1
∀B ∈ B, B ̸= B̃ : B = B ⇒
P h1B ′ = o


P h1B̃ = õ
P h1D = O
=
 ≤ eϵ1 /γ
Equations (3.53) and (3.54) ⇒
′
P h1D = O
P h1B̃ ′ = õ
′

(3.54)
(3.55)

As a result, the computation of h1D is (ϵ1 /γ)DP given the data D, since the Equation
(3.55) does hold for any tuple xe ∈ D. That is consistent with the parallel composition
property of DP, in which batches can be considered disjoint datasets given h1B as a DP
mechanism [100].
This does hold across epochs, since batches B are disjoint and fixed among epochs.
At each training step t ∈ [1, T ], the computation of h1B t does not access the original
data. It only reads the perturbed batch of inputs B t , which is (ϵ1 /γx )DP (Lemma 3.10).
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Following the postprocessing property in DP [100], the computation of h1B t does not incur
any additional information from the original data across T training steps. (Result 2)
Similarly, we show that the optimization of the function RB t (θ1 ) is (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )DP

across T training steps. As in Theorem 3.2 and Proof 3.2.4, we have that P r RB (θ1 ) =
P
Qd Q
ϵ1 ∥ x ∈B ϕxi −ϕ∥1 
i
, where B ∈ B. Given any two perturbed neighboring
exp
−
j=1
ϕ∈Φ
∆R
′

′

datasets D and D differing at most one tuple xe ∈ D and x′e ∈ D :



P r RB 1 (θ1 ) . . . P r RB N /m (θ1 )
P r RD (θ1 )
=


P r RD′ (θ1 )
P r RB ′1 (θ1 ) . . . P r RB ′N /m (θ1 )

(3.56)

From Equations (3.53), (3.56), and Theorem 3.2, we have that

′

P RB (θ1 )



 =1
P RB ′ (θ1 )


P RB̃ (θ1 )
P RD (θ1 )
 ≤ eϵ1
=
Equations (3.56) and (3.57) ⇒
′
P RD (θ1 )
P RB̃ ′ (θ1 )
∀B ∈ B, B ̸= B̃ : B = B ⇒

(3.57)
(3.58)

As a result, the optimization of RD (θ1 ) is (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )DP given the data D (which
is ϵ1 /γx DP (Lemma 3.10)), since the Equation (3.58) does hold for any tuple xe ∈ D.
This is consistent with the parallel composition property in DP [100], in which batches can
be considered disjoint datasets and the optimization of the function on one batch does not
affect the privacy guarantee in any other batch, even the objective function given one batch
can be slightly different from the objective function given any other batch in B. In addition,
∀t ∈ [1, T ], the optimization of RB t (θ1 ) does not use any additional information from the
original data D. Consequently, the privacy budget is (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 ) across T training steps,
following the postprocessing property in DP [100] (Result 3).
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Similarly, we can also prove that optimizing the data reconstruction function RB adv (θ1 )
t

given the DP adversarial examples crafted in Equations (3.48) and (3.49), i.e.,

xadv
j ,

is also

(ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )DP given t ∈ [1, T ] on the training data D. First, DP adversarial examples
xadv
are crafted from perturbed benign examples xj . As a result, the computation of the
j
adv

batch B t

of DP adversarial examples is 1) (ϵ1 /γx )DP (the postprocessing property of

DP [100]), and 2) does not access the original data ∀t ∈ [1, T ]. In addition, the computation
of h1B adv and the optimization of RB adv (θ1 ) correspondingly are ϵ1 /γDP and ϵ1 DP. In fact,
t

t

the data reconstruction function RB adv is presented as follows:
t

RB adv (θ1 ) =
t

d
hX
i
1
adv
adv adv
ej
( θ1i hj ) − xj x
2
adv
i=1

X

xadv
j ∈B t

d
hX

 adv i
1
adv
adv
ej
ej − µ · sign ∇xj L f (xj , θ), y(xj ) x
( θ1i hj ) − xj x
2
adv
i=1

X

=

xadv
j ∈B t

d
hX
i
1
adv
adv
( θ1i hj ) − xj x
ej −
2
adv
i=1

X

X

xadv
j ∈B t

xadv
j ∈B t

=


 adv
µ · sign ∇xj L f (xj , θ), y(xj ) x
ej

adv

(3.59)

adv

= θ1T xadv
where hadv
j
j , hj

+
= hadv
j

2
Lap( ∆ϵ1R ),
m

adv

= θ1 hj . The right
and x
eadv
j

summation component in Equation (3.59) does not disclose any additional information,
since the sign(·) function is computed from perturbed benign examples (the postprocessing
property in DP [100]). Meanwhile, the left summation component has the same form with
RB t (θ1 ) in Equation (3.40). Therefore, we can employ the Proof 3.2.4 in Theorem 3.2, by
replacing the coefficients Φ = { 12 hi , xi } with Φ = { 12 hadv
j , xj } to prove that the optimization
of RB adv (θ1 ) is (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )DP. As a result, Theorem 3.3 does hold. (Result 4)
t

In addition to the Result 4, by applying the same analysis in Result 3, we can
further show that the optimization of RDadv (θ1 ) is (ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 )DP given the DP adversarial
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examples Dadv crafted using the data D across T training steps, since batches used to created
DP adversarial examples are disjoint and fixed across epochs. It is also straightforward
to conduct the same analysis in Result 2, in order to prove that the computation of the
T

first affine transformation h1B adv = {θ1 xadv
j +
t

2
Lap( ∆ϵ1R )}xadv ∈B adv
m
t
j

given the batch of DP

adv

adversarial examples B t , is (ϵ1 /γ)DP with t ∈ [1, T ] training steps. This is also true
given the data level Dadv . (Result 5)
Regarding the output layer, the Algorithm 3.3 preserves (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP in optimizing
the adversarial objective function LB t ∪B adv (θ2 ) (Theorem 3.4). We apply the same technique
t

to preserve (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP across T training steps given disjoint and fixed batches derived
from the private training data D. In addition, as our objective functions R and L are always
adv

optimized given two disjoint batches B t and B t , the privacy budget used to preserve DP
in these functions is (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ), following the parallel composition property in DP
[100]. (Result 6)
With the Results 16, all the computations and optimizations in the Algorithm 3.3
are DP following the postprocessing property in DP [100], by working on perturbed inputs
and perturbed coefficients. The crafting and utilizing processes of DP adversarial examples
based on the perturbed benign examples do not disclose any additional information. The
optimization of our DP adversarial objective function at the output layer is DP to protect the
groundtruth labels. More importantly, the DP guarantee in learning given the whole dataset
level D is equivalent to the DP guarantee in learning on disjoint and fixed batches across
epochs. Consequently, Algorithm 3.3 preserves (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP in learning
private parameters θ = {θ1 , θ2 } given the training data D across T training steps. Note
that the ϵ1 /γx is counted for the perturbation on the benign examples. Theorem 3.5 does
hold.
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3.2.6

Certified Robustness

Now, we establish the correlation between our mechanism and certified robustness. In the
inference time, to derive the certified robustness condition against adversarial examples
x + α, i.e., ∀α ∈ lp (1), PixelDP randomizes the function f (x) by injecting robustness noise
x

h

σr into either input x or a hidden layer, i.e., x′ = x + Lap( ∆ϵrr ) or h′ = h + Lap( ∆ϵrr ),
where ∆xr and ∆hr are the sensitivities of x and h, measuring how much x and h can be
changed given the perturbation α ∈ lp (1) in the input x. Monte Carlo estimation of the
expected values Êf (x), Êlb fk (x), and Êub fk (x) are used to derive the robustness condition
in Equation (3.37).
On the other hand, in our mechanism, the privacy noise σp includes Laplace noise
injected into both input x, i.e.,

1
Lap( ∆ϵ1R ),
m

Note that the perturbation of L2B t
1
Lap( ∆ϵL2
)Wπk ).
m
2

and its affine transformation h, i.e., m2 Lap( ∆ϵ1R ).

P P
θ2 is equivalent to L2B t (θ2 ) = K
k=1
xi (hπi yik Wπk +

This helps us to avoid injecting the noise directly into the coefficients

hπi yik . The correlation between our DP preservation and certified robustness lies in the
correlation between the privacy noise σp and the robustness noise σr .
We can derive a robustness bound by projecting the privacy noise σp on the scale of
the robustness noise σr . Given the input x, let κ =

∆R ∆x
/ r,
mϵ1 ϵr

in our mechanism we have

that: x = x + Lap(κ∆xr /ϵr ). By applying a group privacy size κ [100, 101], the scoring
function f (x) satisfies ϵr PixelDP given α ∈ lp (κ), or equivalently is ϵr /κPixelDP given
α ∈ lp (1), δr = 0. By applying Lemma 3.8, we have

∀k, ∀α ∈ lp (κ) : Efk (x) ≤ eϵr Efk (x + α),
ϵr

or ∀k, ∀α ∈ lp (1) : Efk (x) ≤ e κ Efk (x + α)

With that, we can achieve a robustness condition against lp (κ)norm attacks, as
follows:
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Êlb fk (x) > e2ϵr max Êub fi (x)

(3.60)

i:i̸=k

with the probability ≥ ηx confidence, derived from the Monte Carlo estimation of
Êf (x). Our mechanism also perturbs h (Equation (3.40)). Given φ =

2∆R ∆h
/ ϵrr ,
mϵ1

we further

h

r
have h = h + Lap( φ∆
). Therefore, the scoring function f (x) also satisfies ϵr PixelDP
ϵr

given the perturbation α ∈ lp (φ). In addition to the robustness to the lp (κ)norm attacks,
we achieve an additional robustness bound in Equation (3.60) against lp (φ)norm attacks.
Similar to PixelDP, these robustness conditions can be achieved as randomization processes
in the inference time. They can be considered as two independent and certified defensive
mechanisms applied against two lp norm attacks, i.e., lp (κ) and lp (φ).
One challenging question here is: “What is the general robustness bound, given κ
κφ
). We leverage the
and φ?” Intuitively, our model is robust to attacks with α ∈ lp ( κ+φ

theory of sequential composition in DP [100] to theoretically answer this question. Given
S independent mechanisms M1 , . . . , MS , whose privacy guarantees are ϵ1 , . . . , ϵS DP with
α ∈ lp (1). Each mechanism Ms , which takes the input x and outputs the value of f (x) with
the Laplace noise only injected to randomize the layer s (i.e., no randomization at any other
layers), denoted as f s (x), is defined as: ∀s ∈ [1, S], Ms f (x) : Rd → f s (x) ∈ RK . We aim
to derive a generalized robustness of any composition scoring function f (M1 , . . . , Ms |x) :
QS
s=1 Ms f (x) bounded in [0, 1], defined as follows:
f (M1 , . . . , MS |x) : Rd →

Y

f s (x) ∈ RK

(3.61)

s∈[1,S]

Our setting follows the sequential composition in DP [100]. Thus, we can prove that
the expected value Ef (M1 , . . . , MS |x) is insensitive to small perturbations α ∈ lp (1) in
Lemma 3.12, and we derive our composition of robustness in Theorem 3.6, as follows:
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Lemma 3.12. Given S independent mechanisms M1 , . . . , MS , which are ϵ1 , . . . , ϵS DP
w.r.t a lp norm metric, then the expected output value of any sequential function f of them,
i.e., f (M1 , . . . , MS |x) ∈ [0, 1], satisfies:

PS

∀α ∈ lp (1) : Ef (M1 , . . . , MS |x) ≤ e(

s=1 ϵs )

Ef (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α)

Proof of Lemma 3.12
Proof. Thanks to the sequential composition theory in DP [100], f (M1 , . . . , MS |x) is
Q
Q
P
( s ϵs )DP, since for any O = Ss=1 os ∈ Ss=1 f s (x)(∈ RK ), we have that


P f (M1 , . . . , MS |x) = O
P (M1 f (x) = o1 ) . . . P (MS f (x) = oS )
=
P (M1 f (x + α) = o1 ) . . . P (MS f (x + α) = oS )
P f (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α) = O
≤

S
Y

PS

exp(ϵs ) = e(

s=1 ϵs )

s=1

As a result, we have
P


P f (M1 , . . . , MS |x) ≤ e( i ϵi ) P f (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α)

The sequential composition of the expected output is as:
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Z


P f (M1 , . . . , MS |x) > t dt
0
Z 1
P

( s ϵs )
≤e
P f (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α) > t dt
1

Ef (M1 , . . . , MS |x) =

0

= e(

P

s ϵs )

Ef (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α)

Lemma 3.12 does hold.
Theorem 3.6. (Composition of Robustness) Given S independent mechanisms M1 , . . . , MS .
Given any sequential function f (M1 , . . . , MS |x), and let Êlb and Êub are lower and upper
bounds with an ηconfidence, for the Monte Carlo estimation of Êf (M1 , . . . , MS |x) =
P
P QS
1
1
s
f
(M
,
.
.
.
,
M
|x)
=
1
S
n
n
n ( s=1 f (x)n ).
n
n

∀x, if ∃k ∈ K : Êlb fk (M1 , . . . , MS |x) >
e2(

PS

s=1 ϵs )

max Êub fi (M1 , . . . , MS |x), (3.62)
i:i̸=k

then the predicted label k = arg maxk Êfk (M1 , . . . , MS |x), is robust to adversarial
examples x + α, ∀α ∈ lp (1), with probability ≥ η, by satisfying: Êfk (M1 , . . . , MS |x +
α) > maxi:i̸=k Êfi (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α), which is the targeted robustness condition in
Equation (3.35).

Proof of Theorem 3.6
Proof. ∀α ∈ lp (1), from Lemma 3.12, with probability ≥ η, we have that
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Êfk (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α) ≥

Êlb fk (M1 , . . . , MS |x)
Êfk (M1 , . . . , MS |x)
Ps
≥
PS
(
ϵ
)
e s=1 s
e( s=1 ϵs )

(3.63)

In addition, we also have

PS

∀i =
̸ k : Êfi:i̸=k (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α) ≤ e(

s=1 ϵs )

PS

⇒ ∀i ̸= k : Êfi (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α) ≤ e(

s=1 ϵs )

Êfi:i̸=k (M1 , . . . , MS |x)
max Êub fi (M1 , . . . , MS |x)
i:i̸=k

(3.64)

Using the hypothesis (Equation (3.62)) and the first inequality (Equation (3.63)), we
have that

Êfk (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α) >

e2(

PS

s=1 ϵs )

PS

e(

PS

> e(

maxi:i̸=k Êub fi (M1 , . . . , MS |x)

s=1 ϵs )

s=1 ϵs )

max Êub fi (M1 , . . . , MS |x)
i:i̸=k

Now, we apply the third inequality (Equation (3.64)), we have that

∀i ̸= k : Êfk (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α) > Êfi (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α)
⇔ Êfk (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α) > max Êfi (M1 , . . . , MS |x + α)
i:i̸=k

The Theorem 3.6 does hold.
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There is no ηs confidence for each mechanism s, since we do not estimate the
expected value Êf s (x) independently. To apply the composition of robustness in our
mechanism, the noise injections into the input x and its affine transformation h can be
considered as two mechanisms Mx and Mh , sequentially applied as (Mh (x), Mx (x)).
When Mh (x) is applied by invoking f (x) with independent draws in the noise χ2 , the
noise χ1 injected into x is fixed; and viceversa. By applying group privacy [100] with
sizes κ and φ, the scoring functions f x (x) and f h (x), given Mx and Mh , are ϵr /κDP and
ϵr /φDP with α ∈ lp (1). With Theorem 3.6, we have a generalized bound as follows:
Corollary 3.1. (StoBatch Robustness). Given: ∀x, if ∃k ∈ K : Êlb fk (Mh , Mx |x) >
e2ϵr maxi:i̸=k Êub fi (Mh , Mx |x) (i.e., Equation (3.62)), then the predicted label k of our
κφ
function f (Mh , Mx |x) is robust to perturbations α ∈ lp ( κ+φ
) with the probability ≥ η, by
κφ
satisfying ∀α ∈ lp ( κ+φ
) : Êfk (Mh , Mx |x + α) > maxi:i̸=k Êfi (Mh , Mx |x + α)

Proof of Corollary 3.1
Proof. ∀α ∈ lp (1), by applying Theorem 3.6, we have

ϵr

ϵr

Êlb fk (Mh , Mx |x) > e2( κ + φ ) max Êub fi (Mh , Mx |x)
i:i̸=k

> e2(

κ+φ
)ϵr
κφ

κφ

max Êub fi (Mh , Mx |x) = e2(ϵr / κ+φ ) max Êub fi (Mh , Mx |x)
i:i̸=k

i:i̸=k

Furthermore, by applying group privacy, we have that

∀α ∈ lp (

κφ
) : Êlb fk (Mh , Mx |x) > e2ϵr max Êub fi (Mh , Mx |x)
i:i̸=k
κ+φ
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(3.65)

By applying Proof 3.2.6, it is straight to have

∀α ∈ lp (

κφ
) : Êfk (Mh , Mx |x + α) > max Êfk (Mh , Mx |x + α)
i:i̸=k
κ+φ

with probability ≥ η. Corollary 3.1 does hold.
Compared with stateoftheart robustness analysis [70, 101], in which either the input
space or the latent space are randomized, the advantage of our robustness bound is the
composition of different levels of robustness in both input and latent spaces.

3.2.7

Verified Inference

At the inference time, we implement a verified inference (Algorithm 3.4, Subsection 3.2.3)
to return a robustness size guarantee for each example x, i.e., the maximal value of
for which the robustness condition in Corollary 3.1 holds. Maximizing

κφ
κ+φ

κφ
,
κ+φ

is equivalent

to maximizing the robustness epsilon ϵr , which is the only parameter controlling the size of
κφ
;
κ+φ

since, all the other hyperparameters, i.e., ∆R , m, ϵ1 , ϵ2 , θ1 , θ2 , ∆xr , and ∆hr are fixed

given a welltrained model f (x):

(

∆R ϵr
κφ
)max = max
h
ϵr mϵ1 (∆x
κ+φ
r + ∆r /2)

s.t. Êlb fk (x) > e2ϵr max Êub fi (x) (i.e., Equation (3.62))
i:i̸=k

(3.66)

κφ
The prediction on an example x is robust to attacks up to ( κ+φ
)max . The failure

probability 1η can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of invocations
of f (x), with independent draws in the noise. Similar to [101], Hoeffding’s inequality
is applied to bound the approximation error in Êfk (x) and to search for the robustness
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κφ
bound ( κ+φ
)max . We use the following sensitivity bounds ∆hr = β∥θ1 ∥∞ where ∥θ1 ∥∞

is the maximum 1norm of θ1 ’s rows, and ∆xr = µd for l∞ attacks. In the Monte Carlo
Estimation of Êf (x), we also propose a new method to draw independent noise to control
the distribution shifts between training and inferring, in order to improve the verified
inference effectiveness, without affecting the DP protection and the robustness bounds.
Details of this method is described in the following subsection.
Algorithm 3.4 Verified Inferring
Input: (an input x, attack size µa )
κφ
1: Compute robustness size ( κ+φ
)max in Equation (3.66) of x
κφ
2: if ( κ+φ )max ≥ µa then
κφ
3:
Return isRobust(x) = T rue, label k, ( κ+φ
)max
4: else
κφ
5:
Return isRobust(x) = F alse, label k, ( κ+φ
)max

Effective Monte Carlo Estimation of Êf (x)

Recall that the Monte Carlo estimation
P
is applied to estimate the expected value Êf (x) = n1 n f (x)n , where n is the number
of invocations of f (x) with independent draws in the noise, i.e.,
2
Lap(0, ∆ϵ1R )
m

1
Lap(0, ∆ϵ1R )
m

and

in our case. When ϵ1 is small (indicating a strong privacy protection), it

causes a notably large distribution shift between training and inference, given independent
draws of the Laplace noise.
In fact, let us denote a single draw in the noise as χ1 =

1
Lap(0, ∆ϵ1R )
m

used to

train the function f (x), the model converges to the point that the noise χ1 and 2χ2 need
to be correspondingly added into x and h in order to make correct predictions. χ1 can
be approximated as Lap(χ1 , ϱ), where ϱ → 0. It is clear that independent draws of the
noise

1
Lap(0, ∆ϵ1R )
m

have distribution shifts with the fixed noise χ1 ≊ Lap(χ1 , ϱ). These

distribution shifts can also be large, when noise is large. We have experienced that these
distribution shifts in having independent draws of noise to estimate Êf (x) can notably
degrade the inference accuracy of the scoring function, when privacy budget ϵ1 is small
resulting in a large amount of noise injected to provide strong privacy guarantees.
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To address this, one solution is to increase the number of invocations of f (x), i.e.,
n, to a huge number per prediction. However, this is impractical in realworld scenarios.
We propose a novel way to draw independent noise following the distribution of χ1 +
1
Lap(0, ∆ϵ1R /ψ)
m

for the input x and 2χ2 +

2
Lap(0, ∆ϵ1R /ψ)
m

for the affine transformation

h, where ψ is a hyperparameter to control the distribution shifts. This approach works
well and does not affect the DP bounds and the certified robustness condition, since:
(1) Our mechanism achieves both DP and certified robustness in the training process; and
P
P
(2) It is clear that Êf (x) = n1 n f (x)n = n1 n g a(x + χ1 + m1 Lapn (0, ∆ϵ1R /ψ), θ1 ) +

2χ2 + m2 Lapn (0, ∆ϵ1R /ψ), θ2 , where Lapn (0, ∆ϵ1R /ψ) is the nth draw of the noise. When

P
n → ∞, Êf (x) will converge to n1 n g a(x + χ1 , θ1 ) + 2χ2 , θ2 , which aligns well
with the convergence point of the scoring function f (x). Injecting χ1 and 2χ2 to x and
h during the estimation of Êf (x) yields better performance, without affecting the DP and
the composition robustness bounds.

3.2.8

Distributed Training

In the vanilla iterative batchbybatch training for DP DNNs, at each step, only one batch
of examples can be used to train our model, so that the privacy loss can be computed
[74, 73, 78, 79]. Parameters θ1 and θ2 are independently updated (Lines 412, Algorithm
3.3). This prevents us from applying practical adversarial training [187, 80], in which
distributed training using synchronized SGD on many GPUs (e.g., 128 GPUs) is used to
scale adversarial training to large DNNs. Each GPU processes a minibatch of 32 images
(i.e., the total batch size is 128 × 32 = 4, 096).
To overcome this, a wellapplied technique [73] is to finetune a limited number of
layers, such as a fully connected layer and the output layer, under DP of a pretrained model,
i.e., VGG16, trained over a public and large dataset, e.g., ImageNet, in order to handle
simpler tasks on smaller private datasets, e.g., CIFAR10. Although this approach works
well, there are several utility and security concerns: (1) Suitable public data may not always
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be available, especially for highly sensitive data; (2) Trojans can be implanted in the pre
trained model for backdoor attacks [188]; and (3) Public data can be poisoned [189]. Fine
tuning a limited number of layers may not be secure; while finetuning an entire of a large
pretrained model iteratively batchbybatch is still inefficient.
To address this bottleneck, we leverage the training recipe of [187, 80] to propose a
distributed training algorithm, called StoBatch (Figure 3.6b), in order to efficiently train
large DP DNNs in adversarial learning, without affecting the DP protection (Algorithm
3.5, Subsection 3.2.3). In StoBatch, fixed and disjoint batches B are distributed to N /(2m)
local trainers, each of which have two batches {B i1 , B i2 } randomly picked from B with
i ∈ [1, N /(2m)] (Line 4, Algorithm 3.5). At each training step t, we randomly pick
N local trainers, each of which gets the latest global parameters θ from the parameter
server. A local trainer i will compute the gradients ∇i θ1 and ∇i θ2 to optimize the
DP objective functions R and L using its local batch B i1 and ensemble DP adversarial
examples crafted from B i2 (Lines 514, Algorithm 3.5). The gradients will be sent back
to the parameter server for a synchronized SGD (Lines 1516, Algorithm 3.5), as follows:
P
P
θ1 ← θ1 − ϱNt i∈[1,N] ∇i θ1 , θ2 ← θ2 − ϱNt i∈[1,N] ∇i θ2 . This enables us to train large
DNNs with our DP adversarial learning, by training from multiple batches simultaneously
with more adversarial examples, without affecting the DP guarantee in Theorem 3.5; since
the optimization of one batch does not affect the DP protection at any other batch and at the
dataset level D across T training steps (Theorem 3.5).
In addition, the average errors of our approximation functions are always bounded,
and are independent of the number of data instances N in D (details described in the
following subsection). This further ensures that our functions can be applied in large
datasets.
Our approach can be extended into two different complementary scenarios: (1) Dis
tributed training for each local trainer i, in which the batches {B i1 , B i2 } can be located
P
across M GPUs to efficiently compute the gradients ∇i θ1 = M1 j∈[1,M] ∇i,j θ1 and ∇i θ2 =
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Algorithm 3.5 StoBatch Training
Input: Database D, loss function L, parameters θ, batch size m, learning rate ϱt , privacy
budgets: ϵ1 and ϵ2 , robustness parameters: ϵr , ∆xr , and ∆hr , adversarial attack size µa , the
number of invocations n, ensemble attacks A, parameters ψ and ξ, the size |hπ | of hπ , a
number of N random local trainers (N ≤ N /(2m))
1: Draw Noise χ1 ← [Lap( ∆ϵ1R )]d , χ2 ← [Lap( ∆ϵ1R )]β , χ3 ← [Lap( ∆ϵL2
)]|hπ |
2
2: Randomly Initialize θ = {θ1 , θ2 }, B = {B1 , . . . , BN /m } s.t. ∀B ∈ B : B is a batch
with the size m, B1 ∩. . .∩BN /m = ∅, and B1 ∪. . .∪BN /m = D, B = {B 1 , . . . , B N /m }
where ∀i ∈ [1, N /m] : B i = {x ← x + χm1 }x∈Bi
2
3: Construct a deep network f with hidden layers {h1 + 2χ
, . . . , hπ }, where hπ is the
m
last hidden layer
4: Distribute fixed and disjoint batches B to N /(2m) local trainers, each of which have
two batches {B i1 , B i2 } randomly picked from B with i ∈ [1, N /(2m)]
5: for t ∈ [T ] do
6:
Randomly Pick N local trainers, each of which Gets the latest global parameters
θ from the parameter server
7:
for i ∈ [1, N] do
8:
Assign B t,i ← B i1
9:
Ensemble DP Adversarial Examples:
adv
10:
Draw Random Perturbation Value µt ∈ (0, 1], Assign B t,i ← ∅
11:
for l ∈ A do
12:
Take the next batch B a ⊂ B i2 with the size m/|A|
adv
13:
∀xj ∈ B a : Craft xadv
j by using attack algorithm A[l] with l∞ (µt ), B t,i ←
adv

B t,i ∪ xadv
j
14:
Compute ∇i θ1 ← ∇θ1 RB
χ3
m

15:
16:

adv
t,i ∪B t,i

(θ1 ), ∇i θ2 ← ∇θ2 LB

adv
t,i ∪B t,i

(θ2 ) with the noise

Send ∇i θ1 and ∇i θ2 to the
Pparameter server
P
Descent: θ1 ← θ1 − ϱt N1 i∈[1,N] ∇i θ1 ; θ2 ← θ2 − ϱt N1 i∈[1,N] ∇i θ2 , on the
parameter server
Output: ϵ = (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP parameters θ = {θ1 , θ2 }, robust model with
an ϵr budget
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1
M

P
j∈[1,M]

∇i,j θ2 ; and (2) Federated training, given each local trainer can be considered as

an independent party. In this setting, an independent party can further have different sizes
of batches. As long as the global sensitivities ∆R and ∆L2 are the same for all the parties,
the DP guarantee in Theorem 3.5 does hold given D be the union of all local datasets from
all the parties. This can be achieved by nomalizing all the inputs x to be in [−1, 1]d . This
is a step forward compared with the classical federated learning [190]. We focus on the
distributed training setting in this work, and reserve the federated learning scenarios for
future exploration.

Approximation Error Bounds

To compute how much error our polynomial approx

e Bt (θ1 ) (Equation (3.39)) and
imation approaches (i.e., truncated Taylor expansions), R

LB t θ2 , incur, we directly apply Lemma 4 in [60], Lemma 3 in [161], and the wellknown

e Bt (θ1 ) is the 1storder Taylor series and L θ2
error bound results in [164]. Note that R
Bt
is the 2ndorder Taylor series following the implementation of [191]. Let us closely follow
[60, 161, 164] to adapt their results into our scenario, as follows:
r
Pd P2 P1 F(r)
lj (0)
e Bt (θ1 ) = P
θ1j hi ,
Given the truncated function R
xi ∈Bt
j=1
l=1
r=0
r!
r
Pd P∞ P1 F(r)
lj (0)
b Bt (θ1 ) = P
the original Taylor polynomial function R
θ1j hi ,
r=0
l=1
j=1
xi ∈Bt
r!
the average error of the approximation is bounded as

1 b e
b Bt (θb1 )| ≤
|RBt (θ1 ) − R
|Bt |
1 b e
|LBt (θ2 ) − LbBt (θb2 )| ≤
|Bt |

4e × d
(1 + e)2
e2 + 2e − 1
×K
e(1 + e)2

(3.67)
(3.68)

b Bt (θ1 ), θe1 = arg minθ1 R
e Bt (θ1 ), LbBt (θ2 ) is the original
where θb1 = arg minθ1 R

P
Taylor polynomial function of xi ∈Bt L f (xi , θ2 ), yi , θb2 = arg minθ2 LbBt (θ2 ), and θe2 =
arg minθ2 LBt (θ2 ).
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e Bt (θ1 ) and S = minθ1 R
b Bt (θ1 ) − R
e Bt (θ1 ) .
b Bt (θ1 ) − R
Proof. Let U = maxθ1 R
b Bt (θe1 ) − R
e Bt (θe1 ) and ∀θ1∗ : S ≤ R
b Bt (θ1∗ ) − R
e Bt (θ1∗ ). Therefore,
We have that U ≥ R
we have

b Bt (θe1 ) − R
e Bt (θe1 ) − R
b Bt (θ∗ ) + R
e Bt (θ∗ ) ≤ U − S
R
1
1

(3.69)


b Bt (θe1 ) − R
b Bt (θ∗ ) ≤ U − S + R
e Bt (θe1 ) − R
e Bt (θ∗ )
⇔R
1
1

(3.70)

e Bt (θe1 ) − R
e Bt (θ∗ ) ≤ 0, it is straightforward to have:
In addition, R
1
b Bt (θe1 ) − R
b Bt (θ∗ ) ≤ U − S
R
1

(3.71)

If U ≥ 0 and S ≤ 0 then we have:
b Bt (θ∗ )| ≤ U − S
b Bt (θe1 ) − R
|R
1

(3.72)

Equation (3.72) holds for every θ1∗ , including θb1 . Equation (3.72) shows that the error
incurred by truncating the Taylor series approximate function depends on the maximum and
b Bt (θ1 ) − R
e Bt (θ1 ). This is consistent with [60, 161]. To quantify the
minimum values of R
b Bt (θ1 ) − R
e Bt (θ1 ) as:
magnitude of the error, we rewrite R

b Bt (θ1 ) − R
e Bt (θ1 ) =
R

d
X


b Bt (θ1j ) − R
e Bt (θ1j )
R

(3.73)

j=1

=

|Bt | 2
(r)
d X
∞
X
XX
Flj (zlj )
j=1

i=1 l=1 r=3
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r!

glj (xi , θ1j ) − zlj

r 

(3.74)

where g1j (xi , θ1j ) = θ1j hi and g2j (xi , θ1j ) = θ1j hi .
By looking into the remainder of Taylor expansion for each j (i.e., following

b Bt (θ1j ) − R
e Bt (θ1j ) must be in the
[60, 164]), with zj ∈ [zlj − 1, zlj + 1], |B1t | R
h P min F(2) (z )(z −z )2 P max F(2) (z )(z −z )2 i
2
P maxzj F(2)
zj lj
zj lj
j
j
j
j
lj
lj
lj (zj )(zj −zlj )
interval
,
.
If
≥
l
l
l
2!
2!
2!
(2)

P minzj Flj (zj )(zj −zlj )2
b Bt (θ1 ) − R
e Bt (θ1 ) | ≤
0 and
≤ 0, then we have that | |B1t | R
l
2!
(2)
2
2
Pd P maxzj F(2)
lj (zj )(zj −zlj ) −minzj Flj (zj )(zj −zlj )
. This can be applied to the case of our
j=1
l
2!
autoencoder, as follows:
For the functions F1j (zj ) = xij log(1 + e−zj ) and F2j (zj ) = (1 − xij ) log(1 + ezj ),
(2)

we have F1j (zj ) =
(2)

arg minzj F1j (zj ) =

xij e−zj
(1+e−zj )2
−e
(1+e)2

(2)

and arg maxzj F2j (zj ) =

zj

(2)

e
and F2j (zj ) = (1 − xij ) (1+e
zj 2 . It can be verified that
)
(2)

< 0, arg maxzj F1j (zj ) =

2e
(1+e)2

e
(1+e)2

(2)

> 0, arg minzj F2j (zj ) = 0,

> 0. Thus, the average error of the approximation is at

most:

h
−e 
4e × d
1 b e
e
2e i
b Bt (θb1 )| ≤
|RBt (θ1 ) − R
−
×d =
(3.75)
+
2
2
2
|Bt |
(1 + e)
(1 + e)
(1 + e)
(1 + e)2

Consequently, Equation (3.67) does hold. Similarly, by looking into the remainder
of Taylor expansion for each label k, Equation (3.68) can be proved straightforwardly. In
fact, by using the 2ndorder Taylor series with K categories, we have that:
LbBt (θb2 )| ≤
3.2.9

e2 +2e−1
e(1+e)2

1
|LbBt (θe2 )
|Bt |

−

× K.

Experiments

Model Configurations

The MNIST database consists of handwritten digits [47]. Each

example is a 28 × 28 size graylevel image. The CIFAR10 dataset consists of color images
belonging to 10 classes, i.e., airplanes, dogs, etc. The dataset is split into 50,000 training
samples and 10,000 test samples [99]. Tiny Imagenet (64 × 64 × 3) has 200 classes. Each
class has 500 training images, 50 validation images, and 50 test images. We used the first
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thirty classes with data augmented, including horizontal flip and random brightness, in the
Tiny ImageNet dataset in our experiment. In general, the dataset is split into 45,000 training
samples and 1,500 test samples [102, 192]. The experiments were conducted on a server of
4 GPUs, each of which is an NVIDIA TITAN Xp, 12 GB with 3,840 CUDA cores. All the
models share the same structure, consisting of 2 and 3 convolutional layers, respectively
for MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, and a ResNet18 model for the Tiny ImageNet dataset.
Both fullyconnected and convolution layers can be applied in the representation
learning model a(x, θ1 ). Given convolution layer, the computation of each feature map
needs to be DP; since each of them independently reads a local region of input neurons.
Therefore, the sensitivity ∆R can be considered the maximal sensitivity given any single
feature map in the first affine transformation layer. In addition, each hidden neuron can
only be used to reconstruct a unit patch of input units. That results in d (Lemma 3.9) being
the size of the unit patch connected to each hidden neuron, e.g., d = 9 given a 3 × 3 unit
patch, and β is the number of hidden neurons in a feature map.
MNIST: We used two convolutional layers (32 and 64 features). Each hidden neuron
connects with a 5x5 unit patch. A fullyconnected layer has 256 units. The batch size m
was set to 2,499, ξ = 1, ψ = 2. IFGSM, MIM, and MadryEtAl were used to draft l∞ (µ)
adversarial examples in training, with Tµ = 10. Learning rate ϱt was set to 1e − 4. Given a
predefined total privacy budget ϵ, ϵ2 is set to be 0.1, and ϵ1 is computed as: ϵ1 =

ϵ−ϵ2
.
(1+1/γ+1/γx )

This will guarantee that (ϵ1 +ϵ1 /γx +ϵ1 /γ+ϵ2 ) = ϵ. ∆R = (142 +2)×25 and ∆L2 = 2×256.
The number of Monte Carlo sampling for certified inference n is set to 2,000.
CIFAR10: We used three convolutional layers (128, 128, and 256 features). Each
hidden neuron connects with a 4x4 unit patch in the first layer, and a 5x5 unit patch in
other layers. One fullyconnected layer has 256 neurons. The batch size m was set to
1,851, ξ = 1.5, ψ = 10, and Tµ = 3. The ensemble of attacks A includes IFGSM,
MIM, and MadryEtAl. We use data augmentation, including random crop, random flip,
and random contrast. Learning rate ϱt was set to 5e − 2. In the CIFAR10 dataset, ϵ2 is
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set to (1 + r/3.0) and ϵ1 = (1 + 2r/3.0)/(1 + 1/γ + 1/γx ), where r ≥ 0 is a ratio to
control the total privacy budget ϵ in our experiment. For instance, given r = 0, we have
that ϵ = (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ) = 2. ∆R = 3 × (142 + 2) × 16 and ∆L2 = 2 × 256. N
and M are set to 1 and 4 in the distributed training. The number of Monte Carlo sampling
for certified inference n is set to 1,000.
Tiny ImageNet: We used a ResNet18 model. Each hidden neuron connects with a
7x7 unit patch in the first layer, and 3x3 unit patch in other layers. The batch size m was
set to 4,500, ξ = 1.5, ψ = 10, and Tµ = 10. The ensemble of attacks A includes IFGSM,
MIM, and MadryEtAl. Learning rate ϱt was set to 1e − 2. In the Tiny ImageNet dataset,
ϵ2 is set to 1 and ϵ1 = (1 + r)/(1 + 1/γ + 1/γx ), where r ≥ 0 is a ratio to control the total
privacy budget ϵ in our experiment. ∆R = 3 × (322 + 2) × 49 and ∆L2 = 2 × 256. N and
M are set to 1 and 20 in the distributed training. The number of Monte Carlo sampling for
certified inference n is set to 1,000.

Experimental Results

In this subsection, we will show and explain the experimental

results on MNIST and CIFAR datasets, and with the scenario of under strong attack.

Results on the MNIST Dataset

Figure 3.7 illustrates the conventional accuracy of each

model as a function of the privacy budget ϵ on the MNIST dataset under l∞ (µa )norm
attacks, with µa = 0.2 (a pretty strong attack). It is clear that our StoBatch outperforms
AdLM, DPSGD, SecureSGD, and SecureSGDAGM, in all cases, with p < 1.32e − 4. On
average, we register a 22.36% improvement over SecureSGD (p < 1.32e − 4), a 46.84%
improvement over SecureSGDAGM (p < 1.83e − 6), a 56.21% improvement over AdLM
(p < 2.05e − 10), and a 77.26% improvement over DPSGD (p < 5.20e − 14), given
our StoBatch mechanism. AdLM and DPSGD achieve the worst conventional accuracies.
There is no guarantee provided in AdLM and DPSGD. Thus, the accuracy of the AdLM
and DPSGD algorithms seem to show no effect against adversarial examples, when the
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privacy budget is varied. This is in contrast to our StoBatch model, the SecureSGD model,
and the SecureSGDAGM model, whose accuracies are proportional to the privacy budget.
When the privacy budget ϵ = 0.2 (a tight DP protection), there are significant
drops, in terms of conventional accuracy, given the baseline approaches. By contrast,
our StoBatch mechanism only shows a small degradation in the conventional accuracy
(6.89%, from 89.59% to 82.7%), compared with a 37% drop in SecureSGD (from 78.64%
to 41.64%), and a 32.89% drop in SecureSGDAGM (from 44.1% to 11.2%) on average,
when the privacy budget ϵ goes from 2.0 to 0.2. At ϵ = 0.2, our StoBatch mechanism
achieves 82.7%, compared with 11.2% and 41.64% correspondingly for SecureSGDAGM
and SecureSGD. This is an important result, showing the ability to offer tight DP protections
under adversarial example attacks in our model, compared with existing algorithms.
Figure 3.9 presents the conventional accuracy of each model as a function of the
attack size µa on the MNIST dataset, under a strong DP guarantee, ϵ = 0.2. Our
StoBatch mechanism outperforms the baseline approaches in all cases. On average, our
StoBatch model improves 44.91% over SecureSGD (p < 7.43e − 31), a 61.13% over
SecureSGDAGM (p < 2.56e − 22), a 52.21% over AdLM (p < 2.81e − 23), and
a 62.20% over DPSGD (p < 2.57e − 22). More importantly, our StoBatch model is
resistant to different adversarial example algorithms with different attack sizes. When
µa ≥ 0.2, AdLM, DPSGD, SecureSGD, and SecureSGDAGM become defenseless. We
further register significantly drops in terms of accuracy, when µa is increased from 0.05 (a
weak attack) to 0.6 (a strong attack), i.e., 19.87% on average given our StoBatch, across all
attacks, compared with 27.76% (AdLM), 29.79% (DPSGD), 34.14% (SecureSGDAGM),
and 17.07% (SecureSGD).
Figure 3.11 demonstrates the certified accuracy as a function of µa . The privacy
budget is set to 1.0, offering a reasonable privacy protection. In PixelDP, the construction
attack bound ϵr is set to 0.1, which is a pretty reasonable defense. With (small perturbation)
µa ≤ 0.2, PixelDP achieves better certified accuracies under all attacks; since PixelDP does
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not preserve DP to protect the training data, compared with other models. Meanwhile, our
StoBatch model outperforms all the other models when µa ≥ 0.3, indicating a stronger
defense to more aggressive attacks. More importantly, our StoBatch has a consistent
certified accuracy to different attacks given different attack sizes, compared with baseline
approaches. In fact, when µa is increased from 0.05 to 0.6, our StoBatch shows a small
drop (11.88% on average, from 84.29%(µa = 0.05) to 72.41%(µa = 0.6)), compared
with a huge drop of the PixelDP, i.e., from 94.19%(µa = 0.05) to 9.08%(µa = 0.6) on
average under IFGSM, MIM, and MadryEtAl attacks, and to 77.47%(µa = 0.6) under
FGSM attack. Similarly, we also register significant drops in terms of certified accuracy
for SecureSGD (78.74%, from 86.74% to 7.99%) and SecureSGDAGM (81.97%, from
87.23% to 5.26%) on average. This is promising.

Results on the CIFAR10 Dataset

Results on the CIFAR10 dataset further strengthen

our observations. In Figure 3.8, our StoBatch clearly outperforms baseline models in all
cases (p < 6.17e − 9), especially when the privacy budget is small (ϵ < 4), yielding
strong privacy protections. On average conventional accuracy, our StoBatch mechanism
has an improvement of 10.42% over SecureSGD (p < 2.59e − 7), an improvement of
14.08% over SecureSGDAGM (p < 5.03e − 9), an improvement of 29.22% over AdLM
(p < 5.28e − 26), and a 14.62% improvement over DPSGD (p < 4.31e − 9). When the
privacy budget is increased from 2 to 10, the conventional accuracy of our StoBatch model
increases from 42.02% to 46.76%, showing a 4.74% improvement on average. However,
the conventional accuracy of our model under adversarial example attacks is still low, i.e.,
44.22% on average given the privacy budget at 2.0. This opens a longterm research avenue
to achieve better robustness under strong privacy guarantees in adversarial learning.
The accuracy of our model is consistent given different attacks with different adver
sarial perturbations µa under a rigorous DP protection (ϵ = 2.0), compared with baseline
approaches (Figure 3.10). In fact, when the attack size µa increases from 0.05 to 0.5, the
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conventional accuracies of the baseline approaches are remarkably reduced, i.e., a drop of
25.26% on average given the most effective baseline approach, SecureSGD. Meanwhile,
there is a much smaller degradation (4.79% on average) in terms of the conventional
accuracy observed in our StoBatch model. Our model also achieves better accuracies
compared with baseline approaches in all cases (p < 8.2e − 10). Figure 3.12 further shows
that our StoBatch model is more accurate than baseline approaches (i.e., ϵr is set to 0.1 in
PixelDP) in terms of certified accuracy in all cases, with a tight privacy budget set to 2.0
(p < 2.04e − 18). We register an improvement of 21.01% in our StoBatch model given the
certified accuracy over SecureSGD model, which is the most effective baseline approach
(p < 2.04e − 18).
Scalability under Strong Iterative Attacks First, we scale our model in terms of
adversarial training in the CIFAR10 dataset, in which the number of iterative attack steps
is increased from Tµ = 3 to Tµ = 200 in training, and up to Ta = 2,000 in testing. Note that
the traditional iterative batchbybatch DP adversarial training (Algorithm 3.3) is nearly
infeasible in this setting, taking over 30 days for one training with 600 epochs. Thanks
to the parallel and distributed training, our StoBatch only takes ≊ 3 days to finish the
training. More importantly, our StoBatch achieves consistent conventional and certified
accuracies under strong iterative attacks with Ta = 1, 000, compared with the best baseline,
i.e., SecureSGD (Figure 3.13). Across attack sizes µa ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} and
steps Ta ∈ {100, 500, 1000, 2000}, on average, our StoBatch achieves 44.87±1.8% and
42.18±1.8% in conventional and certified accuracies, compared with 29.47±12.5% and
20±6.1% of SecureSGD (p < 1.05e − 9).
We achieve a similar improvement over the Tiny ImageNet, i.e., following [192],
with a ResNet18 model, i.e., a larger dataset on a larger network (Figure 3.14). On average,
across attack sizes µa ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} and steps Ta ∈ {100, 500, 1000, 2000},
our StoBatch achieves 29.78±4.8% and 28.31±1.58% in conventional and certified
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accuracies, compared with 8.99±5.95% and 8.72±5.5% of SecureSGD (p < 1.55e − 42).
Key observations

(1) Incorporating ensemble adversarial learning into DP preservation,

tightened sensitivity bounds, a random perturbation size µt at each training step, and compo
sition robustness bounds in both input and latent spaces does enhance the consistency,
robustness, and accuracy of DP model against different attacks with different levels of
perturbations. These are key advantages of our mechanism; (2) As a result, our StoBatch
model outperforms baseline algorithms, in terms of conventional and certified accuracies in
most of the cases. It is clear that existing DPpreserving approaches have not been designed
to withstand against adversarial examples; and (3) Our StoBatch training can help us to
scale our mechanism to larger DP DNNs and datasets with distributed adversarial learning,
without affecting the model accuracies and DP protections.

(a) IFGSM attacks

(b) FGSM attacks

(c) MIM attacks
(d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 3.7 Conventional accuracy on the MNIST dataset given ϵ, under l∞ (µa = 0.2) and
Ta = 10.
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(a) IFGSM attacks

(b) FGSM attacks

(c) MIM attacks
(d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 3.8 Conventional accuracy on the CIFAR10 dataset given ϵ, under l∞ (µa = 0.2)
and Ta = 3.
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(a) IFGSM attacks

(b) FGSM attacks

(c) MIM attacks
(d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 3.9 Conventional accuracy on the MNIST dataset given µa (ϵ = 0.2, tight DP
protection) and Ta = 10.
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(a) IFGSM attacks

(b) FGSM attacks

(c) MIM attacks
(d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 3.10 Conventional accuracy on the CIFAR10 dataset given µa (ϵ = 2, tight DP
protection) and Ta = 3.
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(a) IFGSM attacks

(b) FGSM attacks

(c) MIM attacks
(d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 3.11 Certified accuracy on the MNIST dataset. ϵ is set to 1.0 (tight DP protection)
and Ta = 10.
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(a) IFGSM attacks

(b) FGSM attacks

(c) MIM attacks
(d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 3.12 Certified accuracy on the CIFAR10 dataset. ϵ is set to 2 (tight DP protection)
and and Ta = 3.
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(a) Conventional Accuracy (Ta = 1, 000) (b) Certified Accuracy (Ta = 1, 000)

(c) Conventional Accuracy (Ta = 2, 000) (d) Certified Accuracy (Ta = 2, 000)
Figure 3.13 Accuracy on the CIFAR10 dataset, under Strong Iterative Attacks (Ta =
1, 000; 2, 000). ϵ is set to 2 (tight DP protection).
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(a) Conventional Accuracy (Ta = 1, 000) (b) Certified Accuracy (Ta = 1, 000)

(c) Conventional Accuracy (Ta = 2, 000) (d) Certified Accuracy (Ta = 2, 000)
Figure 3.14 Accuracy on the Tiny ImageNet dataset, under Strong Iterative Attacks (Ta =
1, 000; 2, 000). ϵ is set to 5.
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3.2.10

Conclusion

In this part of the dissertation, we established a connection among DP preservation to
protect the training data, adversarial learning, and certified robustness. A sequential
composition robustness was introduced to generalize robustness given any sequential and
bounded function of independent defensive mechanisms in both input and latent spaces.
We addressed the tradeoff among model utility, privacy loss, and robustness by tightening
the global sensitivity bounds. We further developed a stochastic batch training mechanism
to bypass the vanilla iterative batchbybatch training in DP DNNs. The average errors
of our approximation functions are always bounded by constant values. Last but not
least, a new Monte Carlo Estimation was proposed to stabilize the estimation of the
robustness bounds. Rigorous experiments conducted on benchmark datasets shown that
our mechanism significantly enhances the robustness and scalability of DP DNNs. In
future work, we will test our algorithms and models in the Baidu Fedcube platform [193].
In addition, we will evaluate our robustness bounds against synergistic attacks, in which
adversarial examples can be combined with other attacks, such as Trojans [194, 188], to
create more lethal and stealthier threats [195].

3.3 Consistently Bounded Differential Privacy in Lifelong Learning
3.3.1

Background

Let us first revisit L2M with Agem and DP. In L2M, we learn a sequence of tasks T =
{t1 , . . . , tm } one by one, such that the learning of each new task will not forget the models
learned for the previous tasks. Let Di is the dataset of the ith task. Each tuple contains data
x ∈ [−1, 1]d and a groundtruth label y ∈ ZK , which is a onehot vector of K categorical
outcomes y = {y1 , . . . , yK }. A single true class label yx ∈ y given x is assigned to only
one of the K categories. All the training sets Di are nonoverlapping; that is, an arbitrary
input (x, y) belongs to only one Di , i.e., ∃!i ∈ [1, m] : (x, y) ∈ Di (x ∈ Di for simplicity).
On input x and parameters θ, a model outputs class scores f : Rd → RK that map inputs
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x to a vector of scores f (x) = {f1 (x), . . . , fK (x)} s.t. ∀k ∈ [1, K] : fk (x) ∈ [0, 1] and
PK
k=1 fk (x) = 1. The class with the highest score is selected as the predicted label for x,
denoted as y(x) = maxk∈K fk (x). A loss function L(f (θ, x), y) presents the penalty for
mismatching between the predicted values f (θ, x) and original values y.

Lifelong Learning

Given the current task τ (≤ m), let us denote Tτ = {t1 , . . . , tτ −1 }

is a set of tasks that have been learnt. Although there are different L2M settings, i.e.,
episodic memory [196, 197, 89, 90, 91, 92, 198] and generative memory [93, 94, 95],
we leverage one of the stateoftheart algorithms, i.e., Agem [54], to demonstrate our
privacy preserving mechanism, without loss of the generality of our study. Agem avoids
catastrophic forgetting by storing an episodic memory Mi for each task ti ∈ Tτ . When
minimizing the loss on the current task τ , a typical approach is to treat the losses on the
P
episodic memories of tasks i < τ , given by L(f (θ, Mi )) = |M1 i | x∈Mi L(f (θ, x), y), as
inequality constraints. In Agem, the L2M objective function is:

θτ = arg min L f (θτ −1 , Dτ )



θ



s.t. L f (θτ , Mτ ) ≤ L f (θτ −1 , Mτ )

(3.76)


where Mτ = ∪i<τ Mi is the episodic memory with M1 = ∅, L f (θτ −1 , Mτ ) =

Pτ −1
τ −1
, Mi ) /(τ − 1), θτ −1 is the values of model parameters θ learned after
i=1 L f (θ
training the task tτ −1 , indicating that the model will not forget previously learned tasks


{t1 , . . . , tτ −1 }, given the memory replaying constraint L f (θτ , Mτ ) ≤ L f (θτ −1 , Mτ ) .
At each training step, Agem [54] has access to only Dτ and Mτ to compute the
projected gradient g̃ (i.e., by addressing the constraint in Equation (3.76)), as follows:

g̃ = g −

g ⊤ gref
gref
⊤
gref
gref
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(3.77)

where g is the updated gradient computed on a batch sampled from Dτ , gref is an
episodic gradient computed on a batch sampled from Mτ , and g̃ is used to update the model
parameters θ in Equation (3.76).
Differential Privacy guarantees that the released statistical results, computed from
the underlying sensitive data, will be insensitive to the presence or absence of one record
in a dataset. Let us briefly revisit the definition of DP, as follows:
Definition 3.3. (ϵ, δ)DP [55]. A randomized algorithm A is (ϵ, δ)DP, if for any two
neighboring databases D and D′ differing at most one tuple, and ∀O ⊆ Range(A), we
have:

P r[A(D) = O] ≤ eϵ P r[A(D′ ) = O] + δ

(3.78)

where ϵ controls the amount by which the distributions induced by D and D′ may
differ, and δ is a broken probability. A smaller ϵ enforces a stronger privacy guarantee.
DP also applies to general metrics ρ(D, D′ ) ≤ 1, where ρ can be a lp norms
[165]. DPpreserving algorithms in deep learning can be categorized into three lines:
(1) Introducing noise into parameter gradients [62, 166, 59, 73, 74, 76] for streaming data
[199] and Qlearning [97]; (2) Injecting noise into objective functions [60, 71, 72, 96]; and
(3) Injecting noise into labels [167]. In [200], local DP is used to maintain uptodate data
statistics over time. These existing mechanisms have not been designed to preserve DP in
L2M. That is different from our goal in this study.

3.3.2

Privacy Risk & Problem Statement

In this subsection, we focus on analyzing the unknown privacy risk in L2M and introduce
a new concept of Lifelong DP.
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Privacy Risk Analysis

One benefit of L2M is that endusers can use an L2M model after

training each task τ , instead of waiting for the model to be trained on all the tasks. Thus, in
practice, the adversary can observe the model parameters θ1 , . . . , θm after training each task
t1 , . . . , tm . Note that the adversary does not observe any information about the (blackbox)
training algorithm. Another key property in an L2M model is the episodic memory, which is
kept to be read at each training step incurring privacy leakage. Therefore, the training data
D and episodic memory M need to be protected together across tasks. Finally, in L2M, at
each training step for any task ti (i ∈ [1, m]), we only have access to Di and Mi , without a
complete view of the cumulative dataset of all the tasks ∪i∈[1,m] Di and Mm = ∪i∈[1,m−1] Mi .
This is fundamentally different from the traditional definition of a database in both DP (Def.
3.3) and in a model trained on a single task. To cope with this, we propose a new definition
of lifelong neighboring databases, as follows:
Definition 3.4. Lifelong Neighboring Databases.

Given any two lifelong databases

datam = {D, M} and data′m = {D′ , M′ }, where D = {D1 , . . . , Dm }, D′ =
′
{D1′ , . . . , Dm
}, M = {M1 , . . . , Mm }, M′ = {M′1 , . . . , M′m }, Mi = ∪j∈[1,i−1] Mj ,

and M′i = ∪j∈[1,i−1] Mj′ . datam and data′m are called lifelong neighboring databases if,
∀i ∈ [1, m]: (1) Di and Di′ differ at most one tuple; and (2) Mi and Mi′ differ at most one
tuple.

A Naive Mechanism

Given the aforementioned properties and Def. 3.4, to preserve DP

in L2M, one can employ the wellapplied moment accountant in [62] to train the model f
by injecting Gaussian noise into parameter gradients g and gref in Equation (3.77), with
a privacy budget ϵDτ on each dataset Dτ and ϵMτ on the episodic memory Mτ . The post
processing property in DP [100] can be applied to guarantee that g̃, computed from the
perturbed g and gref , is also DP. Let us denote this mechanism as A, and Aτ is used to
denote A applied on the task τ . A naive approach is to repeatedly apply A on the sequence
of tasks T, as follows:
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θτ = arg min Aτ L f (θτ −1 , Dτ )
θ



s.t. L f (θτ , Mτ ) ≤ L f (θτ −1 , Mτ )

(3.79)

Since training data is nonoverlapping among tasks, the parallel composition property
in DP [61] can be applied to estimate the total privacy budget consumed across all the tasks:

P r[A(datam ) = {θi }i∈[1,m] ] ≤ eϵ P r[A(data′m ) = {θi }i∈[1,m] ] + δ

(3.80)

where ϵ = maxi∈[1,m] (ϵDi + ϵMi ), and ∀i, j ∈ [1, m] : δ is the same for ϵDi and ϵMj .
A(datam ) indicates that the model is trained from scratch with the mechanism A,
given randomly initiated parameters θ0 , i.e., A(θ0 , datam ). Intuitively, we can achieve the
traditional DP guarantee in L2M, as the participation of a particular data tuple in each dataset
Dτ is protected under the released (ϵ, δ)DP {θi }i∈[1,m] . However, this approach introduces
unknown privacy risks in each task and in the whole training process, as discussed next.
At each task, the parallel composition property is not sufficient to ensure that the
privacy budget will not be accumulated across tasks (Theorem 3.7).

Together with

lacking of a complete view of the cumulative data of all the tasks ∪i∈[1,m] Di and Mm =
∪i∈[1,m−1] Mi , observing the intermediate parameters {θi }i<τ turns the mechanism Aτ into
a list of adaptive DP mechanisms A1 , . . . , Aτ sequentially applied on tasks t1 , . . . , tτ , where
Q
Ai : ( i−1
j=1 Rj ) × Di → Ri . This is an instance of adaptive composition, which we can
model by using the output of all the previous mechanisms {θi }i<τ as the auxiliary input of
the Aτ mechanism. Therefore, given an outcome θτ ∈ Rτ , the privacy loss c(·) at θτ can
τ ({θ }i<τ ,dataτ )=θ ]
be measured as follows: c(θτ ; Aτ , {θi }i<τ , dataτ , data′τ ) = log PP r[A
r[Aτ ({θi }i<τ ,data′ )=θτ ]
i

τ

τ
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The following theorem shows that: ∀τ ∈ [1, m], the privacy loss is the sum of the
privacy loss consumed in previous tasks.
Theorem 3.7. Let the privacy loss be defined as above. Then, we have that: ∀τ > 1 :
P
c(θτ ; Aτ , {θi }i<τ , dataτ , data′τ ) = τi=1 c(θi ; Ai , {θj }j<i , datai , data′i ).

Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof. Let us denote A1:i as A1 , . . . , Ai , we have:

c(θτ ; Aτ , {θi }i<τ , dataτ , data′τ ) = log
= log

τ
Y
P r[Ai (θi−1 , datai ) = θi |A1:i−1 ({θj }j<i−1 , data1:i−1 ) = θ1:i−1 ]
i=1

=

τ
X
i=1

=

τ
X

P r[Aτ ({θi }i<τ , dataτ ) = θτ ]
P r[Aτ ({θi }i<τ , data′τ ) = θτ ]

log

P r[Ai (θi−1 , data′i ) = θi |A1:i−1 ({θj }j<i−1 , data′1:i−1 ) = θ1:i−1 ]
P r[Ai (θi−1 , datai ) = θi |A1:i−1 ({θj }j<i−1 , data1:i−1 ) = θ1:i−1 ]
P r[Ai (θi−1 , data′i ) = θi |A1:i−1 ({θj }j<i−1 , data′1:i−1 ) = θ1:i−1 ]

c(θi ; Ai , {θj }j<i , datai , data′i )

i=1

Consequently, Theorem 3.7 does hold.
As a result of the Theorem 3.7, the privacy budget at each task τ cannot be simply
bounded by maxτ ∈[1,m] (ϵDτ + ϵMτ ), given δ (Equation (3.80)). This problem might be
addressed by replacing the max function in Equation (3.80) with a summation function:
P
ϵ = τ ∈[1,m] (ϵDτ + ϵMτ ), to compute the upper bound of the privacy budget for an entire of
the continual learning process. However, the challenging issues in bounding the privacy risk
is still the same, centering around the growing number of tasks m, information disclosure via
the episodic memory, and the heterogeneity among tasks for the following reasons. (1) The
larger the number of tasks, the larger the privacy budget will be (proportionally) consumed
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by the

P

function. (2) More critically, memorizing previous tasks will further disclose

information about the data in the past, since gref (Equation (3.77)) is computed using a
batch randomly sampled from the episodic memory consisting of data from previous tasks,
i.e., Mτ = ∪i<τ Mi . Continuing to access the episodic memory intensifies the privacy risk
over time. (3) The growing of the episodic memory M by adding new tuples Mτ −1 selected
from Dτ −1 after training on each task τ − 1 makes it more challenging to bound the privacy
budget ϵ (Equation (3.80)). In fact, given that ∀i ∈ [1, τ −1] : Mi and Mi′ differs at most one
tuple, Mτ and M′τ will differ at most τ − 1 tuples causing additional privacy leakage. Also,
the data sampling probability to compute gref is affected by the increasing size of M [62].
(4) Different tasks may require different numbers of training steps due to the difference in
terms of the number of tuples in each task; thus, affecting the privacy budget ϵ. (5) The
order of training tasks also affect the privacy budget, since computing gref by using data in
the episodic memory from one task may be more than other tasks. Therefore, bounding the
DP budget in L2M is nontrivial.

Lifelong Differential Privacy To address these challenges, we propose a new definition
of (ϵ, δ)Lifelong DP to guarantee that an adversary cannot infer whether a data tuple is
in the lifelong training dataset datam , given the released parameters {θi }i∈[1,m] learned
from a growing stream of an infinite number of new tasks, denoted ∀m ∈ [1, ∞), under
a consistently bounded DP budget (ϵ, δ) (Equation (3.81)). A consistently bounded DP
means having only one fixed value of the privacy budget (ϵ, δ), regardless the number of
tasks m. In other words, if there exists an i ≤ m and an ϵ′ < ϵ, such that releasing {θj }j∈[1,i]
given training dataset datai is (ϵ′ , δ)DP, then (ϵ, δ) is NOT a consistently bounded DP
budget, since it weakens the previously existed protection (ϵ′ , δ) at the task i (Equation
(3.82)). A consistently bounded DP is significant in practice, by enabling us to keep training
an L2M model and releasing its parameters, without intensifying the endtoend privacy
budget consumption. Our Lifelong DP can be formulated as:
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Definition 3.5. (ϵ, δ)Lifelong DP. Given a lifelong database datam = {D, M}, where
D = {D1 , . . . , Dm } and M = {M1 , . . . , Mm }, a randomized algorithm A achieves (ϵ, δ)
Lifelong DP, if for any of two lifelong neighboring databases (datam , data′m ), ∀m ∈ [1, ∞)
we have that



P r A(datam ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]


≤ eϵ P r A(data′m ) = {θi }i∈[1,m] + δ


∄(ϵ′ < ϵ, i ≤ m) : P r A(datai ) = {θj }j∈[1,i]


′
≤ eϵ P r A(data′i ) = {θj }j∈[1,i] + δ

3.3.3

(3.81)

(3.82)

Preserving Lifelong DP

To preserve Lifelong DP, we address the following problems: (1) The privacy loss
accumulation across tasks; (2) The overlapping between the episodic memory M and
the training data D; and (3) The data sampling process for computing gref given the
growing M. Our network is a multilayer neural network stacked on top of a feature
representation learning model. Then, we design a new Lifelong DP preservation algorithm,
called L2DPML (Algorithm 3.6), in computing the gradients g, gref , and g̃ (Equations
(3.83) and (3.87)). To overcome an expensive computation cost, we develop a scalable and
heterogeneous algorithm through a streaming batch training (Algorithm 3.7), to efficiently
learn Lifelong DP parameters (Theorem 3.8).

Network Design

In our Algorithm 3.6, a DNN is designed as f (x) = G(a(x, θ1 ), θ2 ),

where a(x, θ1 ) is a feature representation learning model, i.e., an autoencoder, with x as
an input, and a typical multilayer neural network G(·, θ2 ), i.e., a CNN, taking the output
of a(x, θ1 ) and returning the class scores f (x). Given a dataset Dτ , the objective functions
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of a(·) and G(·) can be the classical crossentropy error functions for data reconstruction
RDτ (θ1 ) at the input layer and for classification LDτ (θ2 ) at the output layer.
This network design allows us to: (1) Tighten the sensitivity of our model, since it is
easy to train a(·) using less sensitive objective functions, given its small sizes; (2) Reduce
the privacy budget consumption, since the computations of G(·) automatically is DP when
the output of a(x, θ1 ) is DP; and (3) Provide a better reusability, given that a(·) can be
reused and shared for different predictive models. For instance, RDτ (θ1 ) can be presented
as follows:

d h
X X

RDτ (θ1 ) =

xrs log(1 + e−θ1s hr ) + (1 − xrs ) log(1 + eθ1s hr )

i

xr ∈Dτ s=1

where the transformation of xr is hr = θ1⊤ xr , the hidden layer h1 of a(x, θ1 ) given
Dτ is h1Dτ = {θ1⊤ xr }xr ∈Dτ , and x
er = θ1 hr is the reconstruction of xr . Our L2M objective
function is defined as:

{θ1τ , θ2τ } = arg min[RDτ (θ1τ −1 ) + LDτ (θ2τ −1 )]
θ1 ,θ2

(3.83)

s.t. RMτ (θ1τ ) ≤ RMτ (θ1τ −1 ) and LMτ (θ2τ ) ≤ LMτ (θ2τ −1 )

where {θ1 , θ2 } are the model parameters; while, {θ1τ , θ2τ } are used to indicate the
values of {θ1 , θ2 } after learning task τ .
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Algorithm 3.6 Lifelong DP  Machine Learning (L2DPML)
Input: T={ti }i∈[1,m] , {Di }i∈[1,m] , ϵ1 , ϵ2
∆

∆

∆

1: Draw Noise χ1 ← [Lap( ϵ1Re )]d , χ2 ← [Lap( ϵ1Re )]β , χ3 ← [Lap( ϵ2Le )]|hπ |
2: Randomly Initialize: θ0 = {θ10 , θ20 }, M1 = ∅, ∀τ ∈ T : Dτ = {xr ← xr +
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:

2χ2
hidden layers {h1 + |D
, . . . , hπ }
τ|
for τ ∈ [1, m] do
if τ == 1 then
Compute g ← {∇θ1 RDτ (θ1τ −1 ), ∇θ2 LDτ (θ2τ −1 )} with the noise
else
Mτ ← Mτ −1 ∪ {Dτ −1 }
Randomly Pick a dataset Dref ∈ Mτ
Compute Gradients:
χ3
g ← {∇θ1 RDτ (θ1τ −1 ), ∇θ2 LDτ (θ2τ −1 )} with the noise |D
τ|

11:

gref ← {∇θ1 RDref (θ1τ −1 ), ∇θ2 LDref (θ2τ −1 )} with the noise

12:

g̃ ← g −

13:
14:

g ⊤ gref
gref
⊤ g
gref
ref

χ1
|Dτ | }xr ∈Dτ ,

χ3
|Dτ |

χ3
|Dref |

Descent: {θ1τ , θ2τ } ← {θ1τ −1 , θ2τ −1 } − ϱg̃ # learning rate ϱ
Release: {θ1τ , θ2τ }
Output: (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )Lifelong DP parameters {θi }i∈[1,m] = {θ1i , θ2i }i∈[1,m]

3.3.4

Gradient Update g

To compute the gradient update g for {θ1τ , θ2τ } (Equation (3.83)) on the current task τ , we
first derive polynomial forms of RDτ (θ1 ) and LDτ (θ2 ), by applying the 1st and 2nd orders
of Taylor Expansion [160] as:

e Dτ (θ1 ) =
R

d h
X X
xr ∈Dτ s=1

θ1s

 i
1
− xrs hr
2

(3.84)

K X h
i
 X
1
1
hπr Wπk − (hπr Wπk )yrk − |hπr Wπk | + (hπr Wπk )2
LeDτ θ2 =
2
8
k=1 x ∈D
r

(3.85)

τ

where hπr computed from the xr through the network with Wπ is the parameter at the
last hidden layer hπ . Laplace noise is injected into polynomial coefficients of the function
e Dτ (θ1 ), which are the input x and the first transformation h1 . As in [96], the global
R
sensitivity ∆Re is bounded as: ∆Re ≤ d(|h1 | + 2), with |h1 | is the number of neurons in h1 .
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e function becomes:
The perturbed R

RDτ (θ1 ) =

d
i
X hX
1
( θ1s hr ) − xr x
er
2
s=1

(3.86)

xr ∈Dτ

where xr = xr +

∆
1
Lap( ϵ1Re ), hr
|Dτ |

= θ1⊤ xr , hr = hr +

∆
2
Lap( ϵ1Re ),
|Dτ |

x
er = θ1 hr , hr

is clipped to [−1, 1], and ϵ1 is a privacy budget.
More importantly, the perturbation of each example x turns the original data Dτ
into Dτ = {xr ← xr +

∆
1
Lap( ϵ1Re )}xr ∈Dτ ,
|Dτ |

which is a (ϵ1 /γx )DP dataset with γx =

∆Re /|Dτ | (Algorithm 3.6, line 2). Based upon this result, all the computations on top
of the (ϵ1 /γx )DP dataset Dτ , including hr , hr , x
er , and the computation of gradients,
P|Dτ |
δRDτ (θ1 )
1
i.e., ∀s ∈ [1, d] : ∇θ1s RDτ (θ1 ) =
=
r=1 hr ( 2 − xrs ) are shown to be
δθ1s
(ϵ1 /γx )DP, without incurring or accessing any additional information from the original
e is (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx ), by having
data Dτ . As a result, the total privacy budget used to perturb R


P r Dτ
P r RDτ (θ1 )
×
 ≤ (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx ). Details are available in our proof of Theorem 3.8
′
P r RD′ (θ1 )

P r Dτ

τ

(Subsection 3.3.5).
A similar approach is applied to perturb the objective function LeDτ (θ2 ) at the output
layer with a privacy budget ϵ2 . The perturbed function of Le is denoted as LDτ (θ2 ). As in
Lemma 3 [96], we further have that the output of a(·), which is the perturbed transformation
⊤

h1Dτ = {θ1 xr + |D2τ | Lap(

∆R
e
)}xr ∈Dτ ,
ϵ1

is (ϵ1 /γ)DP, given γ =

2∆R
e
|Dτ |∥θ1 ∥1,1

and ∥θ1 ∥1,1 is the

maximum 1norm of θ1 ’s columns [186]. As a result, the computations of all the hidden
layers of G(a(·), θ2 ) are (ϵ1 /γ)DP, since the input of G(a(·), θ2 ) is (ϵ1 /γ)DP h1Dτ , i.e.,
the postprocessing property of DP [100] (Algorithm 3.6, line 2). This helps us to (1) avoid
extra privacy budget consumption in computing g(a(·), θ2 ); (2) significantly tighten the
sensitivity of the function LDτ (i.e., ∆Le ≤ 2|hπ |); and (3) achieve DP gradient update
∇θ2 LDτ (θ2 ) for θ2 . The total privacy budget used to perturb Le is (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ), by having


P r LDτ (θ2 ) /P r LD′τ (θ2 ) ≤ (ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ). Consequently, the total privacy budget in
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computing the gradient updates g, i.e., {∇θ1 RDτ (θ1τ −1 ), ∇θ2 LDτ (θ2τ −1 )}, for the current
task τ is (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP (Algorithm 3.6, lines 5 and 10).

3.3.5

Episodic and Projected Gradients gref and g̃

Now we are ready to present our approach in achieving Lifelong DP, by configuring the
episodic memory Mτ as a fixed and disjoint set of datasets {D1 , . . . , Dτ −1 } (Algorithm 3.6,
line 7); such that, at each training step, the computation of gradient updates gref (Equation
(3.77)) for θ1 and θ2 , i.e., ∇θ1 RDref (θ1 ) and ∇θ2 LDref (θ2 ), using a randomly picked dataset
Dref ∈ Mτ (Algorithm 3.6, lines 8 and 11), is (ϵ1 +ϵ1 /γx +ϵ1 /γ +ϵ2 )DP, without incurring
any additional privacy budget consumption for the dataset Dref . Then Equation (3.77) can
be used to compute the projected gradient g̃ from g and gref . Based on the postprocessing
property of DP [100], the projected gradient g̃ is also (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )DP. Hence,
the L2M objective function (Equation (3.83)) can be reformulated as:

{θ1τ , θ2τ } = arg min[RDτ (θ1τ −1 ) + LDτ (θ2τ −1 )]
θ1 ,θ2

s.t. RMτ (θ1τ −1 ) ≤ RMτ (θ1τ −1 ), LMτ (θ2τ −1 ) ≤ LMτ (θ2τ −1 )
where Mτ = {D1 , . . . , Dτ −1 }

(3.87)

By using the perturbed functions R and L, the constrained optimization of Equation
(3.87) can be addressed similarly to Equation (3.77), when the projected gradient g̃ is
⊤
gref )gref , where g is the gradient update on the current
computed as: g̃ = g −(g ⊤ gref )/(gref

task τ , and gref is computed using a dataset Dref randomly selected from the episodic
memory Mτ .
Theorem 3.8 shows that Algorithm 3.6 achieves (ϵ, δ)Lifelong DP in learning
{θi }i∈[1,m] = {θ1i , θ2i }i∈[1,m] , where ϵ = (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ) and δ = 0. There are three
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key properties in our algorithm: (1) For every x in the whole training set D = {Di }i∈[1,m] ,
x is included in one and only one dataset, denoted Dx ∈ D. As a result, the DP guarantee
to x in D = {Di }i∈[1,m] is equivalent to the DP guarantee to x in Dx ; (2) Given the
episodic memory as a fixed and disjoint set of datasets across T training tasks, we can
prevent additional privacy leakage, caused by: (i) Differing at most i − 1 tuples between
neighboring Mi and M′i for all i ∈ (1, m]; and (ii) Generating new and overlapping sets
of data samples for computing the episodic gradient (which are considered overlapping
datasets in the parlance of DP) in the typical training. Therefore, the optimization on one
task does not affect the DP protection of any other tasks, even the objective function given
one task can be slightly different from the objective function given any other tasks; and
(3) Together with (1) and (2), by having one and only one privacy budget for every task,
we can simultaneously achieve Equations (3.81) and (3.82) in Lifelong DP (Def. 3.5).
Theorem 3.8. Algorithm 3.6 achieves (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )Lifelong DP in learning
{θ1i , θ2i }i∈[1,m] .
Proof of Theorem 3.8
′

Proof. ∀τ ∈ T, let Dτ and Dτ be neighboring datasets differing at most one tuple xe ∈ Dτ
′

and x′e ∈ Dτ , and any two neighboring episodic memories Mτ and M′τ . Let us denote
Algorithm 3.6 as the mechanism A in Definition 3.5. We first show that Algorithm 3.6
achieves typical DP protection. ∀τ and Dref , we have that






P r A({θi }i<τ , dataτ ) = θτ = P r RDτ (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dτ P r LDτ (θ2τ −1 )



× P r RDref (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dref P r LDref (θ2τ −1 )

Therefore, we further have
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P r A({θi }i<τ , dataτ ) = θτ
P r RDτ (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dτ P r LDτ (θ2τ −1 )

=


′
P r A({θi }i<τ , data′τ ) = θτ
P r RD′τ (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dτ P r LD′τ (θ2τ −1 )



P r RDref (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dref P r LDref (θ2τ −1 )

 (3.88)
×
′ 
P r RD′ref (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dref P r LD′ref (θ2τ −1 )

In addition, we also have that:

′

′

′

∃!Dτ ∈ D s.t. xe ∈ Dτ and ∃!Dτ ∈ D s.t. x′e ∈ Dτ

(3.89)

where D = {D1 , . . . , Dm }.
Together with Equation (3.89), by having disjoint and fixed datasets in the episodic
memory, we have that:

(xe ∈ Dτ or xe ∈ Dref ), but (xe ∈ Dτ and xe ∈ Dref )

(3.90)

Without loss of the generality, we can assume that xe ∈ Dτ : Equations (3.88)  (3.90)
⇒






P r A({θi }i<τ , dataτ ) = θτ
P r RDτ (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dτ P r LDτ (θ2τ −1 )
=



′
P r A({θi }i<τ , data′τ ) = θτ
P r RD′τ (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dτ P r LD′τ (θ2τ −1 )
≤ (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )

This is also true when xe ∈ Dref and xe ̸∈ Dτ .
As a result, we have
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(3.91)
(3.92)



P r A({θi }i<τ , dataτ ) = θτ

 ≤ (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )
∀τ ∈ [1, m] :
P r A({θi }i<τ , data′τ ) = θτ

(3.93)

After one training step, Dτ will be placed into the episodic memory Mτ to create
the memory Mτ +1 . In the next training task, Dτ can be randomly selected to compute
the episodic gradient gref . This computation does not incur any additional privacy budget
consumption for the dataset Dτ , by applying the Theorem 4 in [96], which allows us to
compute gradients across an unlimited number of training steps using RDτ (θ1τ −1 ) and
LDτ (θ2τ −1 ). Therefore, if the same privacy budget is used for all the training tasks in T,
we will have only one privacy loss for every tuple in all the tasks. The optimization in one
task does not affect the DP guarantee of any other tasks. Consequently, we have

∄ϵ′ < (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ), ∃i ≤ m




′
s.t. P r A({θj }j<i , datai ) = θi ≤ eϵ P r A({θj }j<i , data′i ) = θi

(3.94)

Equation (3.94) can be further used to prove the Lifelong DP protection. Given datam
where Mt = Dt in Algorithm 3.6, we have that
m

 Y


i
P r A(datam ) = {θ }i∈[1,m] =
P r A({θj }j<i , datai ) = θi
i=1

Therefore, we have
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(3.95)





m
Y
P r A(datam ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]
P r A({θj }j<i , datai ) = θi

=


′
j}
i
P r A(data′m ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]
P
r
A({θ
,
data
)
=
θ
j<i
i
i=1



m h
Y
P r RDi (θ1i−1 ) P r Di P r LDi (θ2i−1 )


=
′
P r RD′i (θ1i−1 ) P r Di P r LD′i (θ2i−1 )
i=1



P r LDi (θ2i−1 ) i
P r RDi (θ1i−1 ) P r Di
ref
ref
ref


×
i′ 
i−1
′
P r RDi (θ1 ) P r Dref P r LDi′ (θ2i−1 )
ref

(3.96)

ref

′

where data′m = {D, {Mi′ }i∈[1,m] }, and Mi′ = Di in Algorithm 3.6.
Since all the datasets are nonoverlapping, i.e., ∩i∈[1,m] Di = ∅, given an arbitrary
tuple xe , we have that
′

′

′

∃!Dτ ∈ D s.t. xe ∈ Dτ and ∃!Dτ ∈ D s.t. x′e ∈ Dτ

(3.97)

Thus, the optimization of {θ1i , θ2i } = arg minθ1 ,θ2 [RDi (θ1i−1 ) + LDi (θ2i−1 )] for any
other task i different from τ does not affect the privacy protection of xe in D. From
Equations (3.96) and (3.97), we have






P r A(datam ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]
P r RDτ (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dτ P r LDτ (θ2τ −1 )

=


′
P r A(data′m ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]
P r RD′τ (θ1τ −1 ) P r Dτ P r LD′τ (θ2τ −1 )


i−1
i 
m P r R i (θ i−1 )
i
P
r
L
(θ
)
Y
1
2
P
r
D
Dref
Dref
ref

 (3.98)
×
i′ 
i−1
P r RDi′ (θ1 ) P r Dref P r LDi′ (θ2i−1 )
i=1
ref
ref

i

The worse privacy leakage case to xe is that Dτ is used in every Dref , i.e., τ = 1 and
i

1

∀i ∈ [2, m] : Dref = Dτ , with Dref = ∅. Meanwhile, the least privacy leakage case to xe
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i

i

1

is that Dτ is not used in any Dref , i.e., ∀i ∈ [2, m] : Dref ̸= Dτ , with Dref = ∅. In order
to bound the privacy loss, we consider the worse case; therefore, from Equation (3.98), we
further have that






m
Y
P r A(datam ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]
P r RDτ (θ1i−1 ) P r Dτ P r LDτ (θ2i−1 )

≤


′
i−1
i−1
′ (θ
′ (θ
P r A(data′m ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]
)
)
P
r
R
P
r
L
P
r
D
1
2
Dτ
Dτ
τ
i=1

(3.99)

Equation (3.99) is equivalent to the continuously training of our model by optimizing
R and L with Dτ used as both the current task and the episodic memory, across m steps.
By following the Theorem 4 in [96], the privacy budget is not accumulated across training
steps. Therefore, we have that



P r A(datam ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]


∀m ∈ [1, ∞) :
P r A(data′m ) = {θi }i∈[1,m]



m
Y
P r RDτ (θ1i−1 ) P r Dτ P r LDτ (θ2i−1 )


≤
′
i−1
i−1
′ (θ
′ (θ
P
r
R
P
r
L
)
)
P
r
D
1
2
D
D
τ
i=1
τ

τ

P r RDτ (θ1 ) P r Dτ P r LDτ (θ2 )


=
′
P r RD′τ (θ1 ) P r Dτ P r LD′τ (θ2 )
≤ (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )

In the least privacy leakage case, we have that
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(3.100)



P r A(dataτ ) = {θi }i∈[1,τ ]

∀τ ≤ m : 
P r A(data′τ ) = {θi }i∈[1,τ ]


P r A({θi }i<τ , dataτ ) = θτ


≥
P r A({θi }i<τ , data′τ ) = θτ
≥ (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )

(3.101)

As a result, we have that





′
∄(ϵ′ < ϵ, τ ≤ m) : P r A(dataτ ) = {θi }i∈[1,τ ] ≤ eϵ P r A(data′τ ) = {θi }i∈[1,τ ] (3.102)

where ϵ = (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ).
From Equations (3.100) and (3.102), we have that Algorithm 3.6 achieves (ϵ1 +
ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )Lifelong DP in learning {θi }i∈[1,m] = {θ1i , θ2i }i∈[1,m] . Consequently,
Theorem 3.8 does hold.

3.3.6

Scalable and Heterogeneous Training

Although computing the gradients given the whole dataset Dτ achieves Lifelong DP, it
has some shortcomings: (1) consumes a large computational memory to store the episodic
memory; (2) computational efficiency is low, since we need to use the whole dataset Dτ
and Dref to compute the gradient update and the episodic gradient at each step; This results
in a slow convergence speed and poor utility.

Scalability To address this, we propose a streaming batch training (Algorithm 3.7), in
which a batch of data is used to train the model at each training step, by the following steps.
(1) Slitting the private training data Dτ (∀τ ∈ T) into disjoint and fixed batches (Algorithm
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Algorithm 3.7 L2DPML with Streaming Batch Training
Input: T={ti }i∈[1,m] , {Di }i∈[1,m] , batch size λ, privacy budgets: ϵ1 and ϵ2 , learning rate ϱ
∆

∆

∆

1: Draw Noise χ1 ← [Lap( ϵ1Re )]d , χ2 ← [Lap( ϵ1Re )]β , χ3 ← [Lap( ϵ2Le )]|hπ |
2: Randomly Initialize θ = {θ1 , θ2 }, M1 = ∅, ∀τ ∈ T : Dτ = {xr ← xr + χλ1 }xr ∈Dτ , hidden
layers {h1 + 2χλ2 , . . . , hπ }, where hπ is the last hidden layer
3: for τ ∈ T do
4:
B = {B1 , . . . , Bn } s.t. ∀B ∈ B : B is a random batch with the size s, B1 ∩ . . . ∩ Bn = ∅,
and B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bn = Dτ
5:
for B ∈ B do
6:
if τ == 0 then
7:
Compute Gradients:
8:
g ← {∇θ1 RB (θ1τ −1 ), ∇θ2 LB (θ2τ −1 )} with the noise χλ3
9:
Descent: {θ1τ , θ2τ } ← {θ1τ −1 , θ2τ −1 } − ϱg
10:
else
11:
Select a batch Be randomly from a set of batches in episodic memory Mτ
12:
Compute Gradients:
13:
g ← {∇θ1 RB (θ1τ −1 ), ∇θ2 LB (θ2τ −1 )} with the noise χλ3
14:
gref ← {∇θ1 RBe (θ1τ −1 ), ∇θ2 LBe (θ2τ −1 )} with the noise χλ3
15:

g̃ ← g −

16:

Descent:

17:
18:

g ⊤ gref
gref
⊤ g
gref
ref
{θ1τ , θ2τ } ←

{θ1τ −1 , θ2τ −1 } − ϱg̃

Randomly Select a batch B ∈ B
Mτ ← Mτ −1 ∪ B
Output: (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 )Lifelong DP parameters {θi }i∈[1,m] = {θ1i , θ2i }i∈[1,m]

Table 3.2 Average Forgetting Measure

Permuted MNIST

Permuted CIFAR10

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.5)

L2DPML (ϵ = 1)

L2DPML (ϵ = 2)

Agem

0.305 ± 0.00886

0.278 ± 0.00907

0.237 ± 0.00586

0.162 ± 0.01096

L2DPML (ϵ = 4)

L2DPML (ϵ = 7)

L2DPML (ϵ = 10)

Agem

0.033 ± 0.00896

0.062 ± 0.01508

0.034 ± 0.00184

0.133 ± 0.00859

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.5)

L2DPML (ϵ = 1)

HARW (5Hz 

0.1133 ± 0.0003

0.1124 ± 0.00029

0.1106 ± 0.00026

10Hz 

Agem

Balanced Agem

Balanced L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

20Hz 

0.1269 ± 0.00045

0.1593 ± 0.00021

0.1309 ± 0.002

50Hz)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2, 2 epochs)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2, 5 epochs)

Heterogeneous L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

0.1639 ± 0.00074

0.2031 ± 0.0013

0.1920 ± 0.00034
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(a) Permuted MNIST (20 tasks)

(b) Permuted CIFAR10 (17 tasks)

(c) HARW (5Hz  10Hz  20Hz  50Hz)
Figure 3.15 Average accuracy on the permuted MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, and on
the HARW dataset (higher the better).
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(a) Permuted MNIST (20 tasks)

(b) Permuted CIFAR10 (17 tasks)

(c) HARW (5Hz  10Hz  20Hz  50Hz)
Figure 3.16 p value for 2tail ttests on the permuted MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, and
on the HARW dataset (lower the better).

169

3.7, line 4). (2) Using a single draw of Laplace noise across batches (Algorithm 3.7, lines
12). That prevents additional privacy leakage, caused by: (i) Generating multiple draws of
noise (i.e., equivalent to applying one DPpreserving mechanism multiple times on the same
dataset); (ii) Generating new and overlapping batches (which are considered overlapping
datasets in the parlance of DP); and (iii) More importantly, for any example x, x is included
in only one batch. Hence, each disjoint batch of data in Algorithm 3.7 can be considered
as a separate dataset in Algorithm 3.6. (3) For each task, we randomly select a batch to
place in the episodic memory (Algorithm 3.7, line 17). (4) At each training step, a batch
from the current task is used to compute the gradient g, and a batch randomly selected from
the episodic memory is used to compute the episodic gradient gref (Algorithm 3.7, lines
1114). Thus, Algorithm 3.7 still preserves (ϵ1 +ϵ1 /γx +ϵ1 /γ+ϵ2 )Lifelong DP, by applying
Theorem 3.8. The computational complexity and memory consumption are reduced, since
only a small batch of data from each task will be stored in the episodic memory.

Heterogeneity Based upon this, our algorithm can be applied to address the heterogeneity
in terms of data sizes among tasks, which is different from multimodal tasks in [201]. We
can train one task with multiple epochs, without affecting the Lifelong DP protection in
Algorithm 3.7, by 1) keeping all the batches fixed among epochs, and 2) at the end of
training each task, we randomly select a batch of that task to place in the episodic memory.
The order of the task does not affect the Lifelong DP protection, since the privacy budget is
not accumulated across tasks. These distinct properties enable us to customize our training,
by having different numbers of training epochs for different tasks and having different
training orders of tasks. Tasks with smaller numbers of data tuples can have larger numbers
of training epochs. This helps us to achieve better model utility under the same privacy
protection, as shown in our experimental results. Our algorithm can also be used to train
L2M models on new data of past tasks. New data is split into disjoint and fixed batches,
which will be fed into Algorithm 3.8, without affecting our Lifelong DP protection.
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3.3.7

Experiments

Our validation focuses on understanding the impacts of the privacy budget ϵ and the
heterogeneity on model utility. We have experimented on permuted MNIST [105] and
permuted CIFAR10 datasets, and our human activity recognition in the wild (HARW)
dataset. Permuted MNIST is a variant of MNIST [47] dataset, where each task has a random
permutation of the input pixels, which is applied to all the images of that task. We adopt
this approach to permute the CIFAR10 dataset, including the input pixels and three color
channels. Our HARW dataset was collected from 116 users, each of whom provided mobile
sensor data and labels for their activities on Android phones consecutively in three months
(either April 1st  June 31st, or May 10th  August 10th, 2020). HARW is an ultimate task
for L2M, since different sensor sampling rates, e.g., 50Hz, 20Hz, 10Hz, and 5Hz, from
different mobile devices are considered as L2M tasks. The data collection and processing
of our HARW dataset is presented as follows.

Data Collection of HARW Dataset

We utilize Android smartphones to collect sensor

data “in the wild” from university students as subjects for the following reasons:
(1) University students should have relatively good access to the smartphones and related
technologies; (2) University students should be more credible and easier to be motivated
than other sources (e.g., recruiting test subjects on crowdsourcing websites); and (3) It
will be easier for our team to recruit and distribute rewards to students. We launched
two data collection runs at two universities for three months each. During the course of
three months, we let the participants to collect data and labels by themselves (in the wild),
and only intervene through reminding emails if we saw a decline in the amount of daily
activities. A total of 116 participants were recorded after the two data collection runs.

Data Processing of HARW Dataset

For the demonstration purpose of this work, we

use only accelerometer data. Our data processing consists of the following steps: (1) Any
duplicated data points (e.g., data points that have the same timestamp) are merged by taking
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the average of their sensor values; (2) Using 300 milliseconds as the threshold, continuous
data sessions are identified and separated by breaking up the data sequences at any gap
that is larger than the threshold; (3) Data sessions that have unstable or unsuitable sampling
rates are filtered out. We only keep the data sessions that have a stable sampling rate of 5Hz,
10Hz, 20Hz, or 50Hz; (4) The label sessions that are associated with each data session (if
any) are identified from the raw labels. Note that the label sessions are also filtered with the
following two criteria to ensure good quality: (a) The first 10 seconds and the last 10 seconds
of each label session are trimmed, due to the fact that users were likely operating the phone
during these time periods; (b) Any label session longer than 30 minutes is trimmed down
to 30 minutes, in order to mitigate the potential inaccurate labels due to users’ negligence
(forgot to turn off labeling); and (5) We sample data segments at the size of 100 data points
with sliding windows. Different overlapping percentages were used for different classes and
different sampling rates. The majority classes have 25% overlapping to reduce the number
of data segments, while the minority classes have up to 90% overlapping to increase the
available data segments. The same principle is applied to sessions with different sampling
rates. We sample 15% of data for testing, while the rest are used for training (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Statistics of the HARW Dataset
Class

Description

N training

N testing

Walking

Walking

49376

8599

Sitting

Exclude in vehicle

52448

8744

InVehicle, Car

Driving, sitting

49536

8586

Cycling

14336

2537

Workout, Running

1984

319

*All classes exclude phone position = “Table”

172

Data Normalization of HARW Dataset

In our L2DPML models, we normalize the

accelerometer data with the following steps: (1) We compute the mean and variance of
each axis (i.e., X, Y , and Z) using only training data to avoid information leakage from the
training phase to the testing phase. Then, both training and testing data are normalized with
zscore, based on the mean and variance computed from training data; (2) Based on this, we
clip the values in between [min, max] = [−2, 2] for each axis, which covers at least 90%
of possible data values; and (3) Finally, all values are linearly scaled to [−1, 1] to finish the
x−min
normalization process, as x = 2 × [ max−min
− 1/2].

Experiment Setting

Agem [54], which is one of the stateoftheart L2M algorithms, is

included in our experiments to show the upper bound in terms of model performance, since
Agem is a noiseless model. We aim to show how much model utility is compromised for
the Lifelong DP protection.
To evaluate the heterogeneity, we derive several versions of our algorithm (Algorithm
3.7), including: (1) Balanced L2DPML, in which all the tasks have the same number of
training steps, given a fixed batch size. This is also true for a Balanced Agem algorithm;
(2) L2DPML with the same number of epochs for all the tasks; and (3) Heterogeneous
L2DPML, in which a fixed number of training epochs is assigned to each task. The
numbers of epochs among tasks can be different. For instance, 5 epochs are used to train
tasks with 5Hz, 10Hz, and 20Hz data, and 1 epoch is used to train the task with a larger
volume of 50Hz data. The number of epochs is empirically identified by the data size
of each task, since the search space of the number of epochs for each task is exponentially
large. We do not consider the model derived from Equation (3.80), since it does not preserve
Lifelong DP.

Model Configuration

In the permuted MNIST dataset, we used three convolutional

layers (32, 64, and 96 features). Each hidden neuron connects with a 5x5 unit patch. A
fullyconnected layer has 512 units. The batch size s was set to 2,500, and learning rate
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ϱ = 0.1. Given a predefined total privacy budget ϵ, ϵ2 is set to be 0.1, and ϵ1 is computed
as: ϵ1 =

ϵ−ϵ2
.
(1+1/γ+1/γx )

This ensures that (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ) = ϵ. ∆Re = (142 + 2) × 25

and ∆Le = 2 × 512. In the permuted CIFAR10 dataset, we used a Resnet18 network
(64, 64, 128, 128, and 160 features) with kernels (4, 3, 3, 3, and 3). One fullyconnected
layer has 256 neurons. The batch size s was set to 500, and learning rate ϱ = 0.2. ϵ2 is
set to (1 + r/3.0) and ϵ1 = (1 + 2r/3.0)/(1 + 1/γ + 1/γx ), where r ≥ 0 is a ratio to
control the total privacy budget ϵ in our experiment. For instance, given r = 0, we have
that ϵ = (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ) = 2. ∆Re = 3 × (142 + 2) × 16 and ∆Le = 2 × 256.
In the HARW dataset, each data tuple includes 100 values × 3 channels of the
accelerometer sensor, i.e., 300 values in total as a model input. The classification output
includes five classes of human activities, i.e., walking, sitting, in car, cycling, and running
(Table 3.3). Given 20Hz, 5Hz, 10Hz, and 50Hz tasks, we correspondingly have 881, 7553,
621, and 156,033 data points in training and 159, 1,297, 124, and 27,134 data points in
testing. We used three convolutional layers (32, 64, and 96 features). Each hidden neuron
connects with a 2x2 unit patch. A fullyconnected layer has 128 units. The batch size s
was set to 120, and learning rate ϱ = 5e − 5. Given a total privacy budget ϵ, ϵ2 is set to 0.1
and ϵ1 =

ϵ−ϵ2
(1+1/γ+1/γx )

to ensure that (ϵ1 + ϵ1 /γx + ϵ1 /γ + ϵ2 ) = ϵ. ∆Re = 4(142 + 2) and

∆Le = 2 × 128.
The experiments were conducted on a server of 4 GPUs, each of which is an NVIDIA
TITAN Xp, 12 GB with 3,840 CUDA cores. The number of runs for each experiment on
the permuted MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets is 5 and on the HARW dataset is 10. For
reproducibility, our implementation is available here1 .

Evaluation Metrics To evaluate our models, we employ the wellapplied average accu
racy and forgetting measures after the model has been trained with all the batches up till
P
task τ [202, 54], defined as follows: (1) average accuracyτ = τ1 τt=1 aτ,n,t , where aτ,n,t ∈
1 https://www.dropbox.com/s/xzz318ap700kq4a/L2DP-ML.zip?dl=0
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[0, 1] is the accuracy evaluated on the test set of task t, after the model has been trained
with the nth batch of task τ , and the training dataset of each task, Dτ , consists of a total
Pτ −1 τ
1
τ
n batches; (2) average forgettingτ = τ −1
t=1 ft , where ft is the forgetting on task t
after the model is trained with all the batches up till task τ . ftτ is computed as follows:
ftτ = maxl∈{1,...,τ −1} (al,n,t − aτ,n,t ); and (3) We measure the significant difference between
two average accuracy curves induced by two models A and B after task τ , using a p value
(2tail ttests) curve:

1 X (A)
1 X (B)
p value {
ai,n,t }i∈[1,τ ] , {
ai,n,t }i∈[1,τ ]
i t=1
i t=1
i

i

(3.103)

All statistical tests are 2tail ttests.

Results in Permuted MNIST

Figure 3.15a and Table 3.2 illustrate the average accuracy

and forgetting measure of each model as a function of the privacy budget ϵ on the MNIST
dataset. There is a small gap in terms of average accuracy between the noiseless Agem
model (showing an upper bound performance) and our L2DPML models given a small
number of tasks. The gap is increased when the number of tasks increased (23.3% at ϵ = 0.5
with 20 tasks). The larger the privacy budget (i.e., ϵ = 2.0), the higher the average accuracy
we can achieve, i.e., an improvement of 9.92% with p < 2.83e−14, compared with smaller
privacy budgets (i.e., ϵ = 0.5). Even though our model can achieve a high average accuracy
given a small number of tasks, the result shows that it is not easy to preserve Lifelong DP
while retaining a high model utility. Also, our L2DPML models have a relatively good
average forgetting with tight privacy protection (ϵ = 0.5, 1, and 2), compared with the
noiseless Agem model.

Results in Permuted CIFAR10 Permuted CIFAR10 tasks are very difficult to classify,
even with the noiseless Agem model, i.e., 35.24% accuracy on average. Interestingly,
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(a) HARW 50Hz  20Hz  10Hz  5Hz

(b) HARW 20Hz  50Hz  5Hz  10Hz

(c) HARW 20Hz  5Hz  10Hz  50Hz
Figure 3.17 Average accuracy and p value for 2tail ttests on the HARW dataset with
random task orders (higher the better).
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(a) HARW 50Hz  20Hz  10Hz  5Hz

(b) HARW 20Hz  50Hz  5Hz  10Hz

(c) HARW 20Hz  5Hz  10Hz  50Hz
Figure 3.18 p value for 2tail ttests on the HARW dataset with random task orders (lower
the better).
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on the CIFAR10 dataset (Figure 3.15b and Table 3.2), the gap between Agem and our
L2DPML model is notably shrunken when the number of tasks increases (from 16.47%
with 1 task to 9.89% with 17 tasks, at ϵ = 4). In addition, the average forgetting values
in our L2DPML are better than the noiseless Agem model. This is a promising result.
We also registered that the larger the privacy budget (i.e., ϵ = 10), the higher the average
accuracy that we can achieve, i.e., an improvement of 4.73% with p < 1.15e − 9, compared
with smaller budgets (i.e., ϵ = 4).

Results in HARW

On the HARW task, a realworld application (Figure 3.15c and Table

3.2), our L2DPML model achieves a very competitive average accuracy, given a very tight
DP budget ϵ = 0.2 (i.e., 61.26%) compared with the noiseless Agem model (i.e., 62.27%),
across four tasks. Our model also achieves a better average forgetting, i.e., 11.33, compared
with 12.69 of the noiseless Agem model. That is promising. Increasing the privacy budget
modestly increases the model performance. The differences in terms of average accuracy
and forgetting are not significant. This is also true, when we randomly flip the order of
the tasks (Figure 3.17 and Table 3.4). The results showed that our model can effectively
preserve Lifelong DP in HARW tasks.

Heterogeneous Training and DP Budgets

Heterogeneous training, with customized

numbers of epochs and task orders, further improves our model performance, under the
same Lifelong DP protection. Figure 3.16 illustrates the p values between the average
accuracy curves of our L2DPML, given 1) heterogeneous training with different numbers
of epochs, 2) task orders, and 3) privacy budgets, over its basic settings, i.e., ϵ = 0.5 for the
permuted MNIST dataset, ϵ = 4 for the permuted CIFAR10 dataset, and ϵ = 0.2 for the
HARW dataset, with the number of training epochs set to 1.
In the permuted MNIST dataset (Figures 3.15a, 3.16a), when our L2DPML model
is trained with 2 or 3 epochs per task, the average accuracy is improved, i.e., 2.81% given
2 epochs and 4.8% given 3 epochs, with p < 8.44e − 9. In the permuted CIFAR10 data,
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Table 3.4 Average Forgetting Measure on Random Orders of HARW Tasks
L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.5)

L2DPML (ϵ = 1)

0.1016 ± 0.0002

0.1012 ± 0.0001

0.098 ± 0.0001

HARW (50Hz 

Agem

Balanced Agem

Balanced L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

20Hz  10Hz  5Hz)

0.1029 ± 0.0002

0.1241 ± 0.0002

0.1274 ± 0.0008

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2, 2 epochs)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2, 5 epochs)

Heterogeneous L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

0.1148 ± 0.0002

0.1012 ± 0.0014

0.1442 ± 0.0003

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.5)

L2DPML (ϵ = 1)

0.0769 ± 2.07e5

0.0761 ± 3.88e5

0.0772 ± 6.7e5

Agem

Balanced Agem

Balanced L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

HARW (20Hz 

0.0781 ± 2.28e5

0.14 ± 3.26e4

0.1248 ± 0.0013

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2, 2 epochs)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2, 5 epochs)

Heterogeneous L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

0.0775 ± 8.45e5

0.099 ± 0.0015

0.1268 ± 0.00028

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.5)

L2DPML (ϵ = 1)

0.0928 ± 5.34e5

0.0921 ± 8.64e5

0.089 ± 8.64e5

HARW (20Hz 

Agem

Balanced Agem

Balanced L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

5Hz  10Hz  50Hz)

0.0866 ± 1.1e4

0.1723 ± 0.00066

0.144 ± 0.0031

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2, 2 epochs)

L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2, 5 epochs)

Heterogeneous L2DPML (ϵ = 0.2)

0.1161 ± 0.0003

0.1792 ± 0.0017

0.1395 ± 0.00026

50Hz  5Hz  10Hz)

179

using larger numbers of training epochs shows significant performance improvements over
a small number of tasks (Figure 3.16b). When the number of tasks becomes larger, the
p values become less significant (even insignificant), compared with the p value curves
of larger DP budgets (i.e., ϵ = 2 and ϵ = 10 in the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets).
Meanwhile, training with a larger number of epochs yields better results with small numbers
of tasks (i.e., fewer than 6 tasks), compared with larger DP budgets.
In the HARW tasks, the improvement is more significant (Figures 3.15c, 3.16c).
Heterogeneous and Balanced L2DPML models outperform the basic settings with uniform
numbers of training epochs, i.e., 1, 2, and 5 epochs. On average, we registered an
improvement of 1.93% given the Balanced L2DPML and an improvement of 5.14% given
the Heterogeneous L2DPML, over the basic setting (1 training epoch). The results are
statistically significant (Figure 3.16c). The average forgetting values of the Balanced
L2DPML (0.1593) and the Heterogeneous L2DPML (0.1920) are higher than the basic
setting (0.1133), with p < 2.19e − 5 (Table 3.2). This is expected as a primary tradeoff in
L2M, given a better average accuracy. In fact, the average forgetting values are also notably
higher given larger uniform numbers of epochs, i.e., 2 and 5 epochs, and the Balanced
Agem. We do not address this fundamental issue in L2M since it is outofscope of this
study. We focus on preserving Lifelong DP.
We observe similar results in randomly flipping the order of the tasks (Figures 3.17
and 3.18, Table 3.4). Among all task orders, our Heterogeneous L2DPML achieves the
best average accuracy (66.4%) with the task order [5Hz, 10Hz, 20Hz, 50Hz] (Figure 3.15c)
compared with the worse order [20Hz, 50Hz, 5Hz, 10Hz] (56.69%) (Figure 3.17b), i.e.,
p < 9.9e − 5. More importantly, in both average accuracy and forgetting, our Balanced and
Heterogeneous L2DPML models achieve a competitive performance compared with the
noiseless Balanced Agem, which is considered to have the upper bound performance, and
a better performance compared with having the uniform numbers of epochs across tasks.
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This obviously shown that the distinct ability to offer the heterogeneity in training across
tasks greatly improves our model performance, under the same Lifelong DP protection.

3.3.8

Conclusion and Future Work

In this dissertation, we showed that L2M introduces unknown privacy risk and challenges
in preserving DP. To address this, we established a connection between DP preservation
and L2M, through a new definition of Lifelong DP. In Lifelong DP, the participation of
any tuple in any training set is protected, under a consistently bounded DP loss, given the
released model parameters in both learning and memorizing tasks. A consistently bounded
DP means having only one fixed value of the privacy budget, regardless the number of
tasks. We proposed the first scalable and heterogeneous mechanism, called L2DPML, to
preserve Lifelong DP. Our model shows promising results in several tasks with different
settings; therefore, opening a longterm avenue to achieve better model utility with lower
computational cost, under Lifelong DP.
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CHAPTER 4
FEDERATED LEARNING ON MOBILE DEVICES

Chapter Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) [106] has the potential to bring deep learning

(DL) on mobile devices, while preserving user privacy during model training. Despite
progress on theoretical aspects and algorithm/model design for FL [107, 108, 109, 110, 111],
the lack of a publicly available FL system has precluded the widespread adoption of FL
models on smart phones. In this dissertation, we presents FLSys, the first FL system
in the literature created using an applicationsystem codesign approach to address the
aforementioned research questions. FLSys is a key component toward creating an open
ecosystem of FL models and apps that use these model. Such an FL ecosystem will allow
thirdparty model/app developers to easily develop and deploy FL models/apps on smart
phones. Consequently, the users will benefit from novel FL apps based on mobile [sensing]
data collected on the phones. We codesigned FLSys with a human activity recognition
(HAR) in the wild FL model. HAR sensing data was collected in two areas from the
phones of 100+ college students during a fivemonth period. We implemented HARWild,
a CNN model tailored to mobile devices, with a data augmentation mechanism to mitigate
the problem of nonIndependent and Identically Distributed (nonIID) data that affects FL
model training in the wild. A sentiment analysis (SA) model is used to demonstrate how
FLSys effectively supports concurrent models, and it uses a dataset with 46,000+ tweets
from 436 users. We conducted extensive experiments on Android phones and emulators
showing that FLSys achieves good model utility and practical system performance.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. SSubsection 4.1.4 explains the design
of FLSys, while Subsection 4.1.5 describes its prototype implementation. Subsection 4.1.10
presents the HAR model and data. Subsection 4.1.15 shows the experimental results. The
chapter concludes in Subsection 4.1.21 with lessons learned and future work.
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4.1
4.1.1

FLSys: Toward an Open Ecosystem for Federated Learning Mobile Apps
Contributors to this Dissertation

The prototype of FLSys was designed and implemented collaboratively with my colleague
Xiaopeng Jiang.

The author’s contributions are the design of the training protocol,

the implementation of the FL simulation process, and the implementation of cloud
side components in FLSys. Xiaopeng Jiang designed and implemented the mobileside
components, the deep learning model, the communication protocol, and the FL emulation
process. The highlevel design and the data preprocessing steps were designed and
implemented collaboratively by the author and Xiaopeng Jiang. For a better understanding
of the framework and my contribution, the whole framework is presented in this dissertation,
including Xiaopeng Jiang’s part.

4.1.2

System Requirements

Our aim is to design and build an FL system that addresses the list of important questions
mentioned in the Subsection 1.4.1. We use the HAR model, detailed in Subsection 4.1.10,
to illustrate an entire category of FL models based on mobile [sensing] data collected in the
wild. We extract five key requirements derived from this model and from other realworld
FL applications, such as next word prediction, ondevice search query suggestion [116],
ondevice robotic navigation [203], ondevice item ranking [106], object recognition [112],
sentiment analysis, etc., and utilize them to guide our FLSys design: (R1) Effective
data collection: The data collection on the phone must balance resource consumption
(e.g., battery) with sampling rates required by different models; (R2) Tolerate phone
unavailability during training: Since the phones may sometimes be disconnected from
the network or choose not to communicate to save battery power, the interaction between
the phones and the cloud must tolerate such unavailability during federated training;
(R3) Scalability: The cloudbased FL server of our system must be able to scale to large
numbers of users in terms of both computation and storage; (R4) Model flexibility: The
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system must support different DL models for different application scenarios and different
aggregation functions in the cloud; and (R5) Support for thirdparty apps: The system must
provide programming support for third party apps to concurrently access different models
on the phones.

4.1.3

FLSys Overview

FLSys addresses requirements R1 − R5 synergistically. Figure 4.1a show its overall
process of one training round, and Figure 4.1b shows its system architecture. These figures
emphasize four novel contributions made in FLSys, compared with existing FL systems
[106, 116, 129, 113, 128]: (1) FLSys allows the phones to selfselect for training when
they have enough data and resources; (2) FLSys has an asynchronous design (Figure 4.1a),
in which the server in the cloud tolerates client failures/disconnections and allows clients
to join training at any time. (3) FLSys supports multiple DL models that can be used
concurrently by multiple apps; each phone trains and uses only the models for which it
has subscribed; and (4) FLSys acts as a “central hub” on the phone to manage the training,
updating, and access control of FL models used by different apps.
These features balance model utility with mobile device constraints, and can help
create an ecosystem of FL models and associated apps. FLSys allows different developers
to build FL models/apps and provides a simple way for users to take advantage of these
apps, as it offers a unifying system for the development and deployment of FL models and
apps that use these models. FLSys acts as common middleware layer for all these apps
and models. The users just need to download/install the apps, and FLSys will take care of
downloading/installing the FL models used by the apps, will perform FL training as needed,
and will run FL inference on behalf of the apps.

184

(a) Asynchronous Protocol with Phone SelfSelection and Multiple Models

(b) FLSys Architecture

Figure 4.1 FLSys Asynchronous Protocol and Architecture. Typical operations: ⃝
1 Phone
Manager of Client #1 registers with the Cloud Manager of Model 1, which grants registration
based on training settings. ⃝
2 Phone Manager of Client #1 fetches uptodate global model from
a designated storage, trains it with local data, and uploads local gradients to a designated storage.
⃝
3 Phone Manager of Client #2 tries to register, but is denied. ⃝
4 Phone Manager of Client #2
successfully registers at a later time, but the training misses the deadline, thus its gradients upload
is denied. ⃝
5 Clients #1 and #2 try to register during server aggregation and are denied. ⃝
6 Each
model’s Aggregator loads the gradients updates, aggregates them, and saves the aggregated model.

185

4.1.4

System Architecture

The architecture (Figure 4.1b) has two main components: (1) FL Phone Manager, which
coordinates the FL activities on the phone; and (2) FL Cloud Manager, which coordinates
the FL activities in the cloud. These two components work together to support the
three phases of the FL operation: data collection and preprocessing, model training and
aggregation, and mobile apps using inference. In the following, we describe each phase
and explain how the system architecture satisfies the five system requirements.

Data Collection and Preprocessing The FL Phone Manager controls the data collection
using one or multiple Data Collectors. A basic Data Collector is tasked with collecting data
from one sensor at a given sampling rate. Such basic Data Collectors could be embedded
in more complex ones to collect different types of data at the same time. It is important
to have one app that coordinates data collection because having multiple apps collecting
overlapping sets of data multiple times is inefficient. Having the FL Manager to coordinate
the data collection also simplifies sensor access control.
To satisfy requirement R1, FLSys supports ondemand configuration of sensor types,
sampling rates, and the period for data flushing from memory to storage. Each model
informs the FL Phone Manager of the type of data and sampling rate it needs. In this way,
the FL Phone Manager knows which Data Collectors to invoke and which sampling rates
are needed. The FL Phone Manager balances sensing accuracy (i.e., high sampling rate)
with resource consumption.
To regulate and keep such balance aligned with the user experience, the FLSys has
three features: (1) include several builtin sampling rate settings, with empirical values
from our experiences; and (2) collect key statistics of the data collection (e.g., CPU time
consumed, battery life impact, etc.) and show them to the user, upon request; and (3) provide
global level controls for the user to adjust the data collection behaviors, should the user feel
that their experience is impacted by data collection.
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The Data Collectors store the sensed data in the Raw Data Storage and inform the FL
Phone Manager each time new data is added to the Raw Data Storage. For efficiency, the
Data Collectors can buffer a certain amount of sensed data in memory before committing it
to the storage. The FL Phone Manager can dynamically reconfigure the data flushing period
that defines when the data is written to storage. Data Collectors set this data flushing period.
Some models may use the raw data directly, while others may require additional processing.
The FL Phone Manager decides when to invoke the modelspecific Data Processors, which
will store the data in the Processed Data Storage. This is a matter of policy and can be done
any time new data is available in the Raw Storage Data or at a regular interval. The only
constraint is to have all the data preprocessed before a new local model training operation.

Federated Training To satisfy requirement R2, we make two design decisions. First,
FLSys allows the phones to selfselect for training when they have enough data and
resources. This is different from traditional FL architectures [106], where the server selects
the phones to participate in training, which may not be available or may not have enough
data or resources for training. Second, in FLSys, the communication between the phones
and the cloud is asynchronous to cope with phone disconnections. The software at the cloud
side is designed to tolerate missing messages from the phones. Overall, FLSys reduces
communication overhead and increases client utility, at the expense of less control in the
client sampling process, compared to [106].
In order to use a given model on the phone, the FL Phone Manager first registers the
phone with the FL Cloud Manager. If the phone model and mobile OS are known to work
with the model, the FL Cloud Manager registers the phone with the New Model Notification
Service, which works as a PublishSubscribe cloud service, and returns the subscription to
the phone. This subscription allows the phone to receive asynchronous notifications when a
new global model is available for download. The FL Phone Manager downloads the model
at a time determined based on the model usage frequency and power settings.
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The training for each model is done in rounds. The FL Cloud Manager decides the
duration of a round, based on preferences associated with each model. For example, the
server may start a new aggregation (i.e., by invoking the Model Aggregator for a certain
model) when a given time interval has passed or when a certain number of local training
updates have been received from the phones. The FL Phone Manager decides when to
participate in training. This decision is done based on local policies that attempt to balance
inference accuracy, the amount of input data for training, and the resources consumed during
training. The intention to participate in training for a given model is conveyed by a message
sent to the FL Cloud Manager. Based on the model preferences (e.g., amount of data, and
the number of users in a training round), the server may decide to ask the phone to train for
the model and to provide the FL Phone Manager with a URL to upload the results in the
Cloud Local Gradients Storage. If there is a deadline for participation in the round, the FL
Cloud Manager lets the FL Phone Manager know about it.
The FL Phone Manager invokes the Model Trainer for the given model and passes
as parameter the location of the data in the Processed Data Storage. After the training is
done, the Model Trainer stores the newly computed gradients in the Phone Local Gradients
Storage. The FL Phone Manager decides when to upload these gradients to the Cloud Local
Gradients Storage. The FL Cloud Manager will invoke the Model Aggregator for the model
when the duration for the round expires or when enough updates have been uploaded. The
Model Aggregator reads the updates from the Cloud Local Gradients Storage, computes
the aggregated weights, and stores them in the Cloud Global Model Weights Storage. The
intermediate training state is stored in the Training State Storage to provide lower I/O
latency compared with the other types of cloud storage in our design. This is because
FLSys needs frequent access to these data during training. Then, the Model Aggregator
sends a notification via the New Model Notification Service to let the phones know that a
new model version is available.
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The cloudside system satisfies requirement R3, as it can scale to large numbers of
users due to its modular design that decouples computation, communication, storage, and
notification services. The cloud elasticity features of each service allow different services
to scale up or down according to the workload.
As we observe from the architecture, each model is managed individually by FLSys,
and multiple models can coexist both at the phones and the cloud. In the cloud, different
models use independent cloud resources, which can be scaled independently. On the phone,
independent model trainers and inference runners are responsible for different applications.
The cloud contains all the models in the system, while each phone contains only the models
for which it has subscribed. This modular design allows our system to satisfy requirement
R4.

Mobile Apps Using Inference We decouple mobile apps that need inference on the
phones from the models that provide the inference. This allows an app to use multiple
models, while the same model can be used by multiple apps. FLSys provides an API and a
library that can be used by thirdparty app developers to perform inference using DL models
on the phone. In this way, the system architecture satisfies requirement R5. When an app
needs an inference from a model, it sends a request to the FL Phone Manager using one of
the OS IPC mechanisms. The FL Phone Manager then generates the input for the inference
from the data stored in the Processed Data Storage of Raw Data Storage, and then invokes
the Model Runner with this input. The Model Runner sends the result to the App using the
IPC.

Model Concurrency Given the design of FLSys, both the FL Phone Manager and the FL
Cloud Manager are able to handle multiple models concurrently. However, the meanings
of concurrency are slightly different for each side. FL Cloud Manager needs to handle the
aggregation of all models that are registered with it. Also there is the need to communicate
to a potentially large number of clients for each model at the same time. FLSys handles this
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concurrency through services provided by the underlying cloud platform, which support
concurrency by design. FLSys just needs to orchestrate the invocation of these services.
The FL Phone Manager needs to handle concurrent training and inference. Our preliminary
experiments on smart phones show parallel training of multiple models is very slow due
to resource contention. It also affects the user experience on the phones. Therefore, we
decided to train models sequentially. The FL Phone Manager can request to participate in
training rounds for multiple models concurrently, but it locally decides a sequential order
in which to train these models, based on parameters such as frequency of model usage by
apps, the training round deadlines, and historical training latency for each model. Finally,
the inference requests from the apps are executed as soon as they are received to maintain
good user experience.

4.1.5

Prototype Implementation

We implemented an endtoend FLSys prototype in Android and AWS cloud, which have
been chosen because they are the market leaders for mobile OSs and cloud platforms,
respectively. The FLSys design is general and it can be implemented in other mobile
OSs and cloud platforms. The prototype implements all of the components described
in the system architecture (Figure 4.1b). This subsection reviews the implementation
technologies, the reasons for selecting them, and then focuses on the Android implemen
tation and the AWS implementation of FLSys.

Deep Learning Framework We choose Deep Learning for Java (DL4J) as the underlying
framework for the ondevice DLrelated operations (i.e., training and model execution)
because it is the only mature framework that supports model training on Android devices.
While the Model Aggregator in the cloud could be implemented using other DL technologies,
for consistency, we implement it in DL4J as well. The models are stored as zipped JSON
and bin files stored in folders on the phone and in AWS S3 buckets in the cloud.
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Ondevice Communication

For IPC among Android apps/services, we use Android

Bound Service and Android Intent. A bound service can efficiently serve another appli
cation component because it does not run in the background indefinitely. Through IPC,
the FL Phone Manager can provide thirdparty apps with an interface to request inference
results without revealing the model or the data. Furthermore, it can communicate with the
Data Collector.

Cloud Platform and Services

We opt to utilize the Functionasaservice (FaaS) archi

tecture for our cloud computation. The core cloud components of FLSys are implemented
and deployed as AWS Lambda functions [204]. We decided to choose FaaS for our
implementation for five reasons. First, it matches our asynchronous, eventbased design, as
Lambda functions are triggered by events. Second, it provides finegrained scalability at the
function level; therefore leading to less resource consumption in the cloud. Furthermore,
computation and storage are scaled automatically and independently by the cloud platform.
Third, unlike other cloud platforms, it does not require running virtual machines when
no computation is necessary; this saves additional resources and reduces cost. Fourth,
FaaS simplifies the development and deployment of our prototype because it does not
require software installation, system configuration, etc. Fifth, different functions can be
implemented in different programming languages making the implementation even more
flexible.
Lambda functions are triggered in different ways in our prototype. We use the AWS
API Gateway to define and deploy HTTP and REST APIs. For instance, we create a REST
API to relay clients’ requests to participate in the FL training to the Lambda function that
handles these requests. We also use the AWS EventBridge to define rules to trigger and
filter events for Lambda functions.
FLSys uses a number of cloud services for storage, authentication, and publish
subscribe communication. For model storage, validation datasets, and FL Cloud Manager
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configuration files, we use AWS S3, which offers a reliable and costeffective solution for
data accessed infrequently. More importantly, AWS S3 buckets can be accessed directly
by phones, which simplifies the asynchronous communication in FLSys. To authenticate
clients and allow them to upload and download models from the AWS S3, FLSys uses
Identity Pool in AWS Cognito. To store data that is accessed frequently, such as training
round states and model states, we use AWS DynamoDB, a reliable NoSQL database. AWS
SNS is utilized in conjunction with the Google FCM to notify clients when newly trained
models are ready. The use of a Google Cloud service in our AWS implementation was
necessary in order to push notifications directly to apps on the phones when a new global
model is ready in the cloud.

4.1.6

Phone Implementation

The phone implementation (leftside of Figure 4.1b) consists of three apps: a FL Phone
Manager, a HAR Data Collector, and a Testing App used to test model inference.

Data Collector

We implemented a HAR Data Collector app designed for longterm

and battery efficient data collection. To that end, sensor values are not collected at an
enforced fixed high frequency, but are instead collected independently through Android
listeners whose actual frequency is variable, determined by the underlying OS. This is
appropriate for data collection in the wild. In our experience, this tends to be much
friendlier to the performance and battery life of the user devices, lowering the risk that
a user abandons FLSys prematurely due to concerns about how it is affecting their device
resources. Furthermore, users are given the option to pause or stop data collection of all
or a subset of sensors in case they have resource consumption or privacy concerns. For
simplicity, the raw data and the processed data are stored as files.

FL Phone Manager The FL Phone Manager app decides to initiate an ondevice training
round based on evaluating a Ready To Config policy (RTCp). We implemented a simple
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policy to check if the phone is charging and is connected to the network before declaring
its availability for training. If yes, it sends a Ready To Config message (RTCm) to the
FL Cloud Manager. RTCm is implemented as an HTTP request with JSON payload and
is sent to a REST API URL in AWS. The FL Cloud Manger either accepts or denies the
phone’s participation in this training round, based on a simple Accept/Deny for Training
policy (A/DFTp) that checks the phone model and client identity.
The phone is accepted for a round of training when it receives an Accept For Training
message (AFTm). AFTm contains the information of the AWS S3 locations from where to
download the latest global model weights and where to upload the local gradients. The
message also contains the deadline for this training round’s completion. The FL Phone
Manager evaluates a Start To Train policy (STTp) based on the available device resources
and the round’s deadline to determine whether to actually perform the ondevice training
for this round or not.
The FL Phone Manager will create the corresponding Model Trainer if it decides to
train. The Model Trainer is implemented with Android native AsyncTask class to ensure
the trainer is not terminated by Android, even when the app is idle. AsyncTask also enables
multiple trainers to train in the background. Once the training is complete, the Model
Trainer uploads the local gradients to the corresponding AWS S3 location.
Model inference is implemented as a background service with Android Interface
Definition Language (AIDL), and it gets inference requests from thirdparty apps. When
such a request is received, the FL Phone Manager uses the current sensor data from the Data
Collector as input for the model, runs the inference, and responds to the thirdparty apps
with the inference results.

Testing App

We implemented a simple testing App to test model inference. The App

uses AidlConnection to interface with the FL Phone Manager. Let us note that the App
itself does not access any data or model.
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4.1.7

Cloud Implementation

The cloud implementation (rightside of Figure 4.1b) consists of two main components: FL
Cloud Manager and Model Aggregator.

FL Cloud Manager

The FL Cloud Manager is implemented as a series of Lambda

Functions (FaaS service in AWS). When starting a training round, it reads a configuration
file and determines the deadline for the round (i.e., the time when the round must finish).
During the period between the start time and the deadline, the FL Cloud Manager accepts or
denies clients’ requests for training (RTCm). When the deadline is reached, the FL Cloud
Manager executes the Model Aggregator according to the Start for Aggregation policy
(SFAp). The current policy checks if enough clients have submitted their local gradients
in the AWS S3 (a configurable parameter). Then, the Lambda function implementing the
FL CLoud Manager schedules an event for itself to perform the next training round and
terminate. The training process stops when the predefined number of rounds is achieved,
or the desired performance (model accuracy) is achieved, if the model developers provided
a validation dataset.

Model Aggregator For implementation simplicity, the Model Aggregator uses the federa
ted average technique [205], with the assumption that each client contributes equally
to the global model in each training round. When it is invoked, it loads the uploaded
local gradients, and aggregates their gradients to the global model of this round. Once
the global model is updated, the Model Aggregator invokes AWS SNS to notify clients
that they can download the newly aggregated model. Note that the Model Aggregator
is called dynamically through reflection, such that different aggregation functions can be
dynamically swapped.
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4.1.8

Asynchronous Federate Averaging Implementation

Algorithm 4.1 shows the pseudocode of our asynchronous federated averaging process.
The algorithm consist of three procedures, which execute asynchronously. “ClientLoop”
(lines 112) runs at clients and executes a round of training (lines 712), if the phone
selfselects for training and the cloud accepts it (lines 16). “ServerRTCmHandler” (lines
1317) is a part of the FL Cloud Manager and decides whether a phone is accepted for
training. “ServerLoop” (lines 1840) also runs at the FL Cloud Manager. It performs
the aggregation of local gradients and controls the progression of training. The clients
participating in a training round must submit their local gradients before the deadline for
the round expires. When the deadline comes, the procedure first evaluates the Start for
Aggregation policy, which checks whether there are enough local gradient updates in order
to preform aggregation. If yes, the aggregation is preformed (line 2426); if not, this round
is aborted, but the uploaded gradient updates will be carried to the next round. After
aggregation, the procedure may check against predefined conditions to decide whether
this aggregation outcome should be accepted or not (lines 2730). Finally, the procedure
checks if a new round should be started by evaluating the Start New Round policy. If a new
round is to be started, a new deadline will be set (lines 3336). Otherwise, the procedure
terminates.

4.1.9

FLSys Setup Workflow

By design, FLSys acts as a service provider that handles multiple FL models with minimum
input from the users. The setup procedures for FLSys are divided into two stages. The first
stage involves the FL Cloud Manager and the app developers without user involvement.
The second stage involves the FL Phone Manager and the mobile apps that use FL models,
and it requires minimum user involvement. The FL Cloud Manager is deployed before the
first stage, and the FL Phone Manager should be installed on the user’s device before the
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Algorithm 4.1 AsynFedAveraging
1: procedure ClientLoop( )
2:
while true do
3:
readyT oConf ig ← evaluateReadyToConfigPolicy(powerState, wif iState,...)
4:
if readyT oConf ig then
5:
response ← sendRTCm( )
6:
if response == “AFT” then
7:
B ← sampling(DL )
8:
θl ← θ t
9:
for batch b ∈ B do
10:
θl ← θl − η∇L(θl ; b)
11:
∆l ← θl − θt
12:
uploadClientGradients(∆l )
13: procedure ServerRTCmHandler(RT Cm)
14:
if evaluateAcceptForTrainingPolicy(RT Cm) then
15:
returnResponse(“AFT”)
16:
else
17:
returnResponse(“DFT”)
18: procedure ServerLoop( )
19:
deadlineT riggered ← f alse
20:
setupDeadline( ) (deadlineT riggered ← true when triggered)
21:
while true do
22:
if deadlineT riggered then
23:
if evaluateStartForAggregationPolicy( ) then
24:
{∆1 , ...∆
Pk } ← loadClientGradients( )
25:
∆t = ( k ∆k )/k
26:
θt+1 ← θt + γ∆t
27:
if isRoundAcceptable( ) then
28:
acceptRound(θt+1 )
29:
else
30:
abortRound( )
31:
else
32:
abortRound( )
33:
if evaluateStartNewRoundPolicy( ) then
34:
startNewRound( )
35:
deadlineT riggered ← f alse
36:
setupDeadline( )
37:
else
38:
stopTraining( )
39:
else
40:
wait( )
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second stage. To illustrate these stages, let us briefly explain the setup workflow using the
HAR app as an example.
In the first stage, the developers of the HAR app need to register the model with the FL
Cloud Manager. If the model is developed by the app developers, then the developers need
to provide the FL model to be trained and the training plan (e.g., training frequency, number
of rounds, number of participants in a round, etc.) to register the app. If the developers plan
to use an existing FL model, then they need to specify which model to use to register the
app. After registration, an unique key for the authentication between the app and the FL
Phone Manager in the second stage will be provided.
The second stage is typically triggered during the installation process of the HAR
app on the user’s device. The app will communicate with the FL Phone Manager and
authenticate itself using the aforementioned unique key. Once the app is successfully
authenticated, the FL Phone Manager will perform a series of operations and eventually
become ready to serve the FL model for the app. These operations including: (1) Register
the phone with the FL Cloud Manager; (2) Set up communication channels with the app;
(3) If the model does not exist on the phone, it downloads the model specified by the app
and the training plan from the FL Cloud Manager; If the model already exists on the phone,
it only establishes the connection between the app and that model; and (4) Set up the local
training schedule and notify the user. After the second stage, the FL model that the HAR
app needs is installed on the phone, ready for inference and training. The training plan
can be adjusted by the developers through the FL Cloud Manager, if the developers own
the model. Userexperience related parameters can be adjusted by the user through the FL
Phone Manager.

4.1.10

HARWild: Data, Model, and Training

We codesigned FLSys with a HAR model, which was used to extract the main requirements
for FLSys, and then to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of FLSys. To show
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that FLSys works with different concurrent models, we also implemented and evaluated
a sentiment analysis (SA) model, as described in Subsection 4.1.15. In this Subsection,
we describe the HAR dataset, our HARWild model, and its training algorithm using data
augmentation to deal with nonIID data in the wild.
Table 4.1 Total Number of Minutes for Each Labeled Activity.
Label

Total minutes Label

Total minutes

sitting

862544.50

table

864904.00

walking

158087.40

mounted

49440.29

driving

38013.98

strap

2485.22

lying

488596.70

vehicle_car

72121.55

cycling

2589.50

vehicle_train/subway 355.24

workout_gym

3649.47

vehicle_motorcycle

88.84

workout_running 2212.69

home

1171968.00

workout_others

16500.13

outside

41886.80

palm

511092.20

travel

14094.12

bag

6446.19

elevator

924.09

pocket

99557.67

office

17562.08

4.1.11 Data Collection
Although there are good HAR datasets publicly available, e.g., WISDM [123], UCI
HAR [124], they are not representative for reallife situations. These datasets were collected
in rigorously controlled environments on standardized devices and controlled activities, in
which the participants only focused on collecting sensor data with a usually high and fixed
sampling rate frequency, i.e., 50Hz or higher.
Thus, given our goal to test FLSys with data collected in the wild, we have used
our Data Collector, described in Subsection 4.1.6, to collect data from 116 users at two
universities. We opt to collect data from university students as subjects for the following
reasons: (1) University students should have relatively good access to the smartphones
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and related technologies; (2) University students should be more credible and easier to be
motivated than other sources (e.g., recruiting test subjects on crowdsourcing websites);
and (3) It will be easier for our team to recruit and distribute rewards to students. The data
collection was approved by the IRBs at both universities.
The students collected data from April 1st to August 10th, 2020. Each user provided
mobile accelerometer data and labels of their activities on their personal Android phones.
We provided labels in five categories for participants to choose form: “Walking,” “Sitting,”
“In Car,” “Cycling,” and “Running”. The phones were naturally heterogeneous, and the
dailylife activities were not constrained by our experiments.
Therefore, we collected a novel HAR dataset in the wild that is different from the
existing datasets in the following three aspects: (1) The sensors’ sampling rates vary from
time to time and from user to user, due to battery constrains, device variability, and usability
targets; (2) The same basic activity will generate different signals since different users will
have different habits of carrying smart phones; (3) Label distributions are not just biased,
but vary significantly among users.
The data and labels for each user are uploaded to the backend server that runs
on a secure AWS instance fully managed by Unknot.id and NJIT. Upon registration,
each account will get a unique random identifier for the user. The raw data and labels
are associated only with this identifier to ensure user anonymity. The total size of the
accumulated raw data is about 1 TB.

4.1.12

Data Preprocessing

Our data processing consists of the following steps: (1) Any duplicated data points (e.g.,
data points that have the same timestamp) are merged by taking the average of their sensor
values; (2) Using 300 milliseconds as the threshold, continuous data sessions are identified
and separated by breaking up the data sequences at any gap that is larger than the threshold;
(3) Data sessions that have unstable or unsuitable sampling rates are filtered out. We only
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keep the data sessions that have a stable sampling rate of 5Hz, 10Hz, 20Hz, or 50Hz;
(4) Data sessions are also filtered with the following two criteria to ensure good quality:
(a) The first 10 seconds and the last 10 seconds of each data session are trimmed, due to
the fact that users were likely operating the phone during these time periods; (b) Any data
session longer than 30 minutes is trimmed down to 30 minutes, in order to mitigate the
potential inaccurate labels due to users’ negligence (forgot to turn off labeling); and
(5) We sample data segments at the size of 100 data points with sliding windows. Different
overlapping percentages were used for different classes and different sampling rates. The
majority classes have 25% overlapping to reduce the number of data segments, while the
minority classes have up to 90% overlapping to increase the available data segments. The
same principle is applied to sessions with different sampling rates. We sample 15% of data
for testing, while the rest are used for training. Details are shown in Table 4.2.

Data Normalization

In our models, the accelerometer data is normalized as x ∈ [−1, 1]d

to achieve better model utility. We compute the mean and variance of each axis (i.e., X,
Y , and Z) using only training data to avoid information leakage from the training phase to
the testing phase. Then, both training and testing data are normalized with zscore, based
on the mean and variance computed from training data. Based on this results, we choose
to clip the values in between [min, max] = [−2, 2] for each axis, which covers at least
90% of possible data values. Finally, all values are linearly scaled to [−1, 1] to finish the
normalization process:

x=2×[

x − min
− 1/2]
max − min
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(4.1)

Figure 4.2 HARWild model architecture.

4.1.13

Model Design

The design of our HARWild model has two requirements: low computational complexity
and small memory footprint. Satisfying these requirements ensures the model can work
efficiently on phones. Figure 4.2 shows our model architecture. For a low computation
complexity, HARWild is based on CNN (instead of RNN, e.g., LSTM) and tailored to
work well on mobile devices. In addition, instead of using data from multiple sensors,
HARWild can achieve comparable results with several baseline approaches by using only
accelerometer data, which makes the training faster.
The accelerometer data are processed into data segments of shape [3, 100], indicating
100 data points of 3 axis: X, Y, and Z. We leverage the recipe of ResNet model [206] into a
smallsize model, by using the processed accelerometer data as input of (1) a sequence of a
1DCNN  a Batch Norm  a 1DCNN  a Batch Norm  a Flatten layer, and (2) a sequence of
a 1DCNN  a Batch Norm  a Flatten layer. The two flatten layers are concatenated before
feeding them into a sequence of a Drop Out layer  a Dense layer  and an Output layer. By
doing so, HARWild can memorize and transfer the low level latent features learned from
the very first 1DCNN, directly derived from the input data, to the output layer for better
classification. We use Global Average Pooling [207] given its small memory footprint,
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Figure 4.3 Number of data points of each class for each user.

instead of the popular Local Max/Average Pooling [208]. A smallsize model is expected to
perform better on data collected in the wild, since the data will likely have more distribution
drift, increasing the chance of model overfitting on largesize models.

4.1.14

HARWild Async Augmented Training

The performance of FL models is negatively affected by nonIID data distribution [133,
109, 127], and we observed this to be true for HARWild as well. Figure 4.3 shows the
data distribution of HARWild. To address this problem, we leverage data augmentation
training [209] and tailor it to mitigate the distortion in computing gradients at clientside
by balancing the client data with a small number of augmentation data samples without an
undue computational cost.
The pseudocode for HARWild Asynchronous Augmented Learning is described
in Algorithm 4.2. This algorithm is integrated in Algorithm 4.1 by replacing lines 712
from Algorithm 4.1 with the AugmentedGradients procedure in Algorithm 4.2. Before the
whole training process starts, the FL Cloud Manager executes the procedure Init (lines 13,
Algorithm 4.2), which first collects a small pool of random samples for each class that will
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be used for data augmentation (line 2). These data can be collected from a small number
of volunteers or controlled users who share IID data with the FL Cloud Manager in FLSys.
The augmentation data pool could also come from publicly available datasets. Then, the
augmentation data pool A is delivered to each client (line 3). In each training round, each
client (i.e., phone) randomly samples the augmentation data (line 8). Then, the sampled
augmentation data DA will be combined with the local data DL (line 10, Concatenate(DA ,
DL )) to compute the local gradients (lines 1113, LocalTraining). The local gradients are
then sent to the cloud for the asynchronous average aggregation and model update (line 14).
In order to deliver the augmentation data to the clients (line 3), we consider two
objectives: (i) privacypreserving, and (ii) communication efficiency. One naive approach
is to send data to augment the missing classes at the clients in each training round, since
the local missing data can change over time. In this approach, the FL Cloud Manager
needs to know which classes are missing for each client in each training round. This could
increase the communication cost and significantly increase data privacy risk; since the cloud
learns certain aspects of the user behavior based on the classes that miss data over time. To
achieve both privacypreserving and communication efficiency, the approach implemented
in our FLSys (Algorithm 4.2) first delivers the entire augmentation data to every client
only once at the beginning of the training process. Then, the clients use only the data
necessary to augment their missing data in each training round. Given the small size of the
augmentation data, the overhead of also sending unnecessary augmentation data is minimal,
without causing extra data privacy risk.

4.1.15

Evaluation

The evaluation has two main goals: (i) Analyze the performance of the two FL models,
HARWild and sentiment analysis (SA), to understand if they perform similarly with their
centralized counterparts; (ii) Quantify the system performance of FLSys with HARWild
and SA on Android and AWS. In terms of system performance, we investigate energy
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Algorithm 4.2 HARWild Asynchronous Augmented Learning
1: procedure Init(clients)
2:
augmentation pool A ← sampleAugmentData(clients)
3:
deliverAugmentPool(A, clients)
4: procedure AugmentedGradients(Round t, Client i)
5:
Augmentation data pool A
6:
Local data pool Li
7:
θl ← θt
8:
augmentation data DA = sampleAugmentData(A)
9:
local data DL = sampleData(Li )
10:
training data DT = concatenate(DA , DL )
11:
for batch b ∈ DT do
12:
θl ← θl − η∇L(θl ; b)
13:
∆l ← θl − θt
14:
uploadClientGradients(∆i )
efficiency and memory consumption on the phone, system tolerance to phones that do not
upload local gradients, and FL aggregation scalability in the cloud. We also study the overall
response time for third party apps that use FLSys on the phone. For model evaluation, we
use Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1score metrics. For system performance, we report
execution time and memory consumption for both the phones and the cloud, and battery
consumption on the phones.
Most of the evaluation is done in the context of HARWild, which illustrates a typical
FL model based on mobile sensing data. However, to demonstrate that FL works for
different models, we also show results for the SA model. The rest of the Subsection is
organized as follows: Subsection 4.1.16 evaluates HARWild under different scenarios.
Subsection 4.1.17 describes the SA model and shows its performance. Subsection 4.1.18
shows the HARWild performance over the FLSys prototype. Since we did not have
enough phones, we show the results using Android emulators to replay each user’s data.
Subsection 4.1.19 presents scalability and faulttolerance results for HARWild over FLSys
in AWS. Finally, Subsection 4.1.20 presents results for HARWild and SA over FLSys on
two types of Android phone models.
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(a) Centralized and Simulated FL

(b) Android Emulated FL vs. Simulated FL

(c) Linux FL Emulation

Figure 4.4 HARWild accuracy under different settings.

4.1.16

HARWild Model Evaluation

Table 4.2 shows the basic information of our collected dataset used for all HARWild
experiments. Some of the users have very limited numbers of labeled activities; thus, we
select data from 51 users who labeled a reasonable amount of samples.
We perform centralized and simulated evaluation to assess HARWild’s utility
compared with several baselines. Centralized training works as an upper bound performance
for FL models. In addition, it allows us to finetune the model’s hyper parameters. The
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Table 4.2 Number of Samples in the Dataset for 51 Users

Type

Class 0

Class 1 Class 2 Class 3

Walking Sitting

Class 4

In Car

Cycling Running

Training 48855

51499

49185

14281

1920

Testing

8828

8595

2514

319

8514

evaluation includes three variants of HARWild: HARW32, HARW64, and HARW128,
which have the numbers of convolutionchannels set to 32, 64, and 128. We derive
two versions of our HARW64 model in simulated FL with (HARW64uniform) and
without (HARW64stock) the data augmentation. The augmentation data, consisting of
640 samples of each class, is fixed and shared with all clients.

Baseline approaches To demonstrate that HARWild is competitive with respect to
stateoftheart HAR models, we consider two baseline models: (1) Bidirectional LSTM
with 3axial accelerometer data as input. This is a typical model for timeseries data, and
we finetune it based on gridsearch of hyperparameters; and (2) The CNNbased models
proposed by Ignatov [120], with additional features (CNNIg) and without additional
features (CNNIg_featureless) using recommended settings in [120]. For a fair comparison,
we used TensorFlow implementations for all models. Table 4.3 shows all the hyper
parameters and model configurations.

Results

Figure 4.4a shows that HARWild models outperform the baseline approaches.

On average, HARW64 performs best and achieves 82.49% accuracy compared with
78.68%, 76.39%, and 77.08% of the BiLSTM, CNNIg and CNNIgfeatureless. Our
HARWild models also achieve the best performance in all the other metrics (Table
4.4). Overall, HARW64 (60,613 trainable weights) has the best tradeoff among model
accuracy, convergence speed, and model size, and we use it in all the following experiments
for HARWild.
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Table 4.3 Model Settings of HARW and Baselines
Model

Optimizer

Other key parameters
LR=0.0005, dropout_rate=0.4,

HARWild (centralized)

Adam

batch_size=1024,
Sampling: Same as class distribution
client_LR=0.005, server_LR=1.0,

HARWild (simFL)

Adam

dropout_rate=0.4, batch_size=128,
Sampling: [50, 100] samples per class,
[15, 30] augment samples per class
client_LR=0.005, server_LR=1.0,

HARWild (FLSys)

Adam

dropout_rate=0.4, batch_size=64,
Sampling: [50, 100] samples per class,
[15, 30] augment samples per class
LR=0.0005, dropout_rate=0.05,

CNNIg (centralized)

Adam

batch_size=1024
Sampling: Same as class distribution
LR=0.0005, dropout_rate=0.2,

BiLSTM (centralized)

Adam

batch_size=1024
Sampling: Same as class distribution
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In the simulated FL, we replay the data collected in the wild for each user. HAR
Wild trained with FL and data augmentation achieves 71.8% accuracy, which is about
10% less than the accuracy of the centralizedtrained HARWild. This is the cost of
privacyprotection provided by FL. We notice the substantial benefits of data augmentation,
since HARW64uniform outperforms HARW64stock (without data augmentation), in
all metrics.
Table 4.4 HARWild vs. Baselines: MacroModel Performance

4.1.17

Model

Accuracy Precision Recall

F1score

HARW32centralized

0.8186

0.8486

0.8360 0.8409

HARW64centralized

0.8249

0.8512

0.8354 0.8428

HARW128centralized 0.8262

0.8529

0.8449 0.8484

BiLSTM

0.7868

0.8074

0.7831 0.7941

CNNIg

0.7639

0.7970

0.7715 0.7834

CNNIg_featureless

0.7708

0.8004

0.7779 0.7878

HARW64fedstock

0.5368

0.3828

0.3569 0.3190

HARW64feduniform 0.7181

0.7464

0.7419 0.7378

SA Model Evaluation

FLSys is designed and implemented to be flexible, in the sense that the training and
inference of multiple models can run concurrently. On the server, different applications
use independent AWS resources. On the phone, independent model trainers and inference
runners are responsible for different applications. This subsection showcases the training
performance of the SA model, a text analysis application that interprets and classifies the
emotions (positive or negative) from text data. With the inferred emotions of mobile users’
private text data, a smart keyboard may automatically generate emoji to enrich the text
before sending.
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Figure 4.5 SA model architecture.

We build the SA model specifically for tweet data. We use the FL benchmark dataset
Sentiment140 1 , which consists of 1,600,498 tweets from 660,120 users. We select the
users with at least 70 tweets, and this subdataset contains 46,000+ samples from 436 users.
Figure 4.5 shows our SA model architecture. We first extract a feature vector of size 768
from each tweet with DistilBERT [210]. Then, we apply two fully connected layers with
relu and softmax activation, respectively, to classify the feature vector into positive or
negative. The number of hidden states of the first fully connected layer is set to 128 to
balance the convergence speed and model size. In the FL version of the model, 5% of the
users are used for data augmentation, and the rest of the users follow 4:1 traintest split.

Results

While the reference implementation associated with this benchmark dataset

reached 70% accuracy [211] using 100 users with stacked LSTM in FL simulation, our SA
model achieves superior performance, as shown in Table 4.5. Centralized learning achieves
81% accuracy, while FL achieves 79% accuracy (an acceptable drop).

4.1.18

HARWild over FLSys Emulation Performance

This set of experiments tests FLSys with HARWild by running the actual phone code
in Android emulators. However, since Android emulation is slow and costly, we run
several largerscale experiments with the same DL4J algorithms and functions in Linux,
1 http://help.sentiment140.com/home

Retrieved on June 15, 2021
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Table 4.5 SA Model Performance per Class in FLSys Training
Class
CL
FL

negative
positive
negative
positive

Accuracy Precision Recall F1score Support
0.81
0.79

0.75

0.69

0.72

3159

0.84

0.88

0.86

5746

0.73

0.64

0.68

3159

0.81

0.87

0.84

5746

which is much faster; this enables us to conduct largerscale experiments. This subsection
demonstrate that FLSys and HARWild can work well in reallife, where they are deployed
on Android phones.
All the phone components of the prototype, except for Data Collector and Data
Preprocessor, run in the emulators. The cloud part of the prototype runs in AWS. The
Android emulators run on top of virtual machines (VMs) in Google Cloud, as AWS does
not support nested virtualization. We run 10 VMs in Google Cloud, and each VM has 16
vCPUs and 60GB memory. On each instance, we run 4 Android v10 emulators from AVD
manager in Android Studio. Each emulator is loaded with 3 users’ data files, and each file
is sampled twice as different clients. In each round, each Android emulator participates
in training on behalf of a few clients. We set the deadline for the round in the FL Cloud
Manager to 6 minutes.

Results

Figure 4.4b shows that HARWild with 64 clients emulation in both Android and

Linux on FLSys achieve comparable accuracy with the simulated FL with TensorFlow, i.e.,
69.07%, 68.50%, and 66.00%. Figure 4.4c shows the results of HARWild with higher
number of clients (up to 960) using Linux emulations. The client data was oversampled
from the original 51 users. HARWild model achieves up to 69.17% accuracy, and more
clients help the model converge quicker with better performance.
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Figure 4.6 Aggregation time and participating clients

4.1.19

Fault Tolerance and Scalability

Fault Tolerance In daily life, some clients may fail to upload a trained model to the FL
Cloud Manager due to network or computation issues. This set of experiments verifies the
fault tolerance of FLSys in terms of model performance as a percentage of clients dropped
out randomly in each round. Figure 4.4c shows the accuracy of HARWild with up to
50% clients dropping out randomly from 480 clients in each round. With 1,000 rounds of
training, the accuracy is reduced by at most 3.11%. This is a promising result showing that
FLSys can tolerate reasonably large dropout rates during training.

Scalability As discussed in Subsection 4.1.5, computation and storage scale indepen
dently in the cloud for FLSys. This set of experiments verifies the scalability of FLSys
across training rounds. The only FL function that may be computationally intensive in the
cloud is the Model Aggregator. Figure 4.6 shows the Model Aggregator in AWS scales
linearly with the number of participating clients. We also observe that the aggregation of
960 clients generally finishes in less than 4 minutes. By interpolating these results and
given the current 15 minutes execution time limit of an AWS Lambda process [204], the
FLSys prototype (with singlethreaded aggregator) can handle up to 3,600 clients, which is a
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sufficient number of clients, per training round. This number can be multiplied substantially
by implementing both threadlevel and processlevel parallelization to handle realworld
traffic volume.

4.1.20

FLSys Performance on Smart Phones

We benchmarked FLSys with HARWild and SA on Android phones using a testing app to
evaluate training and inference performance. We also assessed the resource consumption
on the phones. We used two phones with different specs (Google Pixel 3 and Pixel 3a).
Table 4.6 Model Performance per Class in FLSys Training
Model

HARW64

Class Accuracy Precision Recall F1score
0

0.7003

0.6628

0.6810

1

0.5922

0.8655

0.7032

0.8606

0.5443

0.6668

3

0.8324

0.6450

0.7268

4

0.6682

0.9028

0.7680

2

0.6907

Training Performance Table 4.7 shows the training time and the resource consumption
on the phones. The training time is recorded by training 650 samples for 5 epochs for HAR
Wild, and 100 samples for 5 epochs for SA, which are the optimum scenarios determined
in Subsection 4.1.18. Foreground training is done while leaving the screen on, and it uses
the full single core capacity. It provides a lower bound for the training time. However, in
reality, we expect training to be done in the background, either on battery or on charger.
As in practice, other apps or system processes working in background may interfere with
training. We take 10 measurements for each benchmark, and report the mean and standard
deviation.
Training for one round is fast on the phones. The foreground training time on the
more powerful phone, Pixel 3, is just 0.7 min for HARWild, and 0.22 min for SA. The
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Table 4.7 Training Resource Consumption and Latency
Model
Phone

Maximum RAM
Usage (MB)
Foreground Training Time
Mean/SD (min)

HAR

SA

Google

Google

Google

Google

Pixel 3a

Pixel 3

Pixel 3a

Pixel 3

156

165

128

136

1.23/0.01

0.70/0.06

0.33/0.005 0.22/0.002

3.94/0.04

3.58/0.10

0.84/0.006 0.76/0.02

Background Training Time
on Charger
Mean/SD (min)
Background Training Time
on Battery

85.82/33.07 79.96/36.82 25.42/5.72 24.19/8.12

Mean/SD (min)
Battery Consumption
per Round (mAh)
Number of Training Rounds
for Full Battery

9.72

3.79

2.02

0.76

308

769

1481

3846
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Table 4.8 Inference Resource Consumption and Latency
Model
Phone

Maximum RAM
Usage (MB)
Foreground Inference Time
Mean/SD (millisecond)

HAR

SA

Google

Google

Google

Google

Pixel 3a

Pixel 3

Pixel 3a

Pixel 3

158

177

108

129

38.48/10.07

36.59/6.43

11.90/3.71 10.11/2.88

99.73/19.76

99.60/33.69

20.65/4.45 15.59/5.89

Background Inference Time
on Charger
Mean/SD (millisecond)
Background Inference Time
on Battery

100.11/19.69 100.11/21.45 19.58/3.93 17.42/5.69

Mean/SD (millisecond)
Battery Consumption
per prediction (µAh)
Millions of inferences
for Full Battery

4.12

1.94

2.3

0.17

0.73

1.50

1.30

17.63
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background training time on charger, which is the expected situation for FL training, is good
for any practical situation. The phones experience a higher training time compared with the
foreground case (completed one training round in less than 4 minutes). The background
training time on battery is notably longer, since Android attempts to balance computation
with battery saving.
The results show training is also feasible in terms of resource consumption. The
maximum RAM usage of the app is less than 165MB, and modern phones are equipped with
sufficient RAM to handle it. While we did not perform experiments for battery consumption
in the foreground (as this test was used just for a lower bound on computation time), we
measured battery consumption for background training on battery. The phones could easily
perform hundreds of rounds of training on a fully charged battery. It is worth noting that,
typically, one round of training per day is enough, as the users need enough time to collect
new data.

Inference Performance The results in Table 4.8 demonstrate that FLSys can be used
efficiently by thirdparty apps. The inference time is measured within the testing app, and
thus includes the latency due to both FLSys and the FL models. We continuously perform
predictions for 30 minutes and report the average values. The inference time for the three
scenarios on the thirdparty app, foreground, background on charger, and background on
battery, follows a similar trend as training. FLSys and HARWild/SA have reasonable
resource consumption, which make them effective in practice.
In the real world, inference may be expected in both foreground and background. One
inference can be completed within tens of milliseconds for foreground and background on
charger, which is good for all practical applications. The latency for background on battery
is hundreds of milliseconds, which is still acceptable for many applications. However, the
two phones experience high standard deviation in this scenario. This is because inference
is typically a short task, and whenever it is interfered by other processes, its execution may
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be significantly prolonged. Nevertheless, background inference is typically used to assist
an application, such as advertisement, and even latency in the orders of seconds may be
acceptable for practical purposes.
FLSys and HARWild also have reasonable resource consumption, which make them
effective in practice. The maximum RAM usage for inference is less than 177MB. The
battery consumption per prediction is low enough to execute millions of predictions with
a full battery. With further optimization, such as model pruning and compression, the
resource consumption can be even lower.

4.1.21

Conclusions, Lessons Learned, and Future Work

This chapter presented our experience with designing, building, and evaluating FLSys,
an endtoend federated learning system. FLSys was designed based on requirements
derived from reallife applications that learn from mobile user data collected in the
wild, such as human activity recognition (HAR). Compared with existing FL systems,
FLSys balances model utility with resource consumption on the phones, tolerates client
failures/disconnections and allows clients to join training at any time, supports multiple
DL models that can be used concurrently by multiple apps, and acts as a “central hub”
on the phone to manage the training, updating, and access control of FL models used by
different apps. We built a complete prototype of FLSys in Android and AWS, and used
this prototype to demonstrate that FLSys is effective and efficient in practice in terms of
model performance, resource usage, and latency. We believe FLSys can open the path
toward creating an FL ecosystem of models and apps for privacypreserving deep learning
on mobile sensing data. In terms of actual deployment of FLSys in practice, we believe
it can be offered as FL as a Service (FLaaS) by cloud providers. Next, we report lessons
learned and future work.

Build mechanisms to cope with nonIID data

Since our data collection happened during

the Covid19 pandemic, we expected to see somewhat similar data from users who mostly
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stayed indoors. However, the data was nonIID strengthening the idea that data collected
in the wild will almost always be nonIID. A future work in FLSys is to provide support for
model and dataspecific augmentation and other approaches to cope with nonIID data.

Beware the simulation pitfalls

One common practice in FL simulations is to use the same

instances/placeholders in memory for the different clients. Such simulations must carefully
reset the instances for different clients to avoid any information leakage among clients,
which can never happen in a real system. Our initial experiments showed unexpectedly
different results between simulations and Android emulators with DL4J for the same
settings. The first problem we discovered was that Batch Normalization (BN) is not
supported in DL4J for specific data shapes. We implemented our own BN in DL4J, but
the simulation results still did not match the experimental results. Finally, we realized that
BN does not work well for FL (consistent with [212]), but it does work in the simulations
due to shared instances among the simulated clients. Thus, the FL models used in the
reported experiments do not use BN. The second problem we noticed was that the Adam
optimizer worked well for simulation, but not for the Android emulator experiments. This
was also caused by shared instances accessed by all clients in the simulation. This should not
happen in practice given privacy leakage through the shared instances. The lesson learned
was that simulation may show better results than experiments with real systems for FL.
Since most of FL papers in the literature are based on simulations, which may suffer from
similar problems with the ones described here. We believe FLSys offers an opportunity to
test such FL models in reallife conditions.

Balance mobile resources and model accuracy In the current FL literature, there are
no results to show the FL models work well on mobile devices, while consuming a limited
amount of resources on these devices (e.g., battery power, memory). A lesson that we
understood early on is that FLSys will need to balance resource usage on mobiles with
model accuracy. Therefore, FLSys used an asynchronous design in which policies on the
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mobile devices are evaluated to decide when it makes sense for the device to participate
in training and consume resources. Our results show that good model accuracy can be
achieved even when a significant number of mobile devices do not participate in training
in order to save resources. Let us also note that real systems cannot expect to run the same
number of rounds that we observe in simulations. For example, it is common to see 10,000
rounds in simulations. However, in real life, mobile devices may not train more than once
a day due to both resource consumption and lack of enough new data. In such a situation,
running 10,000 rounds will take over 27 years. Thus, models must be optimized for a
realistic number of rounds.

Design for flexibility FLSys was designed for model flexibility on the phones from the
beginning (i.e., allow apps to use multiple interchangeable models). However, we did
not originally design for flexiblity in the cloud. At first, we used virtual machines in the
cloud and durable cloud storage for all FL operations. When we analyzed scalability and
performance issues, we realized that an FaaS solution and different types of storage are
necessary. Therefore, we changed the design of the FLSys in the cloud to allow for different
types of cloud platforms and storage options. Thus, FLSys can easily be ported to other
cloud platforms beyond AWS.

Future Work In the near future, we will add features to allow FLSys to support
continuous data collection, which is what we expect to see in reallife scenarios. We will
also focus on designing and implementing privacy and security components for FLSys.
Finally, we plan to improve FLSys from a DevOps point of view. We will evaluate the
system performance under concurrent training of multiple models, plugnplay modules,
and support a dashboard.
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CHAPTER 5
OTHER WORK

5.1
5.1.1

Recursive Structure Similarity: A Novel Algorithm for Graph Clustering
Abstract

A various number of graph clustering algorithms have been proposed and applied in
realworld applications such as network analysis, bioinformatics, social computing, and
etc. However, existing algorithms usually focus on optimizing specified quality measures
at the global network level, without carefully considering the destruction of local structures
which could be informative and significant in practice. In this work, we propose a
novel clustering algorithm for undirected graphs based on a new structure similarity
measure which is computed in a recursive procedure. Our method can provide robust and
highquality clustering results, while preserving informative local structures in the original
graph. Rigorous experiments conducted on a variety of benchmark and protein datasets
show that our algorithm consistently outperforms existing algorithms.

5.1.2

Introduction

In general, graph clustering, or community detection, is to detect cluster or community
structures in a given system or network by analyzing its corresponding graph using
information from the graph’s topology. Graph clustering is one of the most important ways
of network analysis [213, 214].
A wide variety of methods have been developed to perform graph clustering, and
many of them can obtain impressive results in competitive running time. However, there
are still weaknesses and limitations in existing methods. For instance, in Spectral clustering
algorithm [213], the relation between the original minimum cut problem over actual
clustering and the relaxed version of it is still not clear, and the necessity of providing the
number of clusters k limits the scope of the Spectral clustering. For Modularity optimization
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methods [215, 216, 217], they suffer from inconsistency and may easily get stuck in local
maximum due to their randomness nature. Even very effective, Markov Cluster Algorithm
(MCL) [214] has an issue of eliminating the graph’s original structure. This results in
producing starlike clusters, which may destroy dense and informative local structures.
In this work, we propose a novel community detection algorithm for undirected
graph based on a new structure similarity measure. Structure similarity in general is
a type of similarity measure that shows how two nodes are similar to each other, at
the graph structure point of view. By incorporating structure similarity with Shannon’s
information theory, we define a novel recursive structure similarity as a measure of the
weight, or the carrying information, for each edge in the graph. In our algorithm, the
structure similarity is calculated recursively until it converged to an equilibrium state in
which each edge has a consistent weight, which enables clustering through removing
weak edges. Rigorous experiments conducted on wellknown benchmark datasets and
wellconstructed proteinprotein interaction datasets show that our algorithm consistently
outperforms existing algorithms given a variety of quality and accuracy measures.

5.1.3

Related Work

Community detection or graph clustering has been extensively researched through many
different tracks. Here we briefly revisit the early and traditional methods of addressing the
problem, as well as the stateoftheart methods.
Hierarchical clustering algorithms [218] approach this problem by revealing a hierar
chical structure of the target graph, given that many graphs do have hierarchical structures.
Partitional clustering approaches [219] are often used to find a given number of clusters
by mapping data points into metric space and then minimizing some chosen cost functions
which are based on distance measures. For instance, DBSCAN [220] utilizes density by
scanning each data point’s perimeter and merging points and clusters if they are within a
distance threshold.
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Spectral clustering has been researched extensively, but there are still problems to be
solved. For example, the relationship between the original minimum cut problem and the
relaxed version of the graph partition problem is still unclear. One of the most recent works
[221] proposed a quite effective normalized spectral clustering algorithm.
The divisive method proposed by Girvan and Newman [222] is a significant contri
bution for clustering. In this method, edge betweenness, as a centrality measure, is used to
pick edges that are to be removed. Later, Modularity optimizationbased methods [223, 217]
that use greedy techniques to give approximated results became widely adopted.
Another branch contains RandomWalk based methods such as MCL [214] and
Infomap [224]. MCL iteratively performs a sequence of expansion, inflation, and normal
ization operations on the transfer matrix of the graph, which represents the Random Walk
probability of every edge, until it converges. It was commonly used in bioinformatics
because of its simplicity. Infomap [224] algorithm uses a probability flow of Random
Walks to represent information flow in the network, and then reveals community structure
by compressing a description of the probability flow.

5.1.4

Recursive Structure Similarity

In this subsection, we first give the definition of the graph and show how the weight, or the
carrying information, of each edge is quantified by defining variance and covariance using
Shanon’s information theory. Then, we demonstrate how community detection can be done
using the quantified information.
We consider an undirected and unweighted network G = (V, E) with n nodes ∈ V
and l edges ∈ E. Given node i and node j, their direct connection status is denoted as Iij ,
where Iij = 1 if the two nodes are directly connected, and Iij = 0 otherwise. We always
have Iij = Iji , since edges are undirected. We adopt the convention that Iii = 1, which
means that any node i is considered connected with itself. We have the edge weight between
node i and j denoted as θij , and θij = θji . A weight matrix Θ = (θij )n×n is where each
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edge’s weight θij is kept. Originally, all entries in Θ equals to 1.0. Our goal is to quantify
the information carried in each edge, which is then reflected in weight matrix Θ. By setting
a threshold τ , weakly connected edges will be removed to extract communities.

Quantifying the Information Carried in the Network G To quantify the information
carried in the network G, we first quantify how much information is carried in a single node
and a single edge. Let us consider only one node i and one of its neighbors k. Given the
fact that, for every pair of nodes (e.g., node i and node k), we have both θik and θki in the
weight matrix Θ. For making notation confusion free, we denote one of the nodes i as i′
and replicate all its connections to k, as shown in Figure 5.1. The selfconnection Iii is
now denoted as a direct connection Iii′ = 1 between i and i′ . Also, an indirect connection
between i and i′ through neighbor k appears. Considering all the original neighbors of node
i, in Figure 5.1, the weighted sum of all the indirect connections between i and i′ is:
X

Iik θik θki′

(5.1)

k̸=i,k̸=i′

Figure 5.1 The variance of a node i, where i′ is a replication of i and k denotes the
neighbors of i.

For a node i, we define its variance, σi2 , as the sum of weighted connections that i
has, including direct and indirect connections, given weight matrix Θ. The intuition of this
definition is that the variance of a node i given its connections is a measure of how much
structural information is reserved in its local network. The greater variance a node i has,
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the larger amount of the local structural information it carries. Given that θik = θki′ , the
variance of a node i can be denoted as follows:

σi2 = σi2 (Θ) = 1 +

X

Iik θik θki′ = 1 +

k̸=i,k̸=i′

X

Iik (θik )2

(5.2)

k̸=i

Similarly, the covariance of an edge ij between a pair of nodes i and j is a measure of
how much information is shared among i and j. A pair of nodes with higher covariance is
more likely to be in the same cluster, since they share more information and cutting them will
cost more information loss. The covariance between nodes i and j can be simply defined as
a product of how much information each node carries and the weighted connection between
them:

Covij (Θ) = σi σj θij

(5.3)

By convention, the total information the network G = (V, E) carries can be measured
as the sum of the covariances of all the edges in E:

Inf o(G) =

X

Covij (Θ) =

ij∈E

X

σi σj θij

(5.4)

ij∈E

In (5.4), the total information in the network G is measured based on how nodes
directly share information via only weighted direct connections θij . However, nodes can
also indirectly share information to each other through their common neighbors. Therefore,
the total information or the covariance Covij (Θ) between node i and node j needs to be
decomposed into direct and indirect information sharing, correspondingly denoted as dij (Θ)
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and dcij (Θ). Given two different nodes i and j, the direct information sharing is difficult to
define at this moment, but the indirect information sharing dcij (Θ) can be defined as follows:

dcij (Θ)

=

n
X

Iik Ikj dik (Θ)dkj (Θ)

(5.5)

k=1

The direct information sharing dij (Θ) can be then defined:

dij (Θ) = Covij (Θ) − dcij (Θ)

(5.6)

From (5.6), we have an alternative expression of the covariance Covij (Θ) as:

σi σj θij = dij (Θ) +

n
X

Iik Ikj dik (Θ)dkj (Θ)

(5.7)

k=1

5.1.5

Recursive Structure Similarity Algorithm

In (5.7), dij (Θ) can be further defined as an arbitrary kernel function of the weight matrix
Θ. For clustering problems, we formulate dij (Θ) as: dij (Θ) = θij . Equation (5.7) now
becomes:

σi σj θij = θij +

n
X

Iik Ikj θik θkj

(5.8)

k=1

To generalize (5.8), we use a hyperparameter λ to control the degree of the direct
information contributes to the total information of the graph as follows:
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σi σj θij = λθij +

n
X

Iik Ikj θik θkj .

(5.9)

k=1

Now we are ready to define our Recursive Structure Similarity (RSS) algorithm (Alg.
5.1) to solve (5.9) and learn the weight matrix Θ. Since (5.9) depends on the weight
matrix Θ, while the weight matrix Θ is also the goal that we want to learn, we begin with
some initial estimation of the weights and compute them iteratively (reweighting) until
reaching convergence. Start from an initial estimation of the weight matrix, by applying
(m)

the coordinate descent algorithm, we have the explicit formula for θij at the mth iteration
based on the previous state of the weight matrix Θ(m−1) as follows:

(m−1)

(m)
θij

=

λθij

+

Pn

(m−1) (m−1)
θkj
k=1 Iik Ikj θik
(m−1) (m−1)
σi
σj

(5.10)

Equation (5.10) is also the definition of the new recursive structure similarity
measure.

Convergence Analysis

In our algorithm, we consider two extreme cases: (1) When λ
(m−1)

is extremely large, in the numerator of righthandside of (5.10), the first term λθij
P
(m−1) (m−1)
θkj . Therefore, we have Θ(m) = Θ(m−1) =
dominates the second term nk=1 Iik Ikj θik
... = Θ(0) . This means the weight matrix Θ(0) will stay unchanged and we could not learn
the weights; and (2) When λ = 0, we can simplify (5.9) as Σ(Θ)ΘΣ(Θ) = Θ2 , where
Σ(Θ) = diag{σ1 , · · · , σn }. By the property of idempotent matrix, we can show that Θ(m)
converges to an identity matrix. Through these two facts we can conclude that, when enough
iterations of (5.10) are preformed, any λ value that is between the two extreme stages will
bring Θ to a stable state where communities can be distinguished.
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Algorithm 5.1 Recursive Structure Similarity
1: procedure Parameter Initialization
2:
G ← Graph(n, l) // import the graph
3:
Θ ← {}
4:
for all i, j ∈ (Iij = 1) do
5:
θij ← 1.0 // default edge weight=1.0
6:
Θ ← Θ ∪ θij
7:
8:
9:

′

Θ ← Θ // create a copy of Θ
for all θij ∈ Θ do
θij ← init(θij , G)

10: procedure Parameter Estimation
11:
p ← 0 // loop index
12:
δ ← ϵ // ϵ being the threshold of δ value
13:
while p < max_iteration and δ >= ϵ do
14:
for all θij ∈ Θ do
′
15:
θij ← RSS(θij ) // RSS() being the Equation (5.10)
′
16:
θij ← θij
′

17:
δ ← d(Θ, Θ ) // d(Θm , Θm+1 ) being the Equation (5.12)
18:
p←p+1
19: procedure Community Detection
20:
C ← {} // Empty set of clusters
21:
for all θij ∈ Θ do
22:
if θij > τ then
23:
if Gi & Gj ∈
/ (any c ∈ C) then
24:
c ← {Gi , Gj } // create a new cluster
25:
C ←C ∪c
26:
else if Gi ∈ (c ∈ C) & Gj ∈
/ (c ∈ C) then
27:
c ← c ∪ Gj
28:
else if Gi ∈
/ (c ∈ C) & Gj ∈ (c ∈ C) then
29:
c ← c ∪ Gi
return C

226

Here we present how we use RSS to perform community

Community Detection with RSS

detection. The pseudo code is shown in Alg. 5.1. Our Recursive Structure Similarity
Clustering algorithm consists of three stages. The initialization stage reads the graph from
the file and initializes the weight matrix Θ. All the entries in the Θ would be initiated by
using the modified cosine similarity as:

p

2 + |Γi ∩ Γj |
(1 + |Γi |)(1 + |Γj |)

(5.11)

where |Γi | is the number of neighbors of node i.
In the second stage, RSS is applied iteratively to update the weight matrix Θ. In
each iteration, (5.10) is applied to each entry in the current Θ(m) to create Θ(m+1) . The
hyperparameter λ was set to 2 for our tests. This stage is terminated when a desired number
of iterations (max_iteration) is reached, or when the average difference between Θ(m) and
Θ(m+1) is smaller than a predefined threshold ϵ:

1 X (m)
(m−1)
<ϵ
θij − θij
l I =1

(5.12)

ij

The setting of max_iteration and ϵ depends on the graph, the required level of
convergence, and the desire of running time. The max_iteration was set to 5000, and
we used ϵ = 10−8 in our tests to ensure good convergence.
In the final stage, the input is the weight matrix Θ and the list of nodes, and the
output is a set of clusters. The clusters are separated from each other by removing edges
that have connection strengths below certain threshold τ . Threshold τ is a hyperparameter
that controls the sparsity of the result. A larger τ will let more edges to be removed thus
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creates more clusters. The choice of τ is domain dependent. An example of it is τ = 10−5 .
Given a Θ, this stage can be repeated to find the optimum τ for desired clustering results.
Here we analyze our algorithm’s time complexity. For a reasonably sparse graph
with n nodes and l edges, Edeg (G) being the expected average degree of each node, and
Eneighbors (i, j) being the expected number of common neighbors that any pair of nodes i and

j has, then the time complexity will be O 2lmEdeg (G)Eneighbors (i, j) . Also, in the second
stage, which is most timeconsuming stage, each mth step of this algorithm is based on the
static (m − 1)th state, and the order of entries to be updated does not affect the final result.
This property enables a distributed parallel implementation of our algorithm for handling
large dataset.

5.1.6

Experimental Settings

Datasets

Six datasets were used for our experiments. The small benchmark datasets we

used were: “Zachary’s karate club” (Karate), a social network; Polbooks, a copurchase
network; PPI5, a proteinprotein interaction network; and DBLP, a citation network. For
datasets with groundtruth, we used LCDIP and BioGRID proteinprotein interaction (PPI)
network datasets, both of which were used by [225] for evaluation purposes. The LCDIP
and BioGRID datasets were accompanied by the gold standards, MIPS and SGD [225].
Table 5.1 shows details of each dataset and groundtruth.

Baseline Approaches We chose four effective clustering algorithms as baseline approa
ches with which to compare with. These measures are: MCL [214], FastUnfolding [216],
Infomap [224], and a newly proposed version of Spectral clustering [221].

5.1.7

Accuracy and Quality Measures

We first focused on how accurately the clustering results could represent or align with
real, meaningful communities. We used the following five measures: Clusteringwise
Sensitivity (CW S) [226], Clusteringwise Positive Predictive Value (P P V ) [226],
228

Table 5.1 Datasets

Type

Name

# of nodes

# of edges

# of clusters

Karate

34

78



Benchmark

Polbooks

126

440



Network

PPI5

184

261



DBLP

1,230

3,410



PPI

LCDIP

4,980

22,076



Network

BioGRID

5,640

59,748



PPI

SGD





323

Gold Standard

MIPS
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Geometric Accuracy (ACC) [226], Fraction (F RAC) [226, 227], and Maximum Matching
Ratio (M M R) [225]. For all these measures, the higher the scores are, the better.
For measuring the quality of community detection results, we chose the following
seven measures suggested by [228]: Internal Density (InDens) [229], Edges Inside (Edges
In) [229], Average Degree (AvgDeg) [229], Cut Ratio (CutRatio) [230], Normalized Cut
(NCut) [231], AverageODF (AvgODF) [232], and Modularity (Mod.) [233]. These
measures in general can show us, for a given set of nodes, how communitylike its
connectivity structure is [228], disregarding if the clusters reflect realworld communities
or not. Note that all these measures are computed in a percluster manner, then an average
score of all clusters was used. For InDens, EdgesIn, AvgDeg, and Mod., a higher score
is better; for CutRatio, NCut, and AvgODF, a lower score is better.

Consistency and Robustness Measures

There are many possible definitions of structure

similarity [234], but our algorithm should work with any structure similarity definition as
the initial estimation of the recursive structure similarity. Thus, we tested whether using
different initial structure similarity estimations will affect the consistency and robustness
of our algorithm. The meaning of consistency for our algorithm is unusual since there is no
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randomness in the results. Instead, we want to know whether, using different initial structure
similarity measures will change the outcomes of our algorithm, as the iteration process goes.
Robustness refers to whether our algorithm will converge to the same equilibrium states
given different initial structure similarity estimations.
For testing the consistency and robustness, we chose six structure similarity measures
suggested by [234] as our algorithm’s initial weight for each edge. These initial measures
were modified to fit the definition of recursive structure similarity. We tested the two
following scenarios: (1) Robustness: whether our algorithm would converge to the same or
similar results, when different initial measures are used. (2) Consistency: when we change
the clustering threshold (τ value), whether different initial structure similarity measures
would cause the structure of clusters in the results to change. The aforementioned seven
clustering quality measures were used. In the following formulas (Equation (5.13)), We
show the definitions of the six different structure similarity measures of a node pair. In
these formulas, i and j are any two nodes, and Γi means the set of neighbors of i.

2 + |Γi ∩ Γj |
Def ault(Cosine) = p
(1 + |Γi |)(1 + |Γj |)
2 + |Γi ∩ Γj |
Jaccard =
2 + |Γi ∪ Γj |
2 + |Γi ∩ Γj |
min =
min((1 + |Γi |), (1 + |Γj |))
q
sqrt = 2 + |Γi ∩ Γj |
square = 2 + |Γi ∩ Γj |2
vertex =

2 + |Γi ∩ Γj |
(1 + |Γi |)(1 + |Γj |)

230

(5.13)

5.1.8

Accuracy results

In this test, to ensure fair comparison, we used each algorithm’s default parameter. For our
algorithm (denoted as RSS), we used parameter settings mentioned in algorithm subsection.
For MCL, we used I = 3.0 as the inflation value. For Infomap, we ran the program with
default M arkov − time option value 1.0. For FastUnfolding (denoted as FUF), we ran it
without q (Modularity increase threshold) parameter, which means highest accuracy [216].
Because Spectral was not suitable for graphs in this scale, we did not include Spectral in
accuracy test. Since there were two gold standards for both BioGRID and LCDIP datasets,
we evaluated each result with both gold standards.
From the shown results (Table 5.2) we can see that, in all dataset and groundtruth
combinations, our algorithm beats all others in the measures of ACC, FRAC, MMR, and
PPV. These results clearly show that in proteinprotein interaction network analysis, our
algorithm has a significant advantage over other methods in terms of the quality of the
clusters and the number of meaningful clusters. We can also see that our method does not
have the lead in CWS, but does not fall short by much. The reason for this could be that our
method tend to predict more clusters with sizes smaller than those in the gold standards.

5.1.9

Structural quality results

Because these seven quality measure scores are strongly correlated to the number of clusters
in a clustering result, we had to select appropriate parameters for each algorithm. Once each
method gave the exact same number of clusters for each dataset, a fair comparison could
be made. This constrain means that the clustering results might not be optimized (e.g., 4
clusters instead of 2 for Karate dataset, due to the fact that FastUnfolding can not produce
result with 2 clusters). During the test we found that if the dataset is large, it was very
unlikely to be able to align the number of clusters for all methods, and this was the reason
for us to use only small benchmark datasets for quality testing. To adjust the clustering
results, for our algorithm, we adjust τ value. For MCL it means to adjust the −I value.
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Table 5.2 GroundTruth Based Accuracy Results
Algorithm

ACC

CWS

FRAC

MMR

PPV

Dataset: BioGRID, gold standard: SGD
RSS

0.619

0.811

0.377

0.202

0.472

MCL

0.310

0.388

0.055

0.044

0.247

FUF

0.537 0.797

0.226

0.112

0.362

0.555

0.187

0.081

0.371

Infomap

0.831

Dataset: LCDIP, gold standard: MIPS
RSS

0.400 0.414

0.350

0.152

0.386

MCL

0.269

0.199

0.238

0.110

0.363

FUF

0.383

0.460

0.270

0.117

0.319

Infomap

0.387

0.470

0.217

0.085

0.319

Dataset: LCDIP, gold standard: SGD
RSS

0.587 0.644

0.358

0.184

0.534

MCL

0.409

0.335

0.271

0.153

0.500

FUF

0.518

0.621

0.294

0.148

0.432

Infomap

0.526

0.650

0.197

0.089

0.426

Dataset: BioGRID, gold standard: MIPS
RSS

0.460 0.572

0.318

0.139

0.370

MCL

0.274

0.352

0.032

0.016

0.214

FUF

0.434

0.630

0.191

0.089

0.300

Infomap

0.456

0.650

0.169

0.068

0.320
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For Infomap we adjust the M arkovtime option. For FastUnfolding algorithm, we adjust
parameter q. For Spectral clustering we just give the k (number of clusters) value. Due to
the page limitation, here we show some of the results for each dataset in Table 5.3.
In Table 5.3, for measures of EdgesIn, CutRatio, AvgODF, and Mod., our results
are mostly dominant in all datasets. On the other hand, for InDens, AvgDeg, and NCut,
although our method does not outperform others, there is no other method is dominant in all
datasets. These results show that our algorithm can consistently provide clustering results
that are good in each aspect of structural quality. But it is also interesting to see that, for
the measures from the same aspect, e.g., InDens, EdgesIn, and AvgDeg, our method only
excels in EdgesIn. One possible reason to explain this is that our method can find most
densely connected clusters, but tend to assign nodes on the edges of the clusters to larger
clusters thus lowering some of the normalized measures.

Figure 5.2 Upper: Consistency test result on Karate. Lower: Robustness test result on
Karate
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Table 5.3 Quality Test Results
Algorithm InDens EdgesIn AvgDeg CutRatio NCut AvgODF Mod.
Dataset: PPI5, Number of Clusters: 40
RSS

13.54

187

45.53

39.49

23.68

5.15

0.63

MCL

26.41

152

58.09

58.61

18.44

12.76

0.55

Spectral

25.58

152

55.72

49.96

18.53

11.52

0.52

FUF

26.88

160

60.17

57.05

17.92

12.09

0.58

Infomap

20.72

161

55.16

80.01

19.30

9.22

0.58

Dataset: Karate, Number of Clusters: 4
RSS

1.58

63

10

4.08

1.75

0.63

0.37

MCL

1.45

49

8.66

8.31

2.00

1.84

0.19

Spectral

1.80

57

12.42

4.91

1.15

0.92

0.42

FUF

1.80

57

12.42

4.91

1.15

0.92

0.42

Infomap

1.95

59

12.25

4.72

1.15

0.99

0.42

Dataset: Polbooks, Number of Clusters: 18
RSS

9.16

314

42.46

56.42

12.12

5.67

0.46

MCL

11.91

148

41.11

111.42 12.59

11.90

0.25

Spectral

12.81

187

55.90

79.34

10.55

9.74

0.34

FUF

9.15

261

44.88

86.28

11.92

6.29

0.42

Infomap

13.38

250

52.73

90.82

11.01

9.01

0.42

60.47

0.74

Dataset: DBLP, Number of Clusters: 252
RSS

185.34

2,567

715.18

347.53 101.05

MCL

188.99

1,970

650.97

618.97 117.12 101.55 0.57

spectral 212.61

2,347

740.41

362.55 86.95

76.08

0.67

210.53

2,491

762.60

373.53 88.38

75.15

0.72

Infomap 158.88

2,339

676.07

905.84 107.46

52.25

0.68

FUF
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5.1.10

Consistency and robustness results

We evaluated the consistency of our algorithm by plotting the number of iterations that
the algorithm runs against clustering quality measures. In each subfigure of upper part of
Figure 5.2, X axis is the number of iterations our algorithm runs, and Y axis is the value
of quality measures. Different line colors and shapes stands for different initial structure
similarity measures.
As we can see in the upper part of Figure 5.2, although there are some variations
at the beginning and early stage, all results align perfectly with other results at the end,
which indicates that our algorithm is consistent against different initial structure similarity
measures.
We evaluated the robustness by plotting the number of clusters against each structural
quality measure. In each subfigure of lower part of Figure 5.2, the X axis is the number
of clusters detected by our algorithm, and the Y axis is the value of quality measures.
Different line color stands for different initial structure similarity definitions. As we can
see in lower part of Figure 5.2, except when the number of clusters is small, different initial
structure similarity measures have very little impact on the structure quality of detected
clusters, which means that as long as the initial structure similarity measure follows general
definition of recursive structure similarity, our algorithm will give robust clustering results.

5.1.11 Conclusions
In this work, we proposed a novel clustering algorithm for detecting community structures
in undirected graphs. We newly defined a recursive structure similarity based on Shannon’s
information theory, which can quantify the carried information of edges using variance and
covariance. And the clustering process is done by conducting a recursive procedure that
effectively shows the graph’s networking process. We put our algorithm into a competition
for clustering quality and accuracy with widely used clustering algorithms. The results
show that our algorithm can consistently outperform other methods in the majority of
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quality and accuracy measures. Other test results confirm that our algorithm is also robust
against different variants of initial structure similarity measures. Another advantage that
our algorithm has is that there is no random factor to affect the outcome.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this chapter, we conclude this dissertation in each direction it covers and show the future
research directions.

6.1

Drug Abuse Detection and Analysis in Online Social Media

In this line of work, we explore the usefulness of online social media in the detecting
and tracking of the drug abuse epidemic. In the first part, we explore the utilization of
crowdsourcing platform for acquiring labeled dataset, where drug abuse related tweets are
identified from regular tweets filtered with drug abuse terms. Then, we design an ensembled
deep learning model and employ selflearning technique to train the model on the naturally
biased dataset and achieve superior performance over traditional machine learning models.
Based on this model, in the second part, we run our model on a dataset of three million
tweets. We perform various statistical, temporal, and spacial analysis on the identified drug
abuse related tweets. The interesting patterns identified from the results provide insights
of the usefulness of online social media in reflecting the trend of drug abuse epidemic.
Having the detection results, in the third part, we develop a communityfocused drug abuse
monitoring and supporting system that provides a function rich visualization interface that
can help local communities an organizations being informed about drug trends, locating
drug abuse hotspots, and reaching online users who may in need for help.
During the course of the aforementioned projects, we also identified many directions
for future work. Here we list the most important ones: (1) To establish a long term, large
scale drug abuse trend monitoring system that uses Lifelong Learning (L2M) models to
track the ever changing and emerging trend of drug abuse; (2) To expend the source of data
from Twitter to other popular social media platforms, e.g. Reddit, Instagram, or even short
videobased Tiktok, and to extend the model from using only text data to images and sounds;
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(3) To build a realtime drug abuse monitoring system that is capable of continuously
processing and integrating data from multiple sources, training and evaluating detection
models, and performing comprehensive visualization; (4) To explore the popularity and
impact of the songs with drug abuse mentions in their lyrics over the social media users.

6.2

Differential Privacy in Deep Learning with Certified Robustness Bounds

In this line of work, we propose novel privacy protection mechanisms with theoretical
foundations that enhance the privacy protection while keeping the models’ utilities. In the
first part, we proposed Adaptive Laplace Mechanism (AdLM), a DP preserving mechanism
for deep learning that makes the consumption of privacy budget independent to the number
of training epochs. It also improves the model utility over previous privacy mechanism
by injecting noise into different parts of the features. In the second part, we established a
connection among DP preservation to protect the training data, adversarial learning, and
certified robustness. We developed a stochastic batch training mechanism to bypass the
vanilla iterative batchbybatch training, enabling large scale distributed DP training. We
also proposed a new Monte Carlo Estimation scheme to stabilized the estimation of the
robustness bounds of prediction results. In the third part, that L2M introduces unknown
privacy risk and challenges in preserving DP. We proposed a new definition of Lifelong DP
that protects any tuple in any training set with a consistently bounded DP loss. We also
proposed the first scalable and heterogeneous mechanism, L2DPML to preserve Lifelong
DP.
The future work of the differential privacy track falls in the following categories:
(1) Test and refine the proposed mechanisms with realworld platforms, datasets, and newer
attacks; (2) Explore newer and better mechanisms to achieve better model utility with lower
computational cost, under regular DP and Lifelong DP.
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6.3

Federated Learning on Mobile Devices

In this line of work, we present our experience with designing, building, and evaluating
FLSys, an endtoend federated learning system. FLSys was designed based on requirements
derived from reallife applications that locally collects data from mobile users in the wild
and trains FL models, such as human activity recognition (HAR). The main design goal
of the FLSys is to preserve the resources on the mobile phones, by providing a “central
hub” that manages the training and evaluation of FL models for different applications. This
also provides a unified user experience by having all the FL related settings at one place,
reducing the chance of having conflicted settings for different applications. FLSys is also
robust to failures and disconnections, and allows clients to join training at any time. We built
a complete prototype of FLSys in Android and AWS, and used this prototype to demonstrate
that FLSys is effective and efficient in practice in terms of model performance, resource
usage, and latency.
In the future, we plan to further develop the FLSys in the following directions: (1) To
add features to allow continuous data collection and on device processing, which aligns with
realworld needs; (2) To implement privacy and security features and intergral components
of the FLSys; (3) To improve FLSys from a DevOps point of view, including continues
model evaluation, OTA reconfiguration and plugnplay modules.
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